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This thesis is broadly about the structure of propositional knowledge and the 
ways in which an individual knower can have such knowledge. More 
specifically, it is about the epistemology of factive psychological attitudes 
and the view that knowing is a purely mental state. I take such a view as 
being not so much a theory of knowledge, but rather an accounting of how 
we know, or the ways in which we know. In arguing for this view I offer a 
different interpretation of certain epistemic conditions, like seeing and 
remembering and try to show how understanding the metaphysics of mental 
states and events clarifies the relation between such conditions and the 
factive psychological attitudes implicit in them. Part one of the thesis is 
occupied with a discussion about a form of externalism popular in 
contemporary philosophy of mind, content externalism and a form of 
externalism popularized by Timothy Williamson which I refer to in the thesis 
as attitude externalism. I argue that content externalism in the style of Tyler 
Burge, arguably one of its most prominent advocates, faces a rather serious 
dilemma when it comes to the role that mental states and specific mental 
events are meant to play in psychological explanation. The view endorsed by 
Timothy Williamson, which says that some psychological attitudes, factive 
attitudes like ‘seeing that’, can be thought of as broad prime conditions is 
offered as a way in which the content externalist can avoid this dilemma and 
retain a causal-psychological explanatory thesis about mental states and 
events. The second part of the thesis is concerned with the epistemology of 
factive psychological attitudes and I focus carefully on two paradigmatic 
cases – seeing and remembering. I dedicate a chapter to each and offer a 
series of arguments to the effect that seeing and remembering though they 
may be thought of as ways of having propositional knowledge, it is not 
	
necessary that they entail knowing nor that they be stative to do so. In this 
sense, there is a strong and important divergence in the dialectic of the thesis 
from the view offered by Timothy Williamson, on which many points in this 
thesis there is agreement. I conclude the thesis with a discussion on what I 
take to be a fundamental epistemological principle, which I call the 
multiformity principle. The argument there is that when a subject knows that 
p, there is always a specific way in which that subject knows. I further take 
this principle to reveal the fact that propositional knowledge is an 






This achievement is not really my own. At least, it isn’t completely my own. 
No one ever does anything completely on their own, no matter how much is 
required of the individual to get the job done. I think this is especially true 
for a PhD thesis. In a sense, this is what makes the acknowledgments of a 
work like this so important. It is an opportunity to recognize that whatever 
this thesis amounts to in the broader scheme of things, it is as much a 
contribution of my entire network of friends and family as it is of my own. 
For whatever reason, it always seems easiest to thank those people who 
obviously play a very important role in your life. These are the people that 
you depend on day-in and day-out for support and encouragement in most 
areas of your life. I am fortunate to have people—lots of people—in my life 
that fit this description. It is much harder to acknowledge those people who 
may have played some small role in influencing my thinking or inspiring me 
in some subtle way such that the completion of this work would never have 
occurred had they not been there. And those people are out there. Perhaps 
some of them even know who they are, and how they may have played the 
role they played. So, I’ll start with those people. I am grateful to all of you. I 
am grateful for my time in Edinburgh, and meeting the many new friends 
and colleagues that I now have. The city of Edinburgh and the climate there 
is truly inspiring and highly conducive to philosophical study. The many 
research seminars, talks and conferences that transpired over the last several 
years provided me with constant interaction with some of the most brilliant 
individuals I have ever met. The conversations that these interactions 
fostered were some of the most stimulating intellectual conversations I have 
ever had. I am grateful for my time in such a rich stimulating environment 
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and having been part of the great tradition which is philosophy at 
Edinburgh. In particular, I’m quite happy that I had the chance to present 
some of my early research into the topic of this thesis at Edinburgh and get 
very helpful criticism and feedback from my peers. Lani, Lee, Allan, Robin, 
Chris, Natalie and a whole cadre of other brilliant young philosophers at 
Edinburgh played such an integral role in my studies there that it is nearly 
impossible to qualify their contributions. But I am truly grateful for our 
many stimulating discussions, and regular deviations from our academic 
responsibilities (even though philosophy still continues on at the pub). My 
supervisors at Edinburgh, Jesper Kallestrup and Allen Hazlett were 
tremendously helpful and provided me with the necessary guidance to get 
the project done. To all my other friends that I made while living in Scotland, 
Kelly and Kyle in particular, I thank you for your inspiration, support and 
companionship. You made living abroad so easy and enjoyable that Scotland 
quickly became home. 
Amongst all those who’ve provided me with guidance and support along 
the way, there are some who stand out. My wife, Nichole, stands out the 
most. Her unwavering support and encouragement throughout our 
seventeen years together has really been bedrock for me. She truly does see 
who I am and what motivates me and her eagerness to see my goals 
achieved is really only matched by my own. There is no better foundation for 
support than an individual like this in one’s life. She is truly my partner. My 
parents, Larry and Susan (two individuals without whom I would not exist) 
must also be acknowledged for their constant encouragement and support. 
Everything I’ve ever wanted to do in life has in some way been as important 
to them as it has been to me, and I simply would not be here (not in the 
philosophical sense) without their support. 
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I would be remiss if I didn’t acknowledge the inspiration and stimulation I 
received from my fellow students during my master’s program at San Jose 
State University. The students there really supercharged my aspiration to 
become an academic and take seriously the possibility of continuing on to a 
PhD program. The professors there, Anand Vaidya, Rick Tieszen, Peter 
Hadreas and Carlos Sanchez reawakened something in me that lay dormant 
after completing my undergraduate studies in philosophy. If it were not for 
that program, I might not have ever pursued this degree and vocation. 
Finally, to my daughter, Madison. Your very existence has made me often 
reflect on the notion of inspiration, and I’ve come to realize that only the 
inspired can truly inspire others. You have only ever really known me while 
I was in school. I guess, in a sense, I have strived to accomplish this personal 
goal of mine for you. Though it was a goal of mine, to earn my PhD in 
philosophy, everything really changed once you arrived on the scene. What 
is important to me personally, is of secondary importance as what is most 
important is how what I do in my life will encourage and inspire you to set 
goals for yourself and strive as hard as you can to achieve them. You are a 
powerfully motivating element of my life and I know that my pursuit of this 
degree would have been very different, possibly non-existent had I never 





As the title suggests, the work that follows is both an exercise in the 
philosophy of mind and in epistemology. For, a developing trend in 
contemporary epistemology, which this work is meant to continue, is to 
incorporate notions traditionally associated with the philosophy of mind into 
our epistemological theorizing. This trend recognizes that some of our most 
fundamental epistemological concepts are best understood and explored 
only with recourse to a very specific picture of the mental. On the picture 
developed here epistemology is so intimately related to the philosophy of 
mind that to give an account of propositional knowledge is to endorse a 
specific view on the nature of mental states. In and of itself this is nothing too 
novel. Timothy Williamson has argued for such linkages between the 
philosophy of mind and epistemology, and if one searches hard enough one 
can find precursors for Williamson’s work in the writings of the Oxford 
school of the first part of the last century. Philosophers like Cook Wilson, 
H.A. Prichard and even Gilbert Ryle all at one point or another espoused 
views on knowledge and mind similar in theme to what we find in 
Williamson’s treatment on knowledge. However, it is Williamson’s position 
on the nature of knowing, that has reshaped my thinking altogether on how 
epistemology as a philosophical discipline is to be conducted. As such, this 
thesis can be viewed as a kind of variation on Williamson’s work. For, it is 
essentially Williamson’s version of psychological externalism that is argued 
for in part I; and the epistemology in part II can be considered a kind of 
adaptation of Williamson’s view in the light of Quassim Cassam’s 
explanatory theory of knowing. Cassam’s important work on knowledge 
and ways of knowing has informed my thinking on the disjunctive nature of 
propositional knowledge as much as anyone, and it is his explanatory 
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approach to ways of knowing along with Williamson’s factive attitude 
account that has helped shaped the arguments of the last chapter on the 
disjunctive nature of propositional knowledge. 
Finally, it must be said that much of the metaphysical discussion in the first 
part of the thesis is based on the work of Helen Steward. Her insights in 
“The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes and States” not only served as an 
inspiration but in a very real sense laid the groundwork for the structure of 
the thesis. It is her conception of temporal shape and her treatment on the topic 
of mental states in the philosophy of mind that made possible the view 
advocated for in this thesis. Her work has also, I think, served to provide 
metaphysical support for important points in Timothy Williamson’s 






If I say that belief is a kind of state of mind, most would not find this to be a 
controversial claim. Of course belief is a kind of state of mind. I might say 
that desire, hope, fear, anger, frustration, as well as happiness and sadness 
are kinds of states of mind. Again, nothing said here appears controversial. 
In fact, statements like these may seem quaint and uninformative. We have a 
kind of everyday notional understanding of what is meant by ‘state of mind’, 
and these are very standard examples of such states. What about 
knowledge? Is the claim ‘knowing is a state of mind’ just as uncontroversial 
as the claim ‘belief is a state of mind’? Prima facie it doesn’t seem like it 
should be any more or less problematic than any of the other claims. 
However, this claim, which has been endorsed by some philosophers, most 
recently by Timothy Williamson has been met with incredible resistance. 
There seems to be something very controversial about saying that knowing 
is a state of mind. But what is it that is so controversial? The project this 
thesis is the result of is an attempt to understand just why this claim is 
considered so controversial and what exactly it means to say that knowing is 
a state of mind. For it is not obvious just what could be so problematic with 
such a claim, and the amount and degree of resistance Williamson’s claim 
has met with really merits some investigation. While Williamson’s overall 
epistemology has been debated from many perspectives, it is his particular 
form of psychological externalism and the debates that it engenders that will 
be the focus of the first part of this thesis. The claim that knowing is a state of 
mind is supported by a new, radically different form of externalism, which is 
a quite substantial deviation from other more traditional forms of 
externalism in the philosophy of mind. 
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Consider a contemporary view about mental content, which says that the 
content of one’s thought, that is, what it is that one is thinking about, is an 
abstract entity and is at least partly fixed by factors external to the thinker. 
Views of this type go by many names, but in general they are referred to as 
externalist views about mental content. The basic idea with this form of 
externalism is something like the following. If a subject S believes, say, that 
water is a translucent substance, the content of that belief that ‘water is a 
translucent substance’ is not wholly determined by what is going in the 
subject’s head. In order for such a belief to be about ‘water’ the subject’s 
historical relations to the environment must be considered. The famous 
Twin-Earth examples of Putnam and Burge have made the case for this view 
rather well, and as such the view has been adopted by many theorists. 
Mental content is, in many cases, dependent upon one’s relation to the 
environment as the individualistic properties of the subject are not always 
sufficient for determining such content. So, in some sense at least, some fact 
or truth about the world can be part of one’s mental state, if we think of the 
content of one’s thought as at least partly constituting the mental state one is 
in. However, the content, on this type of view, is still just an abstract entity, 
something in the public domain available to anyone who entertains such 
content. And that one believes that water is a translucent substance, though 
the content ‘water is a translucent substance’ may be partly fixed by factors 
external to the subject, does not depend upon the way things are in the 
world. That is to say, the mental attitude of believing is just a mental attitude, 
which for most, is the result of the individualistic properties of the subject. 
Regardless of what the content is, call it p, believing that p, insofar as it is a 
believing is just a mental attitude or mental state of the individual and not 
something that requires the world to be any particular way. The same goes 
for desiring that p or hoping that p. When one believes that p is true, nothing in 
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the world need be any specific way in order for one to believe that p. We can 
have false beliefs. One may believe all kinds of falsehoods and nothing in the 
world need correspond to these beliefs in order for one to have them. Thus, 
one can believe that p independently of how things are in the world. Fear, 
anger, happiness, sadness, frustration, all of these are different states of mind 
and anyone can be in any one of them independently of how the world is. 
The world does not need to cooperate in any specific way for anyone to be in 
any of these states. In a sense, we regard a state of mind as a state of the 
person who is in that state, not a state of the world, or some weird hybrid 
world-person state. All of these types of mental states seem to not require 
that the world be a certain way in order for one to be in them. The world 
may have to be a certain way for one’s mental state to have the particular 
content it has, but one is free to believe or hope or desire whatever it is they 
believe, hope or desire. Thus we may adhere to a type of externalism about 
mental content, but still think that one’s attitude toward that content is only 
the result of how things are with the individual subject, not with the way the 
world is. 
Knowledge, on the other hand is different. Knowledge is factive. One can 
only know that p, if p is true. Thus, one cannot know that p independently of 
how things are in the world; p must be the case for one to know that it is. 
This seems to imply that if knowing is a state of mind, then one’s state of 
mind, when one knows, somehow involves the world in a unique kind of 
way, different from the way in which the content of one’s mental state 
involves the world. That is, the attitude one takes to some proposition p, is 
not just a result of how things are with the individual subject, but necessarily 
depends on how things are in the world. Thus the claim that knowing is a 
state of mind, is really the claim that knowing is a kind of mental attitude, 
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just like belief or desire or hope is. Only, the difference here is that if 
knowing is its own kind of mental attitude, like belief, desire and hope, then 
there is a mental attitude that necessarily involves the fact or the truth that 
what is known is the case. But how could there be such an attitude? Is the 
claim here that when one knows that p, the fact that p is the case must in 
some sense be mental? If this is the right way to think about it, then the 
thesis is quite counterintuitive. For, that thing out there, that truth or fact 
about the world, certainly doesn’t seem to be mental anymore than the books 
on my shelf do. So, how exactly are we supposed to make sense of a view 
about knowing where we are told that knowing is merely a state of mind? 
What must we take into account to get clear on just how this is supposed to 
work? How do we understand knowing as a kind of mental attitude? In 
answering these questions, we ultimately develop a new form of 
psychological externalism, which I refer to as attitude externalism. This form 
of externalism has been given articulation by Timothy Williamson, but has 
not been explored much further by other theorists.  
The thesis is divided into two parts of three chapters each. Part one is an 
attempt to give a more detailed explanation of attitude externalism and what 
exactly it is about the view that allows one to claim that knowing is a state 
mind. This part of the thesis explores the metaphysical underpinnings of this 
form of externalism and proposes a kind of reconceptualization of mental 
states in general, one which ironically was quite popular in the early part of 
the last century with the ordinary language school of philosophy. The first 
three chapters are dedicated to establishing this view and in doing so I cover 
some metaphysical topics, which might not normally be seen in a thesis 
about knowing. The purpose of chapter one’s discussion on the ontological 
distinction between mental states and mental events is to provide a 
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background to the subsequent discussion on attitude externalism. One of the 
main themes of the chapter is that the distinction between occurrent mental 
particulars (mental events) and non-occurrent mental universals (mental 
states) helps us form a clearer picture of the mental and what it means to talk 
of content bearing mental states, such as those expressed by the 
propositional attitude verbs like ‘believe’ and ‘know’. Chapter two assumes 
an externalism about mental content for both mental states and mental 
events, and is focused on making the case for attitude externalism in light of 
the criticisms the traditional content externalists have made of it. I argue that 
the content externalist makes different metaphysical presuppositions from 
the attitude externalist, and that once the metaphysical picture is made clear 
for the attitude externalist view the debate between the two dissolves. The 
attitude externalist is just not working within the same ontological 
framework as the traditional content externalist. In a sense, the two are 
talking past one another. In chapter three I present a problem for the 
traditional form of content externalism, which has in one form or another 
been around since the beginning, but has not been successfully dealt with, 
and as a result has been overshadowed by other concerns with the view. This 
problem has been recently brought out again by Joseph Owens in the form of 
a dilemma. I will argue that the problem space articulated by Owen’s 
dilemma can be best navigated by acknowledging the differences between 
mental states and mental events and how they bear content. It is further 
argued that the role that mental states are meant to play in the explanation of 
human behaviour is misunderstood by most theorists, and a proper 
understanding of their explanatory power can only come when mental states 
and mental events are understood properly—as distinct ontological types. 
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Part II of the thesis is about the epistemology of factive psychological 
attitudes. Building on the work in part I, I endorse the attitude externalist 
picture and examine some paradigmatic factive psychological attitudes from 
an epistemological perspective. Chapters four and five are concerned with 
two specific psychological attitudes ‘remembering’ and ‘seeing’, respectively. 
I have dedicated a chapter to each of these attitudes as their relation to the 
general state of knowing is particularly revealing of what I take to be an 
important and fundamental characteristic of propositional knowledge. In 
doing the epistemology of these attitudes it becomes quite clear that 
knowing is a disjunctive kind. The term ‘disjunctivism’ has been associated 
with philosophical theories of perception and recently with theories in 
epistemology itself. Though the concept of a disjunctive kind employed in this 
thesis is similar to that employed in the perceptual and epistemological 
disjunctivist theories, it isn’t quite correct to classify the theory discussed 
here as disjunctivism, unless it is permitted that one could regard it as 
another kind of epistemological disjunctivism, in which case, it could in a 
very loose way accept such a label. The disjunctive claim made for 
knowledge is that knowing is always and only had in some specific way by 
the knower. That is to say, there is always a way in which a knower has 
knowledge. The concluding chapter covers this notion of ‘ways of knowing’ 
and argues for what I take to be a fundamental epistemological principle I 
call the multiformity principle, and simply stated the principle says that when 
a subject S knows that p, there must be some specific way in which S knows 
that p. I suggest a compromise view between that of Williamson’s and 
Cassam’s views on ‘ways of  knowing’ and propose that the multiformity 
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Chapter 1 Mental States and Mental Events 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a background metaphysical picture 
against which the rest of the thesis can be viewed. At the core of the chapter 
is this distinction between occurrent and non-occurrent mental phenomena. 
In introducing this chapter it needs to be made clear that there are some 
ontological distinctions that are in play in the discussion, which I will briefly 
cover here, though the intent here is not to give strong arguments for taking 
such ontological distinctions as being well established by the arguments 
given herein. On the contrary, I am somewhat relying on the notion that it is 
pretty safe to assume that such distinctions are legitimate distinctions and 
that most would not seriously object to me making them. That being said, let 
me proceed to set the background for this chapter with a discussion about 
what I simply refer to as the occurrence/non-occurrence distinction. 
We might start this discussion by noting that in ordinary language we often 
differentiate between things that happen or occur in some sense and things 
that do not. If someone were to say, “I hate the sheriff” a response to such a 
statement like, “that didn’t happen” would not only strike us as completely 
illogical but would indicate some kind of conceptual failure on the part of 
the responder. Hating the sheriff just isn’t something that happens or occurs. 
However, if someone were to say, “I shot the sheriff”, then such a response is 
perfectly sensible. The rule here seems to be: It is appropriate to say of some 
things that they either happened or did not happen, whereas for some other 
things it is never appropriate to say either. There seems to be a certain 
quality or feature of certain types of entities that we quite naturally 
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recognize, which I take as indicating a kind of pre-theoretical ontological 
distinction, and make use of in ordinary language. And my suggestion is 
going to be that this is a temporal quality that some types of entities seem to 
have and some not. In fact, our vocabulary is replete with temporally 
demarcating terminology, and we know how to use such terminology in 
everyday contexts, and can recognize when such terminology is used 
incorrectly. If John were to say of Bob that he shot the sheriff, we might ask 
when and where such an event occurred because being shot is the type of 
thing that happens. It happens quite quickly of course, so it doesn’t take 
much time to occur, but ‘the shooting of the sheriff’ certainly is something 
that happens at a particular time and in a particular place. Contrast this with 
the ‘hating of the sheriff’. Bob’s hate for the sheriff doesn’t happen at any 
particular time or place. If John were to say of Bob that he hates the sheriff, 
we might inquire as to the reasons for Bob’s hatred of the sheriff, but the 
question as to when and where it happened is practically incoherent. Some 
things just don’t happen. Physical objects, states of objects or systems of 
objects, dispositions and some conditions are among the types of things we 
might classify as those things for which it is inappropriate to ask when and 
where they happened or occurred. On the other hand, changes in objects or 
systems of objects, events and processes, to name a few, are the types of 
things of which it seems quite appropriate to think of as occurring or 
happening in some sense. Whatever it is that gets classified on either side of 
this distinction, whatever kind of taxonomy suggests itself here is not really 
the point. The lists are neither meant to be exhaustive or precisely accurate. 
All that I want to do here is to point out the distinction itself, the distinction 
between those things that occur or happen in some sense and those things 
that do not.  
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This distinction I take as being primarily a kind of temporal distinction, in 
the sense that at a bare minimum, those things that happen or occur and 
those things that do not, fundamentally differ in the way in which they relate 
to time. Events and processes, for example, can be said to occur at a specific 
time, take a certain amount of time or go on for a period of time. None of 
these can be said of physical objects. Chairs, rocks and cigarette lighters 
don’t take time to occur, or go on for any period of time. Physical objects 
don’t happen at a particular time or over particular intervals of time, they 
persist through time. In a similar fashion, we might say that states, like 
physical objects, do not seem to be things that occur or happen in any sense. 
My current state of mind, my current state of health, a certain volume of 
water being in a frozen state or my room’s being in a state of disorder are not 
things that happened or occurred. They may go on for a period of time but 
only in the sense that they obtain for that period, not in the sense in which 
anything is happening during that period that is the state’s “going on.” We 
might say that they persist over a specific interval of time, but the sense of 
‘persist’ is the sense in which objects persist not the sense in which, say a 
persistent process is occurring. These states just don’t seem to be happening 
in a kind of way, but have a more static nature to them. We might be 
tempted to say that my current state of health occurred at a certain point, if 
that state is a particularly unique state or that the physical state of some 
volume of water changed from being liquid to solid. But really what we’re 
doing here it seems is pointing out a specific time at which such states can be 
said to obtain, not that the states themselves are occurring or happening. 
There may be many things that do happen or occur that cause a particular 
state to come to be, but this is not to say that the states themselves are the 
types of things that happen or occur. Compare the current mood I’m in with 
‘my mood’s changing’. What are we referring to in each case if not two 
Chapter	1	
	 16	
subtly, but importantly different types of things? My mood can change, and 
often does, but the mood I’m in and ‘its changing’ seem to be two quite 
different things. As Davidson once put it, “Things change; but are there such 
things as changes?” (Davidson, 1970, p. 25). Whether or not we want to 
countenance the “changes” themselves amongst the rest of the things we 
think make up our world, we certainly recognize that when something 
changes, whether it is an object or the state of some object or system of 
objects, something occurs or happens, and it isn’t the object itself nor the 
state of the object that occurred or happened. The obvious candidate for 
what type of thing it is that happens or occurs in cases like this is an event or 
process. The proposal here is that we use the generic term ‘event’ or ‘process’ 
to refer to those types of entities that happen or occur, and contrast these 
with the generic term ‘state’ which refers to only those types of entities that 
are static in the sense that they do not happen or occur in any way. 
Now, any discussion of events brings to mind several prominent 
philosophers and their massively influential views on the topic. Davidson, 
Kim and Chisholm just to name a few are certainly essential reading for any 
philosopher interested in the topic of events. To canvass the field of 
philosophical contributions to this discourse would far exceed the scope of 
this thesis, and in the interest of keeping exegesis under control and limiting 
it only to those sections where it is necessary, I will not go into a detailed 
exploration of the metaphysics of events. It will be necessary to say a few 
words about some of these views, from a high level, to continue to develop 
the background against which the view outlined in this thesis is to be 
considered. In section one I will say a few words on Davidson’s and Kim’s 
view of events, as their views are quite prominent in the literature and share 
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very important similarities for the purposes of our discussion.1 Much of this 
chapter is exegetical as it is in essence just a rehearsal of Steward’s 
arguments from her “The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes and States.” 
Though I do provide some original arguments, the chapter does not expound 
a particular theory of the mental, nor give a detailed analysis of mental 
events and mental states, but only a kind of overview of Steward’s work. It is 
her conception of mental states and mental events, as mentioned in the 
introduction, that is at work here and it will be necessary to sketch out the 
main points that are relevant to subsequent discussions. There are three main 
points that we are adopting from her work in this chapter: 1) that mental 
events meet a certain particularity requirement, 2) that mental states do not 
meet this requirement and thus lack this type of particularity, 3) that mental 
states are best thought of as fact-like entities. What these three points do for 
us will become apparent throughout the following chapters, but we can say 
at the outset that since mental events, in many cases, can be regarded as 
mental particulars, they are suitable for playing a certain kind of causal 
explanatory role in psychological explanation, whereas since mental states 
lack this kind of particularity, they are not capable of playing the causal 
explanatory role that particular mental events can play. Furthermore, the 
conception of mental states offered us from Steward, that mental states are 
much more akin to facts or states-of-affairs is absolutely critical in 
developing attitude externalism. It is this conception of mental states that is 
implied in the formulation of attitude externalism, and as I will show in 
chapter two recognizing this fact should dissolve any issues between the 
traditional content externalist and the attitude externalist. For, they are 





Section one deals with the distinction between occurrent mental properties 
and non-occurrent mental properties. The intent is to show that clarity on 
some important differences between these mental entities should inform our 
position on two very important debates. Those debates are about the role 
mental states are supposed to play in explaining human action or behaviour, 
and the nature of mental content. In this section I will discuss Stewards 
temporal strategy. What I want to point out here is that the distinction 
between occurrents and non-occurrents translates into the realm of the 
mental. That is to say, there are mental occurrents and mental non-
occurrents, and we already have philosophical, if not ordinary language 
vocabulary for picking out these distinct types of entities. Section two is 
concerned with mental events and particularity and in this section I will 
stipulate a definition for the metaphysical notion of particularity. There is a 
stronger notion of particularity at work in Steward’s treatment on the 
subject, but for our purposes we will adopt a conception of particularity, 
which is essentially contrastive with the concept of universality. In the last 
section I will suggest that the right way to think of mental states is strictly as 
universals. The types of mental states I have specifically in mind are those 
that are usually picked out by propositional attitude verbs such as ‘believe’ 
and ‘know’. Thus, the mental states under discussion are those that have 
some propositional content. It will be argued that such mental states only 
admit of a kind of universality and that the notion of a token mental state is 
problematic. I will also very briefly offer a particular way of conceptualizing 
the notion of a mental state that is suggested by Steward’s work and found 





1.1 Steward on the Temporal Strategy 
I think it is fair to say that philosophers have typically thought of events in 
terms of changes. We recognize that changes take place, that substances 
undergo changes, that objects change their position, that time passes, and so 
on. Referring to such changes as particular events is nothing too 
philosophically controversial, and in some ways coincides with our ordinary 
language use of the terms ‘change’ and ‘event’. In “The Logical Form of 
Action Sentences” Davidson attempted to give us a way of understanding 
the logic and semantics of action sentences. He was interested in 
understanding how quite common and simple sentences such as ‘Jones 
buttered the toast slowly’, sentences we very easily grasp the meaning of, 
could be captured in a purely logical form. Events, for Davidson, served as 
vehicles for understanding the logic of event and action sentences; their 
ontological status, at least initially for Davidson, was of secondary concern. 
He eventually admitted that we must include events as particulars into our 
ontology, but this was mainly as a result of his larger semantic project. What 
is relevant to our discussion here from Davidson’s view on events is not the 
semantics or logical structure of action sentences, but what his view 
committed him to ontologically. Davidson, along with Kim, viewed events 
essentially as dated particulars. Events are real particulars that have 
properties, properties which can causally influence other events or objects. 
For Davidson, since event and action sentences admit of a certain possibility 
of re-description, a single particular event can be described in multiple ways 
and the properties associated with that particular event do not necessarily 
constitute that event on Davidson’s view. Contrast this with Kim’s view of 
events. Kim thinks of events as exemplifications of properties by substances 
at a particular time. On Kim’s approach, we can think of events as essentially 
ordered triples of a substance, a property and a time. The event is that 
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substance exemplifying that property at that particular time. Thus, whereas a 
single event under different descriptions on Davidson’s view is a possibility, 
and as Davidson sees it an advantage, on Kim’s view such a possibility is 
severely limited. The ‘stabbing of Caesar by Brutus’, on Kim’s view, is a 
unique event and is not identical to ‘the killing of Caesar by Brutus’, whereas 
on Davidson’s view we have the same event under different descriptions. 
Both views are realist views about events and regard them as dated 
particulars, which can be located in a spatial framework and which can play 
central roles in causal explanation. Chisholm, whose view is, in many 
important ways, significantly different from both, and one which we will not 
go into here, regarded both Kim and Davidson as advocates of the concrete 
event theory.2 
Though both Kim’s and Davidson’s views of events are substantial and 
widely regarded as classic treatments on the topic of events, both from 
metaphysical and semantico-logical perspectives, there is something missing 
from their accounts, which seems intuitively to be essential to any proper 
account of events. There is an element that I believe we have a pre-theoretical 
understanding of about the concept of event that is not found in either of 
their accounts, or at least not to any degree to which it plays an important 
role in how we understand what events are. That element is time. Just as it is 
fair to say that we think of events as correlated with changes, I think we also 
think of events as essentially temporal phenomena. Events occur. They 
happen. It is essential to what an event is that it be a thing that happens or 
goes on in some way. It is strange that this temporal characteristic that seems 
just as obvious as the notion of change has not found its way to playing a 





recently been pointed out by Helen Steward.3 Steward offers a unique 
perspective on events by focusing on just this element – the role that time 
plays in the structure of events.4  
Where Kim glosses over the differences between possibly distinct ontological 
categories like state, condition and event, Steward spends time identifying 
interesting and arguably important distinctions between the three. 
According to Steward it is a mistake to class events and states into a single 
ontological category. Her view focuses not on the exemplification of 
properties or change, but on the unique temporal qualities of events as 
essentially occurrent phenomena. The fact that events are intrinsically 
temporal phenomena as opposed to states for example, is so often 
overlooked, or relegated to a mere terminological difference that outside of 
Steward’s work, no substantial view of events has been advanced based on 
what seems to be an intrinsic property of events. In one of Kim’s discussions 
he says,  
[I]t is a philosophical commonplace to use the term ‘event’ in a 
broad sense, not only to refer to changes but also to refer to states, 
conditions, and the like (Kim, 1993, p. 34). 
It is clear that he is focusing on the concept of change as the fundamental 
aspect of events, and that the temporal qualities of events are either 
downplayed or subsumed by the role that change plays. In the same essay he 
writes,  
Besides events, we also speak of “states”. If “events” signal 
changes, “states” seem to be static things, “unchanges”… (Kim, 







Despite this overt acknowledgement of states and events as being 
diametrically opposed to one another, the one being essentially changes and 
the other being “unchanges” Kim continues on to characterize his view, 
albeit in a preliminary way, and after downplaying the difference between 
static things like states and events, in the following way. 
Just as changes are changes of properties in substances…[S]tates 
and conditions are states and conditions of or in substances or 
systems of substances. Add this to our earlier reasons for 
underplaying the differences between changes and unchanges, 
and we naturally arrive at a conception of events and states as 
exemplifications by substances of properties at a time (Kim, 1993, p. 34). 
On Kim’s view states and events are grouped together into a single 
ontological category, and there is no principled way in which one might 
draw a distinction between the two other than by regarding one as the 
complement of the other. 
This approach to understanding the nature of events and states is directly 
challenged by Steward. She classes events along with processes according to 
what she refers to as temporal shape. As her goal is to develop an account of 
events that is suitable for an ontology of mind, the context for Steward’s 
discussion is that of current theories in the philosophy of mind, such as the 
token identity theory. Steward argues that insofar as one seeks a correct 
ontology of the mind, if mental events are to be incorporated into such an 
ontology, one needs to develop a view where mental events can be thought 
of as mental particulars. Her criticism of Kim’s view is that it fails to do just 
this.5 In fact, according to Steward, most of the prominent views on events 






events to current views in the philosophy of mind – and she has in mind 
here the token identity theory - would need to meet what she refers to as the 
secret life requirement. What she means by this is that if events are going to 
fulfil a certain role in the philosophy of mind as a sort of entity that we use to 
describe relations between mental and physical properties or act as causally 
generative individuals, they must have a kind of particularity to them. So, 
the secret life requirement (SLR) is essentially a particularity requirement.6 
That is, mental events, if they’re going to do the job philosophers often 
recruit them for in their theories of the mind, need to be mental particulars. 
Contra Kim and others, Steward proceeds to give a thin account of events 
(and processes) based on what she refers to as the “temporal strategy.” The 
temporal strategy essentially says that any theory of events (and processes) 
should base itself on how these entities relate to time. The suggestion here is 
to not identify events (and processes) as either property exemplifications or 


























contrasting events (and processes) with another kind of entity, states. To get 
a good picture of what Steward means by temporal shape it will be helpful 
to briefly discuss some distinctions she offers us with regards to events and 
processes. 
One of Steward’s insights is that important ontological distinctions, such as 
might exist between events and processes, may depend upon the way in 
which each of these entities can be said to “fill” an interval of time. She 
suggests that we can look to the ways in which certain verb usage suggests 
particular temporal characteristics of some of our everyday talk. So, her 
approach is twofold: firstly, to give an analysis of the temporal distinctions 
between processes and events, by identifying the unique way in which each 
can be said to fill a time interval, and secondly, to examine certain qualities 
of verbs and nominalizations, in order to substantiate any claim of a real 
ontological distinction between events and processes. For example, we might 
think about the difference between a process and an event as a difference in 
the way these two occurrents unfold through an interval of time. Some 
occurrents seem to go on for a period of time, but not necessarily take any 
specific amount of time to occur. They might also be said to persist 
throughout that interval as a kind of on-going homogenous activity. The 
buzzing of the lights in my room, for example, seems to persist all the while 
I’m writing this. However, it would just seem strange to ask how long it took 
for that buzzing to occur. It didn’t take any definite amount of time. We can 
talk about how long it when on for, but not how long it took. Some 
occurrents on the other hand seem to be amenable to the above kind of 
question. We tend to think of some occurrents as things that do take a certain 
amount of time. The “running of a marathon” or the “the opening of a 
parachute” are possible examples of this type of occurrent. It seems 
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reasonable to ask of these types of occurrents how long they took. We could 
ask, and expect a sensible answer to, “How long did it take you to run the 
marathon?” or “How long did it take for the parachute to open?” It would 
seem strange to ask how long the “running of the marathon” went on for, 
though we could ask how long the “running” went on for. There seems to be 
a kind of structural difference between “the running of a marathon” and 
“running”, and Steward’s point is that this difference has to do with the way 
in which each, in a sense, unfolds over time. Both seem to be kinds of 
“happenings”, in a broad sense, but the way in which they happen seems to 
be different. Those types of occurrents that go on for a while but don’t seem 
to take any specific amount of time to occur, we might regard as processes, 
whereas those that fill their respective interval of time in a more definite 
manner like ‘the running of a marathon’ we might regard as events. 
Steward rightly acknowledges that these points are not strong enough to 
hang any kind of substantial theory on though we might look at the ways in 
which certain temporally sensitive adjectives might apply to these specific 
types of entities to help reinforce the distinction. According to Steward, 
processes can be said to be ‘continuous’, ‘constant’ or ‘ongoing’, whereas the 
same cannot be said of events. Processes can be ‘intermittent’, ‘steady’, 
‘perpetual’ or ‘sporadic’, but the same just doesn’t seem to be the case for 
events. The idea here is that these adjectives indicate that processes seem to 
go on for an indefinite period of time but events seem to have a kind of 
definite time period that, in a sense, draws a boundary around the event. We 
can ask when the event occurred, and how long it took. We can also ask 
when it began and/or when it ended. The difference in the way each fills its 
time interval is what Steward refers to as a difference in their temporal shape. 
She summarizes things thus,  
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…we can say, roughly, that those features of a temporal entity 
which determine its temporal shape are those which determine 
which of the following may be said of it: 
Whether it persists, occurs, goes on, continues, happens, obtains. 
Whether it takes time, last for a time, goes on for a time, persists 
for a time, occurs at a time. 
Whether certain temporally sensitive adjectives may be applied to 
it – these include ‘intermittent’, ‘continuous’, ‘persistent’, etc. 
(Steward, 1997, p. 98) 
Essentially both events and processes are kinds of happenings or 
occurrences, but the way in which whatever happens during the relevant 
time interval is distributed differently over that interval for both processes 
and events.7 
Even though there may be some further distinctions that can be made, for 
example, between those things that take time as opposed to those things that 
last for a time, or even perhaps go on for a time, and I think Steward’s notion of 
temporal shape might be very useful here, for our purposes we’re mainly 
interested in the broader distinction between those things that occur like 
events and processes and those things that do not occur like states. We’re 


















our discussion of the mental, as we’ll see in the following sections, but for 
now a few remarks on the nature of states will conclude this section’s 
discussion.  
Whereas we can speak of the temporal components or parts of events and 
processes, for example, it makes sense to speak of the point in time at which 
an event began or ended, or some midpoint of an event or process, there do 
not seem to be any such components to states. As Steward suggests, “States 
differ from events most fundamentally…in failing to have temporal parts at 
all.”(Steward, 1997, p. 101) Now, the use of the term ‘state’ in philosophy is 
rather chaotic. Philosophers use the term to describe all kinds of phenomena, 
mental and physical. They range from those that are referred to by a wide 
variety of abstract nouns like ‘solidity’, ‘marriage’, ‘knowledge’ or ‘belief’, to 
more complex nominal phrases like ‘being green’ or ‘having weight’. 
Philosophers are also quite fond of thinking of states as things that certain 
nominalized adjectives refer to like ‘redness’ or ‘tablehood’. All of these 
different kinds of constructions have been thought of as referring to states in 
some sense or other at some point in the history of philosophy. To wade 
through this swamp of possible state-like entities is surely a monumental 
task, and it is not my intention to do so here. Rather, I only want to point out 
the variegated uses to which the concept of state has been put by 
philosophers. Indeed, there doesn’t seem to be any semblance whatsoever of 
consensus on what a state is. For instance, Stich takes a state to be simply the 
instantiation of a property at a time. Of course such a definition hardly does 
us any good if we have any interest in differentiating states from events or 
processes, since events (and probably processes) also can instantiate a 
property at a time. In a similar vein, Kim thinks of states in terms of property 
exemplifications as he does of events, which still doesn’t aid us in making 
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any distinction between those things that occur and those things that do not, 
since both could exemplify some property at some time. Steward on the 
other hand, thinks that states share similar features to that of objects, at least 
with respect to their temporal qualities, which I’m inclined to agree with, 
and since we’re interested in the distinction between occurrence and non-
occurrence something like the temporal qualities of both events/processes 
and states seems like a reasonable area to focus on. Given the fact that there 
is quite a bit of variation both on what counts as a state and what the 
essential characteristics of a state are, any feasible idea seems as good as the 
next. So, there is no burden upon us here to make use of any particular 
theory. In fact, the goal here being one of characterizing only a certain type 
of state, namely, a mental state, only makes the task that much easier. That 
being said, I do believe that with respect to temporality all states share a 
similar profile. All this means is that like Steward, I want to suggest that 
states don’t have any essentially temporal components. They have a similar 
temporal shape to that of objects.8 They persist through time, as objects do. 
They don’t have beginnings or endings; they don’t start and stop. States can 
be said to obtain, but not occur or happen. Their temporal profile seems to be 



















In fact, while it is certainly true that states can obtain for a certain period of 
time it doesn’t follow from this that an interval of time is necessary for any 
state to obtain. If it were, then it wouldn’t be possible for a state to obtain 
over no stretch of time or an infinite amount of time. We wouldn’t be able to 
make sense of states that seem to obtain where time itself is irrelevant. And 
we can do this. In fact, in certain cosmological models of the universe, 
physicists talk about the end state of the universe. In such a state there is no 
time interval to reference as there is no transference of energy since the 
entropy of the universe has reached a maximal point. But we can still talk 
about that state as a state of the universe. We certainly can and do talk about 
states that seem to be independent of any time interval.10 It seems time is 
irrelevant in such cases to the obtaining of such states. We can say of a 
particular state that it obtains at certain times, or only for certain amounts of 
time, but that does not imply that time is in any way essential to statehood. 
Again, it seems we’re lead to the idea that states do not have any temporal 
parts, or at least the idea that any temporal characteristics there might be of 



















can conceive of a state with no temporal qualities or that obtains over no 
interval of time.11 
For some states, namely, mental states, there is always a relevant time 
interval. That is to say, mental states always obtain over a positive interval of 
time, but this is merely a contingent matter of fact, and has more to do with 
the obtaining of a fact, than with any temporal quality of the state itself. The 
suggestion here is that if this notion of temporal shape can be used to 
differentiate states from events and processes in general, then it seems we 
can comfortably situate mental states with those mental properties that are 
non-occurrent and mental events and processes with those mental properties 
that are occurrent. We are thus left with the view that the domain of mental 
phenomena may be bisected, broadly speaking, according to whether a given 
property can be said to have a particular temporal shape. From here on I’ll 
refer to those mental properties that can be said to have a temporal shape 
similar to either events or processes as occurrent mental properties or mental 
events/processes and those that do not have such a temporal shape as non-
occurrent mental properties or mental states. 
In concluding, two final points need to be made. First, mental states like any 
other state are static and do not go on or unfold over an interval of time like 
an event or process might. However, they must obtain over some period of 













interval of time t0 – tn during which m obtains at each instant. Whether or not 
that state is homogenous over that interval is another question, and one that 
should be answered, but it isn’t relevant for our purposes. All that needs to 
be noted here is that mental states must obtain over a positive interval of 
time. We also need to note something about states in general, which will 
come into play in the next chapter when we look at how attitude externalism 
can meet some of its criticisms. Steward notes in her discussion on the 
temporal strategy that states share a similar temporal profile to that of 
physical objects. However, she also makes a key insight regarding states that, 
I think, can ultimately serve to substantiate a very central claim of attitude 
externalism. Thus, this point about states will come into play in an important 
way in the next chapter. Steward notes, 
That states, but not physical objects, can be said to obtain seems to 
me to be related not to a temporal difference, but rather to the 
special relation between the obtaining of a state and the holding of 
certain truths; e.g. if the state of my believing that p ‘obtains’, that 
is because I believe that p (Steward, 1997, p. 99). 
The point here about the relation between the obtaining of certain truths and 
the obtaining of a state, I think reveals something unique about certain types 
of states, namely, mental states. I will emphasize this point, and elaborate on 
just what this relation might be in the last section. It suffices to say at this 
point, that both truths or facts and mental states can be characterized as 
things that obtain over a period of time, and for some states, the fact that 





1.2 Mental Events and Particularity 
It should be practically an undisputed point that most mental phenomena 
have temporal characteristics. They either take time, happen at a particular 
time, persist through time, or obtain for a period of time. It should be equally 
indisputable that we can, at least broadly, categorize mental properties 
according to their temporal qualities. We can at least bifurcate the mental 
realm according to those mental properties that happen or occur and those 
that do not. Occurrent mental properties might be something like ‘noticing 
that the bus is actually on time’, ‘considering whether to have the soup or 
sandwich’, ‘working out a math problem in one’s head’ or ‘wondering 
whether the stove was left on’. There are endless examples that can be 
constructed for this point because this type of mental phenomenon is an 
everyday experience. In fact, we loosely characterize these types of mental 
properties in ordinary language as ‘thoughts’. That is to say, thoughts are 
things that occur. We often make use of common expressions that express 
just this point, as in “a thought just occurred to me”, or “I just had a 
thought”. We regularly and in no philosophically complicated way 
recognize that certain parts of our mental lives have this temporal feature, 
that they occur or happen. Non-occurrent mental properties, or mental 
states, might be things like ‘the belief that the sun will rise tomorrow’, or 
‘knowing that Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland’. These examples are 
quite common and make the point fairly clearly all by themselves, but I think 
we can gain a bit more insight into the distinction by looking at the ways in 
which the behaviour of certain verbs we use to refer to mental properties 
differ from one another.  
The most obvious place to start is with the fact that verbs have tenses. Most 
verbs have past, present and future tenses. However, some verbs of English 
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like ‘run’ for example, can have slightly more complicated tenses such as the 
continuous or progressive tense. We can say things like, ‘She ran a mile last 
week’ and ‘She is running a mile’ and the idea being conveyed by each 
employs the difference in possible tenses of ‘run’, the latter exploiting the 
progressive tense. The difference here is that ‘She [ran/will run] a mile’ does 
not imply that anything is currently going on. In English we use the 
progressive tense [is running] to imply that something is currently 
happening. However, not all verbs work so comfortably in the progressive 
tense. The propositional attitude verbs, are great examples of this. The verbs 
‘know’ and ‘believe’ typically used to indicate something not particularly 
dynamic in nature, but rather something more static are rarely used in the 
progressive tense. If someone believes that Edinburgh is the capital of 
Scotland, we don’t think that there is anything going on with the person that 
is the believing that Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland. The same is the case 
with ‘know’, which also resists use in the progressive tense for similar 
reasons. Saying that ‘Sally is knowing that Edinburgh is the capital of 
Scotland’ just obviously sounds like bad English. Verbs like ‘know’ and 
‘believe’ do not generally take the continuous tense. However, as many 
theorists have pointed out the reason why certain verbs do not take 
continuous tenses can be different. Certain verbs don’t take continuous 
tenses because they tend to indicate something that usually happens 
instantaneously or over a very short time span, such as ‘recognize’. That is, 
we normally wouldn’t expect one to say that they were recognizing 
something for more than just a moment. It wouldn’t do to say, ‘She is 
recognizing a friend in the crowd’, whereas it is appropriate to say, ‘She 
recognized her friend right away’. Usually, recognition occurs rather briefly 
and then it is over. The event is short-lived. Certain other verbs however also 
do not usually take the continuous tense, but not for the reason that they 
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indicate something that happens in a very short amount of time but because 
they indicate something that doesn’t take up time at all, such as the verb 
‘know’. As mentioned above it just seems odd to say, ‘I’m knowing that 
Edinburgh is the capital of Scotland’ and the reason why that sounds odd is 
that the verb ‘know’ doesn’t usually take a continuous tense. However, the 
reason why ‘know’ doesn’t usually take the continuous tense is not the same 
reason why ‘recognize’ doesn’t usually take the continuous tense. The 
difference here has to do it seems, with the way in which recognizing and 
knowing both relate to time. I suggest that the difference here is that we use 
the term ‘recognize’ to identify a type of mental event or process, whereas 
we use the term ‘know’ to identify a type of mental state. This seems a fairly 
obvious conclusion, since as we’ve already discussed states differ 
ontologically from events/processes with respect to time. 
Our lexicon of mental verbs has the distinction between occurrent mental 
properties and non-occurrent mental properties it seems built in to it. That is, 
the distinction between these two ontological categories is something we 
regularly work with in ordinary language. Given that we ordinarily pick out 
by the use of particular mental terms, and by the use of specific tenses of 
verbs and types of predications those things we can regard as mental events 
or processes and those things we can regard as mental states, we might 
inquire into what, if any, characteristic features occurrent and non-occurrent 
mental properties have. If we hold that there is an important connection 
between some of our linguistic constructions and the actual structure of the 
world which they purport to be about, then these subtleties can reasonably 
be held to indicate a real ontological distinction as some theorists have held. 
Steward makes a similar point in saying,  
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The features of human nature and experience which have usually 
been classified as mental are, on the whole, associated either with 
verbs, or else with nouns closely related to verbs…This suggests 
that perhaps there is insight to be gained from an examination of 
the different behavior of these verbs (Steward, 1997, p. 78). 
One reason for focusing on the particular features I’m focusing on instead of 
what is more traditionally thought of as characterizing mental states is that 
what we’re interested in here are not necessarily the properties that make 
something mental, but those that make something a mental state as opposed 
to a mental event or process. The characteristics usually thought of as 
qualifying something as mental such as ‘serving to explain behaviour’ or 
‘tending towards a personal form’, etc., surely help characterize something 
as what we might think of as being mental, but do not necessarily serve to 
differentiate between those mental properties that are occurrent and those 
that are non-occcurrent, which is what we’re interested in identifying. 
Many authors have suggested that mental events can have a kind of 
particularity to them. Davidson and Kim, for example, both regard mental 
events as dated particulars. So, the idea that there are particular mental 
events as opposed to there being only universal or generic types of events is 
fairly common among theorists. So, we might inquire into whether 
particularity is some kind of differentiating feature of mental events as 
compared with mental states, and if so, what are some necessary conditions 
for particularity.12 Of course whether or not mental events meet any 
conditions of particularity will depend on our conception of a particular. As 








particular?—I will only stipulate a working definition for now. Whether 
what is said here for mental events hangs or falls on this definition will just 
have to be a consequence we accept, and as I mentioned earlier, Steward 
offers the SLR as a necessary condition for particularity, which may or may 
not capture those things we think of as particulars. But I will offer a weaker 
definition, as I believe it will be sufficient for our purposes. A particular, as I 
understand it, is contrasted with a universal. While I will not offer a strict 
definition of a universal, we might say that universals are multiply realizable 
abstract entities. We can also point to examples of universals and define the 
concept denotatively. ‘Man’, ‘Whale’ and ‘Planet’ are examples of universals. 
Many individual things can be a man, none of which can be ‘Man’ itself. The 
same goes for ‘Whale’ and ‘Planet’. Thus, we can partially specify what a 
particular is by saying that particulars are not multiply realizable. 
Furthermore, let us say that for all things x,y it is a necessary condition for 
both x’s and y’s being a particular that they occupy a region of spacetime in 
such a way that we can isolate or individuate them from another 
spatiotemporally. That is, x and y exclude one another spatially and 
temporally. Thus, if some thing does not in any way occupy a region of 
spacetime in the manner stipulated above, or is multiply realizable, then it 
does not qualify as a particular. At the very least, this definition captures 
most physical objects. There are of course going to be objections to this 
definition and borderline cases. Substances and stuffs for example, like 
water, iron and mud do not clearly fit into this category. I will set aside this 
point, as the definition is adequate for our purposes. 
So, particulars tend to have some kind of location to which some kind of 
spatial and temporal coordinates can be roughly assigned. Again, contrast 
this with universals or generic types, which cannot have these characteristics. 
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There is no sense in which we could give the spatial and temporal 
coordinates of whale or man, but we can give such coordinates, to one degree 
or another to a whale and a man.13 I want to suggest that such characteristics 
can be attributed to mental events, but not to mental states. And this is a 
crucial point, for this distinction is not made by most theorists. Often what is 
said for the one (mental events) is assumed to hold for the other (mental 
states). Thus, if one has a view where particular mental events play a role 
and there is really no distinction between mental events and mental states, 
then states can play that same role. I want to suggest caution at this point for 
it is not clear that what is true for the one is necessarily true of the other. 
In a sense, it is possible to localize events to a region of spacetime. Reflect for 
a moment on a birthday party. We might regard a birthday party as a type of 
event. Surely it took place over a certain, roughly specifiable interval of time. 
And presumably it took place at some geographical location. How fine 
grained we can get is not the question, but whether the event can at least in 
principle, satisfy the necessary condition for particularity. The same goes for 
a mental event, like a thought. It occurs at a specific time usually, and 
roughly at a specific physical location—wherever the subject whose thought 
it is is located at the time. Though it is a little unusual to talk of the temporal 
and spatial location of a thought, there is nothing incoherent about it. 
Outside of maybe some of the biological sciences there just hasn’t been any 
reason for theorists to discuss thoughts in this manner. We don’t need to be 
very specific to locate a mental event either. We might simply say, “the 
thought occurred to me while I was driving”, or “I had a thought while in 







particular mental event temporally at least. If we wanted to—and 
neurobiologists certainly do—we might even try to localize a specific mental 
event as it occurs and identify it with a particular neurological event in the 
brain, in which case it might be possible to give both a quite specific time 
and spatial coordinate for the event. All of this points up the idea that mental 
events meet our necessary condition for particularity. What really needs to 
be shown is that there is nothing preventing us, in principle, from regarding 
some mental event as being a particular. The literature on events, and mental 
events specifically, is full of references to events as particulars. Whatever our 
particularity requirement is, whether it is Steward’s SLR or some rigorous 
spatiotemporal criteria there is no reason, in principle, to object to there 
being particular mental events. That is to say, insofar as we contrast 
particulars with universals, and universals are multiply realizable there is no 
reason to think that there could not be a mental event that is also a particular. 
 
1.3 Mental States and Universality 
Despite the fact that in the literature references to mental states seem to 
imply a notion of mental states as particulars, and the fact that most theorists 
do not find it necessary, at least for theoretical purposes, to distinguish 
between mental events and mental states, it simply is not a given that what 
holds for the one necessarily holds for the other. So we must ask whether 
mental states meet our, or any, particularity requirement. Can we temporally 
or spatially locate a mental state? Can we do so with a mental state like ‘the 
belief that coffee is bad for one’? Firstly, how exactly do we give any kind of 
time specification for such a thing, if it doesn’t even occur? Mental events are 
advantaged in this respect because they happen. And happening is an 
inherently temporal category. Thus, the temporal coordinate. But states don’t 
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happen. I suppose we could age them, and in this way specify a temporal 
region for a particular mental state. We can say that some physical object is 
so many years old. I suppose we could do the same for the belief that coffee 
is bad for one. One might say, ‘I’ve held the belief that coffee is bad for one 
for most of my adult life’. In a sense, we are drawing a temporal boundary 
within which that belief is held. We might even be inclined to say that this 
belief is “in the head” of the believer, as it were, and thereby give it a spatial 
location as well. Occurrence is certainly not a necessary condition for 
localizability. Rocks and chairs do not occur, but this doesn’t mean we can’t 
localize them to a region of spacetime. So why shouldn’t we be able to do the 
same thing with mental states such as belief? A first response to this is that 
mental states, at the very least, are the types of things that more than one 
person can be in. They are multiply realizable. More than one individual 
could have held the belief that coffee is bad for one for most of their entire 
adult lives. So, this belief certainly does not meet the particularity condition. 
But neither do many other mental states, like ‘the desire to climb Mt. Everest’ 
or ‘the hope that UCLA wins the finals’. Any one of these mental states is 
always a multiply realizable state, one that any individual can be in. Mental 
states thus look much more like universals than they do particulars. For, at 
least the bare minimum for a universal is that it is multiply realizable and 
mental states are multiply realizable. This raises the question of whether or 
not something like the type-token distinction can be applied here. So, let us 
turn to considering whether such a distinction might apply to mental states, 
and whether or not applying this notion allows us to talk of mental states as 
particulars. 
In a case where Sally believes that p and Johnny believes that q, how many 
beliefs are there? This might seem like an odd question, but the term ‘belief’ 
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is a count noun and is amenable in principle to this type of question. How 
about a case where Sally believes that p and Johnny also believes that p? 
How many beliefs in this case? In the first case, answering seems a fairly 
straightforward thing. There are two beliefs. It is straightforward compared 
to the second case because Sally’s belief has a different content from 
Johnny’s. Obviously, they are different beliefs. However, in the second case, 
the question can be interpreted as being ambiguous. That is, one feels that 
there may be two different ways of answering the question. There is one 
belief insofar as we consider Sally’s and Johnny’s belief to be the same belief – 
after all they both believe that p. On the other hand, we might say there are 
two beliefs. There is Sally’s belief that p and Johnny’s belief that p. What 
we’re doing here is using a particular way of counting things which employs 
what we refer to as the type-token distinction. Questions like this invite such 
a distinction, since it is a fairly regular distinction to make when one is 
presented with multiple ways in which specific objects or particulars can be 
grouped. The question is, in the case of belief, can we both group them as 
types and perform the counting and group them as tokens and perform the 
counting? On the face of it, this seems like a perfectly acceptable thing to do. 
After all nouns such as ‘chair’, ‘table’ and ‘boat’ are count-quantifiable 
nouns. They have plural forms, ‘chairs’, ‘tables’, ‘boats’, and such nouns 
allow for a type-token distinction. What about ‘belief’? It has a plural form, 
‘beliefs’. It is a count-quantifiable noun. We say things like, ‘Tina’s beliefs in 
spirituality are inspiring’. So, it looks like the type-token distinction ought to 
apply equally well in this case. Insofar as we recognize a genuine type-token 
distinction in the case of belief we are claiming that mental states like belief 
admit of such a distinction. Though this distinction has widely been used 
over the years in philosophy, I am going to argue that the distinction just 
doesn’t apply to mental states, and its use confuses many issues in the 
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philosophy of mind, specifically for our purposes, it confuses the role mental 
states are supposed to play in psychological explanation. 
However, many theorists hold that it is perfectly sensible to talk of token 
instances of mental states. What is more, when we do talk of particular 
instances of mental states we are typically inviting a type-token distinction. 
Stich’s view is a good example of this. According to his view, beliefs can be 
type individuated and token instances of those types serve in singular causal 
explanations of action. Stich argued for what he referred to as the principle 
of psychological autonomy, which says that psychological causal 
explanations depend only on those internal properties of the individual. 14 
That is, the psychological properties that can be said to supervene upon the 
total internal physical state of the individual are the only properties required 
in the explanation of behaviour. Stich’s purpose in invoking this principle is 
to shed light on the role that belief and desire play in explaining behaviour. 
His view doesn’t just implicitly endorse the type-token distinction as a valid 
way of conceiving of mental states like belief, his arguments explicitly rest on 
this distinction. He writes, 
“If a belief token of one subject differs in truth value from a belief 
token of another subject, then the tokens are not of the same 
type…if an instantiation of belief property p1 differs in truth value 
from an instantiation of belief property p2, then p1 and p2 are 
different properties” (Stich, 1978, p. 578). 
One problem for the theorist who posits the existence of token mental states 
such as belief is how they account for the retention of such token states after 
breaks in consciousness. Presumably, I have all the same beliefs after I wake 
up in the morning as I had before I went to bed. How do we account for the 





wake up in the morning, if I had it the night before? What happens to that 
token state? What happens to my belief that p while I sleep? One might be 
tempted to argue that Stich nor any other theorist ever tied having a belief 
with the need to be conscious or awake. Fair enough, but the point here is 
even more drastic for more serious breaks in consciousness. Take a coma 
patient for example. Let’s say prior to entering a coma, S believes that p, and 
let’s say the coma last for years, and that there is virtually no brain activity 
for long stretches of the entire duration of the coma. When S finally comes 
out of the coma and still believes that p, how are we to account for the 
retention of such a token belief state? Are we to say that S reacquired the 
belief somehow? Is this the case for all of S’s token belief states or only some? 
How do we explain the fact that S still believes that p, let alone attribute the 
belief to S while in the coma? Perhaps, theorists like Stich are thinking that 
there are both occurrent beliefs and non-occurrent beliefs. On such a view a 
mental state like belief spans the occurrence/non-occurrence divide. I 
suppose the thinking here is that one acquires many beliefs throughout the 
day, and at any given time some of those beliefs might be occurrent, that is, 
those beliefs might be the subject of some occurrent thought process. Those 
beliefs that one is not currently thinking about are tacit or non-occurrent on 
such a view. I do not want to spend much time on this type of view as I think 
it is patently absurd and employs a completely senseless notion of belief, 
such that on some of these views it might make sense to say that I acquired 
twenty-five beliefs before breakfast, or worse yet, make sense to use the 
progressive tense of ‘believe’ to denote an occurrent mental process or event 
such that it makes sense to say of Sally that she is believing that p. What is 
more to the point is that theorists who employ the notion of token belief 
states most of the time are not restricting their discussion to only occurrent 
beliefs. And unless we are equating token belief states with occurrent beliefs 
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exclusively, we are left with a very puzzling notion of the reacquisition of a 
very large number of beliefs that must, for mostly everyone, happen every 
time there is a break in consciousness. 
This is not to say that there are no token beliefs in the sense that S’s belief 
that p is a particular sort of belief. We might classify an individual’s beliefs 
on reincarnation as constituting a type of belief, say, their spiritual beliefs, 
and in this sense one’s token belief is a token of that type. But here we’re 
using the type-token distinction as a merely relative or logical notion, which 
is what the distinction is meant for. Tokens are always tokens of a certain 
type. All this is fine. But none of this implies that there are token belief states. 
To say that Sally has a particular belief is not to say that Sally’s belief is a 
particular, and that is what the theorist who employs the type-token 
distinction in discussions of mental state tokens is implying. Of course, 
theorists like Stich could reply in the following way. Why not simply say 
that some token belief states are non-occurrent? Doesn’t this obviate the 
problem altogether? The reason why the coma patient still believes that p 
when she comes to, is just because that belief, or token mental state is a non-
occcurrent token mental state. Not every token state need be occurrent. 
Tokenality does not imply occurrence. And insofar as we’re talking about the 
type of mental state the coma patient is in is a belief that p it is a universal 
and is multiply realizable. But, there is also the token mental state, the non-
occurrent mental particular that is her belief that p, which is not multiply 
realizable. What explains her retention of this belief is the fact that the mental 
state is a non-occurrent state. It is a mental particular, but it is a non-
occurrent mental particular. So, what is wrong with this view? Why should 
we not accept that there are non-occurrent mental particulars? We accept 
that there are occurrent mental particulars (mental events). So, why not non-
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occurrent mental particulars? Isn’t the type-token distinction as applied to 
mental states meant to distinguish between these: mental state types 
(universals), and non-occurrent mental state tokens (particulars)? 
My response to this is that insofar as we are talking about a mental state, I 
agree that it is a non-occurrent mental entity. However, insofar as we are 
talking about ‘the belief that p’ we are still talking about something multiply 
realizable. Anyone can have the belief that p. What is it that makes this non-
occurrent mental state a particular? It would have to be something that 
naturally excludes the possibility of its being multiply realizable and it 
would have to meet the spatiotemporal requirements for particularity. The 
only thing one can point to in this case is that the belief that p in question is 
her belief that p, as opposed to his belief that p or anyone else’s belief that p. 
But this just looks like all we’re doing here is stating the fact that ‘she 
believes that p’ or that ‘he believes that p’ or that ‘someone else believes that 
p’ for that matter. What is it that makes the belief that p hers as opposed to 
his? At this point, the theorist bent on making this argument is going to have 
to start making some kind of identity claims about the token mental state in 
question. Usually, the identity that is offered is one between the token 
mental state and some token brain state. But this move is problematic for a 
whole host of reasons, which I will not get in to at this point.15 Suffice it to 
say that the only way forward for one to argue for the existence of mental 
state tokens is to adopt a kind of token identity theory of the mind, which 
many authors who employ the use of this notion of mental state tokens do 








type-token distinction to mental events. Since, we already acknowledge the 
existence of mental particulars that are occurrences, there is no problem in 
speaking of certain types of these particulars. It is not problematic to start 
with particulars and proceed to group them in to specific types. What is 
problematic, at least with respect to mental entities, is to start with types of 
mental entities and then argue that since there are different types of these 
entities, there must be token instances of these types. 
The misapplication of the type-token distinction in discussions of mental 
states can also be illustrated through examples that include mental states that 
are not captured through the propositional attitude verbs. Paradigmatic 
mental states such as pain can reveal this misapplication as well. One might 
think that even basic examples such as ‘pain’ invite such a distinction, since 
we can talk of pain in general and particular instances of pain. Pain is a type 
of state of which anyone can be in. Certainly, when one is in pain, or has a 
particular pain we can refer to that particular instance as a token pain. But 
just because pain is as a type of state and there are instances of pain or token 
pains, doesn’t imply that there need be any particular token pain states. 
Steward makes just this point and makes it so well, it is worth quoting at 
length. She argues, 
Of course, there is a quite innocuous sense in which pain is a type 
of state – it is a condition that a human being or other animal can 
be in. But here ‘type’ just means ‘sort’ or ‘kind’ – and its use does 
not imply the existence of any set of particular token pain states 
falling under the type. All it implies is the existence of a range of 
such conditions – anger, misery, depression, happiness, etc. – of 
which it is one. These might, indeed, be called token states in a 
sense, for the count noun ‘state’ is a noun under which such 
conditions as these can be brought – but these are not the sorts of 
things that philosophers usually have in mind when they speak of 
token states. It is usually supposed that token states are individual 
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entities, not general conditions like anger that anyone can have or 
‘be in’. But the claim that pain is a type of state involves no 
commitment whatever to the existence of any such individual 
entities (Steward, 1997, p. 128). 
The point is a subtle one. Just because we can think of pain or belief as a type 
of mental state, does not license us to talk of token belief states or token pain 
states. Such notions, as Steward puts it, “are philosophers’ creations” and 
must not just be assumed. The existence of token mental states, in the 
manner in which they are meant to serve within the context of identity 
theories must be argued for, and there are no such arguments for the 
existence of such entities.  
The problems outlined here are symptomatic of attempts to articulate cleanly 
a type-token distinction applicable to mental states like belief. It is exactly 
this kind of problem and problems with the role that beliefs are supposed to 
play in causal explanation, which has led some, like Steward, to argue that 
mental states just do not admit of such a distinction. They seem to lack a 
kind of particularity that events can have. Mental states look more like 
universals or types. We’ll see in the next chapter and again in chapter three 
that these differences can play a very important role in discussions about the 
nature of mental content and psychological explanation. 
I’d like to conclude this chapter by saying a few words about the particular 
conception of mental states that this chapter is driving at. The metaphysical 
picture I’ve been painting in this chapter—with very broad strokes—is, as 
mentioned at the outset, based on recent work by Helen Steward. And the 
conception of mental states that I’ve been trying to draw the reader toward is 
one where we think of the universal/particular divide as roughly 
corresponding to the state/event divide when it comes to the mental. I’ve 
argued that we can make sense of mental events but not mental states as 
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being particulars, and that mental states, at least the types of mental states 
that are of interest here, should strictly be thought of as universals. There is a 
further important point that needs to be made with regards to our 
conception of mental states in this thesis, and that is that mental states are 
fact-like types of entities. That is to say, ontologically speaking the types of 
thing that philosophers quite often are discussing when discussing mental 
states such as belief, desire and knowledge are much more closely identified 
with states-of-affairs or facts than they are with particulars. 
This manner of thinking is not entirely new. In the early part of the 20th 
century, the ordinary language philosophers ushered in a new conception of 
the mental, which for better or for worse was eventually overturned around 
the midpoint of the century. Works by Ryle and Austin were massively 
influential and incredibly insightful treatments on the concepts we use in 
ordinary life to describe the various aspects of our lives we regard as mental, 
and provided philosophy with an opportunity to redirect our efforts in 
understanding the mind away from what Ryle called the “para-mechanical 
hypothesis” and toward something much more in touch with how we 
normally think of the mind. There was a reconceptualization offered by this 
school of thought with a specific goal in mind—clarifying our mental 
concepts. Much of what was offered to us by this movement in philosophy 
has been overshadowed by works in philosophy of mind by writers such as 
Davidson, Lewis and Putnam, where the conception of the mental has in fact 
reverted back to a conception that is precisely what the ordinary language 
philosophers were arguing is misconceived to begin with. The conception of 
mental state adopted here is much more in line with what the ordinary 
language school had in mind, than with what more current fashionable 
views invoke. And before one thinks of this as a weakness of the overall 
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view offered here, which I’m sure some are inclined to think, it needs to be 
understood that the notion of a mental state is really just a philosophers’ 
creation, as Steward suggests. There really is no such notion in ordinary 
discourse. We do of course use the phrase ‘mental state’ from time to time, 
but never in the way in which contemporary philosophers of mind use it. We 
might say something like, “I’m in a weird state of mind” or “I just can’t 
understand her state of mind”, but in these cases we’re referring to 
something more like a person’s general mood or disposition not some 
particular mental entity. We’re certainly not referring to, or trying to pick out 
by this phrase some kind of causally efficacious particular, something which 
most philosophers who employ the term in their writings are interested in. 
The notion that most theorists are actually working with is a vacuous notion. 
There simply are no token particulars that have the properties that such 
theorists claim for them. What sentences like ‘S believes that p’ express, on 
the view endorsed here, are more like facts than they are like particulars. 
Recall Steward’s point earlier that the reason why states can be said to obtain 
is due to, “…the special relation between the obtaining of a state and the 
holding of certain truths; e.g. if the state of my believing that p ‘obtains’, that 
is because I believe that p” (Steward, 1997, p. 99). This point comes very 
close, on my view, to revealing an identity relation. Like Ryle, I hold that 
claims such as ‘Larry knows French’ and ‘Susan believes that all snakes are 
poisonous’ are best understood as revealing certain sorts of facts about Larry 
and Susan, and not as referring to any mental particulars. In fact, they’re not 
referring expressions at all. On the view endorsed here, to claim that S 
knows that p is just to express a fact about S—a mental fact. In the next 
chapter we’ll see how this conceptual shift regarding mental states helps us 
develop a different form of psychological externalism. It makes possible the 
view I refer to as an attitude externalism.
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 In this chapter I will present arguments intended to support a particular 
version of psychological externalism, which I will refer to as attitude 
externalism. Though there are significant variations between the views 
offered in this thesis and Williamson’s externalism, which will become 
apparent as things progress, Williamson’s formulation of things is really the 
dominant view out there as far as attitude externalism goes. So, I will use 
Williamson’s formulation to broadly explain the view. This form of 
externalism is best understood by contrasting it with what can be thought of 
as a moderately internalist view about mental states. Externalist views about 
mental content like the view popularized by Tyler Burge fall under this 
moderately internalist category, and it is Burge’s particular brand of content 
externalism I’m juxtaposing attitude externalism with. As the debate over 
the nature of mental content and the role the environment plays in fixing the 
content of one’s beliefs is quite extensive, it is no surprise that there are many 
variations on Burge’s original formulation of “anti-individualism”, but I will 
try to focus my arguments exclusively on Burge’s more recent refinements of 
the view. Burge’s content externalism says essentially that the content of a 
subject’s mental state is not always determined by the individualistic 
properties of the subject. Mental content, in many cases, depends upon 
factors external to the individual subject. Such factors may include truths 
about one’s physical environment or socio-linguistic environment. Brueckner 
puts the point as well as anyone, and quite succinctly in saying, 
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A thinker’s individualistic properties are not always sufficient to 
determine the content of his thoughts (and other intentional states) 
(Brueckner, 1995, p. 147).  
The attitude externalist and the content externalist both agree as far as 
mental content goes, that in many cases certain external environmental 
conditions play an essential role in determining one’s mental state. That is, 
insofar as one entertains a certain content, no matter what attitude one takes 
to that content, that mental state is what it is, at least in part, as a result of 
what is happening in one’s environment. For both the content externalist and 
the attitude externalist a difference in content entails a difference in state. 
Thus, believing that p and believing that p*, where p and p* are different 
propositions, are two distinct mental states according to both views. The 
same goes for attitude. A difference in mental attitude entails a difference in 
state. Thus, believing that p and hoping that p are two distinct mental states 
on both views. However, beyond this the two views adopt very different 
positions with regards to two important points: 1) what exactly, other than 
mental content, can be determined by environmental conditions, and 2) what 
exactly is meant by a ‘particular mental state’. The externalism being argued 
for here is one where not only does the environment play a role in 
determining content but also plays a role in determining the attitude one 
takes to a given content. 
It is critical for our discussion in this chapter that we recognize, as 
Williamson has, that many content externalists are, in a sense, also moderate 
internalists, since they hold that in cases where a subject S has a factive 
propositional attitude to a proposition p, there is some internal purely 
psychological component playing a critical explanatory role. For most 
content externalists, there is always some non-factive propositional attitude 
like ‘the belief that p’ involved in every case in which a thinker has some 
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factive attitude to some propositional content. The attitude externalist denies 
this. Having a factive attitude like seeing that p or remembering that p, does 
not require any non-factive attitude like belief. Factive attitudes like ‘seeing-
that’ and ‘remembering-that’ are fully mental in their own right and do not 
have any core internal components. These factive attitudes are kinds, as 
Williamson remarks, “…whose essence involves the world” (Williamson, 
1995, p. 563).  
Simply stated, attitude externalism is the view that factive attitudes are 
prime mental conditions that are broadly individuated. There are two key 
points that Williamson's attitude externalism turns on, which can be 
mentioned here at the outset. Firstly, that some, if not most, propositional 
attitudes are broad conditions as the content externalist would claim, but in 
many cases such conditions are also prime conditions, that is, they do not 
factor into internal and external components. Secondly, conditions like the 
condition ‘S sees that p’, or ‘S remembers that p’ are fully mental states in the 
strictest sense of the term. That is to say, they are just as mental as any 
condition that the content externalist holds as being purely mental like ‘S 
believes that p’. Williamson suggests that if we are willing to accept an 
externalism about content, then we ought to be willing to accept an 
externalism about attitudes as well. His move here is to shift the burden of 
the debate onto the moderately internalist content externalist by pointing out 
that it is just as problematic to claim that there is some non-factive core 
mental component to each case of knowing, as it is to accept that factive 
attitudes are broad prime mental conditions.  
Recall the discussion at the end of the last chapter where we saw that the 
view being argued for in this thesis is one on which the notion of token 
mental states, or instances of mental states is dismissed as a kind of category 
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mistake. Thinking of mental states, as many philosophers tend to think of 
them – whether as the result of bad linguistic analyses on stative 
predications employing the propositional attitude verbs or a sloppy 
metaphysics conflating the notion of event and state for a particular 
theoretical agenda – is not only not helpful when it comes to deciding the 
influence one’s environment has on what one is thinking about, but is 
damaging to the development of a proper view of the extent to which the 
environment does play such a role. More specifically, as the attitude 
externalist argues, this mistaken notion of mental states prevents one from 
seeing the influence the environment has on what attitude one has to a given 
content. It will be shown that the metaphysical presupposition that mental 
states admit of a type-token distinction is implicitly, if not explicitly, 
endorsed by the moderate internalist and that this is a source of tension 
between the moderate internalist and the attitude externalist. I’ve already 
shown that there are good reasons to doubt the existence of token instances 
of mental states, and in the next chapter we’ll see that any moderately 
internalist view about factive attitudes like a Burgean content externalism, 
which accepts such a notion, flirts with incoherence. The view argued for in 
this chapter and the next, I propose, resolves a rather serious problem with 
current formulations of content externalism. So, the discussion of this 
chapter is really an attempt to adjudicate the benefits of the moderately 
internalist view as formulated by Burge and the attitude externalist view as 
formulated by Williamson. It will be argued in the next chapter that the 
attitude externalist is better prepared to handle a rather serious problem, 
which current forms of content externalism face. 
The first part of the chapter is somewhat exegetical, but the intent is to give a 
good explanation of the thesis that factive attitudes are both broad and prime 
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conditions. I will be focusing on Williamson’s arguments for primeness in 
the first section, and the claim that knowing (and other factive attitudes) is a 
purely mental condition, in the second section. It is here that much of the 
criticism of Williamson’s view has been focused, and I will discuss some of 
the major criticisms this thesis has faced by moderate internalists. This 
particular debate is where our metaphysical treatment of mental states in the 
last chapter is particularly relevant. It will be argued that the moderate 
internalist is essentially missing the overall picture that the attitude 
externalist is painting, since the two are basing their views on different 
metaphysical suppositions. Once the underlying metaphysical claims are 
sorted out much of the criticism of attitude externalism can be discounted. I 
will show that adopting the view on mental states suggested in the last 
chapter dissolves what I refer to as the “downgrade problem”, and is 
perfectly compatible with the claim that factive attitudes are purely mental. 
This point is made in passing by Williamson, but is not borne out by any real 
argumentation. The intent here is to substantiate this point. 
  
2.1 Williamson on Broad, Prime Conditions 
Williamson, like Burge, develops an externalist view on the nature of the 
mental. His view exceeds Burge’s however in several important ways. For 
Williamson, as well as Burge, mental content can be and in many cases is 
externally individuated by one’s socio-linguistic environment. So whatever 
arguments work for the Burgean content externalist work for Williamson’s 
view as well. However, for Williamson, not only is the content of one’s belief 
often individuated externally, but the attitude one takes to that content can 
also be individuated by environmental conditions. For both the content 
externalist and the attitude externalist, attitudes like seeing and 
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remembering cannot be understood just in terms of one’s individualistic 
properties. Considerations of one’s environment must be taken into account 
for most propositional attitudes, and the case is even more obvious for 
factive attitudes. However, on the Burgean view, attitudes like seeing and 
remembering would involve some internal component, which would serve 
as the relevant propositional attitude. The attitude externalist denies this. So, 
there is a disagreement here about just what can be the result of 
environmental factors. Burge argues that content certainly can be determined 
in part by one’s environment, but the fact that one sees that p, while it 
certainly requires some environmental truths (p’s being the case), is the 
result of both S’s having some internal purely mental state (such as S’s 
seeming to see that p) along with the relevant environmental component. 
The same goes for other factive attitudes like remembering. Thus, on Burge’s 
view, factive attitudes are composite conditions of an internal mental state 
and an external environmental condition. Elizabeth Fricker also holds a view 
like this about factive mental attitudes, as she thinks,  
There are positive reasons to think that mental content is fixed in 
part by crucial relations between a person and the referents of 
some of her content-bearing states – by a broad ‘conceptual role’ 
that extends into the thinker’s environment. But the fact that 
content is fixed partly by certain causal-cum-contextual relations, 
so that mental content is ‘broad’, does not entail, nor even suggest, 
that there are other ways in which mental states are 
environmentally dependent (Fricker, 2009, p. 54). 
According to Fricker,  
[T]he combination of accepting externalism about content, while 
regarding factive attitudes as at most weakly mental, is an 
argumentatively stable position (Fricker, 2009, p. 32). 
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Williamson on the other hand argues that we should think of attitudes like 
seeing-that as prime conditions. That is, they are conditions that do not factor 
into internal and external components. The reason for this has to do with the 
nature of composite conditions in general and I will explain this shortly. 
What is important here is that Williamson’s position treats factive 
psychological attitudes as both broad and prime conditions. 
The term ‘condition’, it needs to be noted, is used strictly as a logical term. 
Conditions are defined in terms of cases, where cases are something like 
centred worlds, in which a subject S is indexed to a time t in a possible world 
w. Conditions are course-grained, which means they are closed under logical 
conjunction and they are usually indicated in each case by the presence of a 
that-clause. Roughly speaking, conditions are just whatever is true of any 
given case. So, in a case where a subject S sees a tree in the yard, that ‘S sees a 
tree’ is a condition of that case, and so is that ‘there is a tree in the yard’. As 
far as conditions in general go, some conditions are composite and some are 
prime. Williamson distinguishes the two thus:  
A condition C is composite if and only if it is the conjunction of 
some narrow condition D with some environmental condition E. 
C is prime if and only if it is not composite (Williamson, 2000, p. 
66).  
In this context, ‘narrow’ refers to any condition that is determined 
exclusively by the internal state of the subject, and ‘environmental’ refers to 
any condition that is exclusively determined by one’s environment. So, for 
example the claim that knowledge is a prime condition is just the claim that 
in any given case α the condition C, ‘S knows that p’ is not composite. That is 
to say, C is not a composite of an internal (narrow) condition of the subject – 
whatever is going on inside the head – and an external condition of the 
environment. The basic idea is that knowledge just doesn’t factor into strictly 
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mental (internal) components and strictly non-mental (environmental) 
components.17 This is true for all factive attitudes. 
Composite conditions are such that components from one case can be 
recombined with components from another case to yield new cases in which 
the same composite conditions obtain. This is just the nature of 
compositeness. The idea here is what Williamson calls the principle of free 
recombination. Composite conditions are such that for every pair of cases α 
and β where a composite condition C obtains, there exists a third case γ in 
which components of C from both α and β can be recombined to yield C in γ. 
If as the moderate internalist contends, knowledge is a composition of 
internal (mental) and external (non-mental) components, then given free 
recombination we should be able to construct triples of cases by recombining 
the components from each such that S knows in each of them. If we cannot, 
then knowledge is not a composition of such components – it must be 
prime.18 
Now, Williamson’s notion of composite conditions is completely 
generalizable. What is crucial for his arguments is that composite conditions 
are simply those that are truth-functionally related, specifically those that are 
conjunctively or disjunctively related. What is really doing the work here, 
what allows for free recombination, is just the associative property of 
compound conditions. In fact, we can think of compositeness as something 












conditions, mental and non-metal. The idea is that just as the logical rule of 
association allows one to freely regroup the conjuncts of any set of 
compound propositions, the components of compound conditions are freely 
recombinable amongst cases, and despite such recombinations the overall 
compound condition in each of those cases is preserved.19  
On Williamson’s view, knowing (and other factive attitudes) are prime 
conditions in the sense that we cannot construct triples of cases where those 
conditions remain true across all three cases. That is just what it means for a 
condition to be prime. It is worth noting that composite conditions do not 
necessarily have to be conjunctions or disjunctions of narrow and 
environmental conditions. What they must be at least is a conjunctive or 
disjunctive condition. In fact, Williamson gives a structural analogy of 
primeness that has nothing to do with narrow or environmental conditions. 
He says,  
Suppose that a property P is the conjunction of a color property Co 
and a shape property Sh, and that both a black sphere and a white 
cube have P. Then a black cube also has P: it has Co because it is 
the same color as the black sphere, which has Co, and it has Sh 
because it is the same shape as the white cube, which has Sh. By 
contraposition, if a black sphere and a white cube have a property 
which a black cube lacks, then that property is not the conjunction 
of a color property and a shape property (Williamson, 2000, p. 68). 
In one sense, to claim that factive attitudes are broad is an uncontentious and 
rather innocuous claim, since most theorists would agree that factivity 
necessarily involves the world at some level of description. However, it isn’t 
the broadness of the content of factive attitudes that is important here. 






internalist form of content externalism. He argues that the attitudes we take 
to such content are broad. The moderate internalist view argues that one’s 
mental state depends constitutively upon conditions in one’s environment, 
and clearly this would have to be the case for knowing, since knowing is 
factive. The world simply has to be a certain way for one to be in some kind 
of factive state if being in that state entails some truth about the world. So, 
obviously factive attitudes are broadly individuated by environmental 
factors as well as by what is going on inside the head. This much a moderate 
internalist can concede. However, for the attitude externalist this only 
amounts to the claim that having a factive attitude is a broad condition, not 
that it is a composite condition. Broadness does not necessarily imply 
compositeness. The impact of this is substantial for the moderate internalist, 
since as we’ll see in the next section for the moderate internalist, only narrow 
conditions are purely mental, and for the attitude externalist factive attitudes 
are purely mental. Thus, the moderate internalist must hold that broadness 
implies compositeness if they deny that factive attitudes are purely 
psychological attitudes. The conceptual move the attitude externalist invokes 
is to think of factive attitudes as examples of broad but prime conditions. The 
remaining question is whether or not we should consider such conditions as 
purely mental. The moderate internalist denies that such conditions are 
purely mental, but does so by denying their primeness. That is, they are not 
purely mental because they are composite conditions. I will not rehearse 
Williamson’s arguments for primeness but will simply take the primeness of 




2.2 Factive Attitudes and Pure Mentality 
We saw in the preceding section that attitude externalism holds that factive 
attitudes like seeing-that and remembering-that are broad prime conditions. 
Attitude externalism also holds that these conditions are purely mental. This 
means that having a factive attitude is a purely psychological property 
contra what Burge-style content externalism contends. On the Burgean view, 
knowing is typically thought of as a kind of hybrid state. Most content 
externalists maintain a moderately internalist view because of this hybridity. 
Steven Stich captures, I think rather well, the tug of intuitions between the 
Burgean content externalist on the one hand, and the more radical attitude 
externalist on the other. He says, 
There are many sorts of properties plausibly labelled 
“psychological” that might be instantiated by a person and not by 
his replica. Remembering that p is one example, knowing that p 
and seeing that p are others. These properties have a sort of 
“hybrid” character. They seem to be analyzable into a “purely 
psychological” property (like seeming to remember that p, or 
believing that p) along with one or more non-psychological 
properties and relations (like p being true, or the memory trace 
being caused in a certain way by the fact that p) ...What is odd 
about the hybrids, I think, is that we do not expect them to play 
any role in an explanatory psychological theory. Rather, we expect 
a psychological theory which aims at explaining behavior to 
invoke only the “purely psychological” properties which are 
shared by a subject and its replicas (Stich, 1978, p. 574). 
Williamson’s view is essentially a straightforward denial of Stich's claim. On 
Williamson's view, having a factive propositional attitude like 'seeing that p' 
or 'remembering that p' is a purely psychological property, and can play an 
important explanatory role.  
In one sense, it’s uncontroversial to say that factive attitudes like seeing-that 
constitutively depend upon the environment. For, part of what it is to see 
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that p is for p to be the case. But why think that this attitude is fully mental? 
Surely, ‘p’s being the case’ is not part of one’s mental state? That is a fact 
about the world. And we don’t think of facts as somehow being parts of our 
mental states. How can a fact, out there in the world, so to speak, be 
constitutive of one’s mental state? Viewing the problem this way, I think, is 
the source of the apparent counter-intuitiveness of the attitude externalist 
view. However, as we will see in the next section this is only an apparent 
dilemma, one which is easily avoidable by the attitude externalist. For now, 
what is important to note is that the moderate internalist position, holds that 
factive attitudes are not purely mental because they are composite. Thus, 
attitudes like seeing-that and remembering-that, which are necessarily broad, 
and which for Williamson are paradigm cases of mental states in the fullest 
sense--that is, purely mental states—are going to be straightforwardly 
denied as mental in the strictest sense by the moderate internalist. Burge 
makes precisely this point in saying, 
…I do not count among mental states factive states like knowing, 
or other states like (veridical) seeing or (veridical) 
remembering…There are reasons to count as mental states in the 
strictest sense only states whose standard specifications do not 
entail representational success in each instance. These are states 
like belief and having a memory or perception as of. By contrast, 
states like knowing and (veridical) seeing are partly mental or 
psychological (knowledge involves belief, seeing entails having a 
perceptual state as of). But they have other aspects as well (Burge, 
2010, p. 62).  
The point is that a moderately internalist position about factive attitudes 
allows one to externalize the conditions for determining the content but still 
adhere to an internalism about any mental component of such an attitude. 
Anthony Brueckner puts the point this way.  
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One can be an externalist factorizer. One can, for example, accept 
content externalism and hold that internal duplicates may differ in 
their mental states in virtue of thinking thoughts with different 
contents (for example, S thinks that water is wet but his physical 
duplicate thinks that twater is wet). One can go on to deny KMS 
[knowledge as a mental state], which, as Williamson himself 
indicates, is not a thesis about the contents of propositional 
attitudes but rather a thesis about the attitudes to those contents 
(Brueckner, 2002, p. 198). 
Fricker puts the shock we might find in the attitude externalist’s suggestion 
like this, 
I think that externalism about the mental is counter-intuitive, and 
that we should buy into it no further than we are forced to. 
Externalism about mental content is counter-intuitive, because we 
think of a person’s mental states a states of her; thus discovering a 
covert relationality in the fixation of their content is surprising. 
Externalism about factive attitudes would be even more so—since 
when someone knows (or remembers, or perceives) a fact, what is 
known, and the mental representation of it involved in the 
knowing, seem to non-philosophically primed common sense 
clearly to be distinct existences (Fricker, 2009, p. 55). 
The point of contention is clearly whether or not to consider factive attitudes 
as hybrid states, and for the moderate internalist whether they are or not will 
determine the degree of their mentality. Both Fricker and Sosa have argued 
that knowing is at best an impurely mental state.20 The claim here is that if we 
count knowing as a mental state it is only by courtesy of the underlying 
belief, which is the mental component in any case of knowing. Knowing is 
not, in this sense, a purely mental state. For it involves necessarily a non-
mental component – the truth of the proposition known. As truth is not 
typically regarded as being something mental, we shouldn’t regard knowing 






individual. Fricker is willing to concede that Williamson has made the case 
that knowing is mental in a weak sense of the term. This concession 
recognizes that knowing meets at least two marks of the mental. Fricker 
grants that knowing meets the criteria of privileged access and plays a 
causal-explanatory role in behaviour, both of which are considered to be 
standard marks of the mental. Call them mark 1 and mark 2. However, it is 
contested by Fricker that two further marks are not met by factive mental 
states. As discussed above, the content externalist position says that mental 
content is in some cases constitutively dependent upon the environment, and 
the moderate internalist position is that there is some internal component to 
mental states which is not environmentally determined. According to 
Fricker, the third and fourth marks are meant to give substance to the notion 
of what we can think of as a ‘purely’ mental state. Fricker articulates these as 
such: 
Mark 3: Internality or ‘narrowness’. An internalist about the 
mental holds that a genuine mental state can have no constitutive 
dependence on any feature of the person’s environment—cannot 
be ‘world-involving’: all truly mental states must be ‘narrow’, not 
‘broad’ (Fricker, 2009, p. 36). 
Mark 4: A state is mental in the fullest sense just if it is Purely 
mental. 
She proceeds to stipulate a definition for purely mental states on the basis of 
these marks. She says, 
[A] state-type ms1 is a Purely mental state-type just if ms1 is Weakly 
mental and it is not the case that: a person’s being in ms1 consists, 
in each instance, in her being in some component mental state ms2 
distinct from ms1, plus some non-mental condition obtaining 
(Fricker, 2009, p. 36). (The italics are Fricker’s) 
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Those mental states that only satisfy the first two marks (privileged access 
and causal-explanatory role in behaviour) are thought of as ‘impurely’ 
mental. Thus, the problem we have here is that the moderate internalist, 
while conceding that knowing may be mental in a weak sense, still requires 
an internal mental component. But let us ask what reason the moderate 
internalist has for holding such a view. It certainly cannot be simply that this 
factive attitude necessarily involves the world, because as externalism about 
content recognizes most states of belief necessarily involve the world. Even 
though the attitude of believing does not guarantee the truth of the target 
proposition, according to the content externalist it is simply not the case that 
one can believe that p independent of how things are in the world for many 
propositions p. We could simply respond to Fricker by asking what reason 
there is to think that the content of a mental state may be individuated by 
environmental factors, but not the attitude. The moderate internalist regards 
this component—the attitude itself—as the purely mental component. But 
what is the reason for this? Factive attitudes cannot be had independently of 
how the world is, but neither can many beliefs. So, if knowing cannot be 
purely mental for this reason, why should we not claim the same thing for 
many beliefs?21 A moderate internalist cannot see how factive attitudes can 
be thought of as purely mental. An attitude externalist cannot see why 
moderate internalism restricts mentality to only non-factive attitudes. So, is 
the debate at a stalemate? Perhaps it is, but we can show what motivates the 
moderate internalist to adopt the view that restricts pure mentality to only 
those attitudes that are non-factive. In the last section I will address these 
commitments and argue that such commitments are based on the untenable 





formulation of a purely mental state type intimates just this point. It should 
become clear that the attitude externalist position is a perfectly reasonable 
position to take once we get clear on the metaphysical commitments of both 
views. 
I’d like to conclude this section with what I think quite succinctly 
summarizes the concerns and objections just discussed by various opponents 
to the attitude externalist view. The following scenario apparently presents a 
problem for the attitude externalist, since it forces an explanation of how a 
change in mental state can be affected by apparently irrelevant distal 
environmental factors. I refer to this problem as the “downgrade problem” 
because it is an apparent problem of how one’s epistemic condition being 
downgraded from knowledge to something short of knowledge, at the same 
time changes one’s mental state. I’ve adapted this problem from a problem 
pointed out by Jennifer Nagel in a recent paper.22 The problem is meant to 
put pressure on the idea that psychological attitudes can be susceptible to 
distal environmental changes in the way in which they would need to be on 
the attitude externalist view, since attitude externalism has the peculiar 
consequence that an epistemic change entails a change in mental state. That 
is, if one knows, and knowing is a unique type of mental state, then knowing 
that p and not knowing that p are different mental states. This might not 
seem strange on the surface of things, but this does lead to the possibility of a 
rather counterintuitive scenario. A simple way to articulate this is through 
the following example. Let’s say a subject S comes to know that the cat is on 
the mat by seeing that the cat is on the mat. And let’s say that for a moment, 
S looks away and the cat jumps off the mat. Once the cat is no longer on the 





her epistemic condition with respect to the proposition ‘the cat is on the mat’ 
has changed, but if knowing is a unique type of state, then it follows that she 
is no longer in the same mental state. However, it isn’t obvious that anything 
about her, psychologically speaking, is different from a moment before. 
Nothing internal to the subject has changed in this case, there was just a 
change in the environment – the cat jumped off the mat. So, what could it 
mean to claim that her mental state has changed? Are we claiming here that 
a distal environmental change such as this can affect her psychological state? 
On one hand we find ourselves looking for a causal explanation for such a 
change. Where is the mechanism? Clearly, the event of the cat’s jumping off 
the mat is what affected a change in the subject’s mental state. But how is 
this possible? Knowledge can be downgraded like this very easily, but we 
don’t expect that these types of downgrades constitute changes in one’s 
psychological state. Note that for the moderate internalist there is no 
problem here. The downgrade from knowledge to belief does not entail a 
change in one’s mental state, since the mental component in the subject’s 
knowledge that p is just the belief that p, which the subject retains after the 
cat jumps off the mat. The truth value of the belief may change, but the 
content and the attitude remain the same. In the next section we’ll see that 
this type of situation can be accounted for by the attitude externalist and the 
downgrade problem, though perceived as a genuine concern by opponents 
of the view, is not really a problem for the attitude externalist. 
 
2.3 Moderate Internalism vs. Attitude Externalism: Clarifying the 
Debate 
On the attitude externalist account attitudes like ‘seeing that p’, are broad 
prime and purely mental conditions, and statements of the form ‘S sees that 
Chapter	2	
	 66	
p’ attribute a purely mental state to the subject S. For the moderate internalist 
we are at best attributing an impurely mental state to the subject. Both agree 
that content is fixed, in part, by environmental conditions. Where they 
disagree is whether anything other than content is subject to such conditions. 
The downgrade problem is the problem of accounting for the fact that a 
distal change in the environment can change one’s mental attitude, and thus 
one’s mental state. Now, the internalist could agree that the general type of 
mental state we attribute to S is a factive mental state, but that any particular 
instance of that type of state is going to be an impurely mental state at best. 
Recall Fricker’s fourth mark of the mental. However, as discussed earlier, the 
externalist denies the existence of any such token instances. For the attitude 
externalist, there are no token mental states, only a range of different types of 
mental states that a subject can be in, and the fact that there is such a range 
does not imply that there are any token instances of these types. The type-
token distinction does not apply to mental states. For the attitude externalist, 
the question of how some truth about the environment (e.g. the cat’s being 
on the mat or not being on the mat) can play a role in fixing one’s mental 
attitude is understood not as being about how one’s token mental state is 
partly constituted by some truth about the environment. It cannot be about 
this because there are no token mental states to speak of. However, the type 
of mental state one is in is determined, in part, by what truths obtain. Mental 
states on the attitude externalist view are universals, entities that are more 
like facts than they are anything else. The claim that knowing is a purely 
mental state is essentially just a statement about a certain sort of fact or truth. 
One of the major sources of puzzlement about the downgrade problem is the 
use of the type-token distinction with respect to mental states by the 
moderate internalist. It is assumed by many moderate internalists (Burge 
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included) that we can distinguish between mental state types and mental 
state tokens, whereas this is not the case for the attitude externalist. The 
externalist will argue that if we accept the suggestion that there are no token 
mental states, only a range of types, then the problem of how a fact about the 
world like ‘the cat’s being on the mat’ can be part of the essence of certain 
mental states like Sally’s knowing that the cat is on the mat dissolves as a 
real issue. The problem is only a problem if we think of the mental states in 
question as particular tokens or mental particulars narrowly conceived as the 
internalist does. There is no problem here for mental state types. For, we’re 
free to type mental states in whatever manner makes sense. The problem the 
moderate internalist has with regarding factive attitudes as purely mental 
states is as token mental states. In other words, as long as the attitude 
externalist, when discussing the mentality of mental states, is restricting the 
discussion to the level of types there is no real disagreement.23 What the 
moderate internalist fails to see—and this failure is widespread—is that 
attitude externalism requires a reconceptualization of mental states, along 
the lines of Steward’s account. The moderate internalist says that factive 
attitudes cannot be purely mental states because internality or “narrowness” 
is a mark of the mental. As Fricker sees it a mental state type is purely mental 
just if it is weakly mental and in every instance one’s being in that mental 
state is not the result of one being in some other component mental state plus 
some non-mental condition obtaining. The key point here is that the 
moderate internalist, whether the Fricker type or the Burge type is arguing 
for the pure mentality of token mental states, something which is completely 
off the table for the attitude externalist. Thus, Fricker’s criteria for pure 





having a factive attitude as a purely mental state because token instances of 
that mental state must have some internal or narrow component. This mental 
particular is what the internalist regards as distinct from the fact that is 
known. As cited in the quote earlier Fricker regards these as distinct 
existences. This is what drives the appearance of there being a problem when 
changes in the environment result in a change in attitude. This is what the 
downgrade problem highlights. The moderate internalist questions how a 
purely mental, purely internal mental particular--the attitude one has to a 
proposition--changes as the result of some distal purely environmental, 
purely external condition. But of course this is not a problem for the attitude 
externalist since there is no internality or narrowness requirement for 
mentality. There is no such requirement because there are no token mental 
states that depend exclusively upon the individualistic properties of the 
subject. This is precisely what makes it an externalism – its denial of the 
internality requirement. 
As I stated in chapter one, the idea that mental states are akin to facts or 
states-of-affairs is absolutely critical in developing attitude externalism, and 
it is the fact that mental states are and should only be regarded as generic 
types, and never as token particulars that allows the externalist to claim this 
kinship. It cannot be stressed enough that for the attitude externalist the 
type-token distinction simply does not apply to mental states. Williamson 
actually says as much in several places. He takes a page from Steward in his 
(2000) when he writes, “The states in question are general: different people 
can be in them at different times. No claim is made about the essences of 
their tokens; indeed, the idea of a token state is of doubtful coherence” 
(Williamson, 2000, p. 40). He reiterates the point in his replies to Jackson and 
Fricker. He says in response to Fricker, 
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The thesis that knowing is a mental state says what kind of general 
state knowing is. It does not say what the metaphysics of instances 
of that general state is, because it does not even employ the idea of 
an instance of a general state (Pritchard and Greenough, 2009, p. 
295). 
And in a reply to Jackson he offers up essentially the same point in saying, 
“…states are universals…I reject the idea of a token state as of doubtful 
coherence…” (Pritchard and Greenough, 2009, p. 330) It is clear that the 
attitude externalist and the moderate internalist are working with different 
conceptions of mental state. The former restricts discussion of mental states 
to the level of types, whereas the latter does not. If the attitude externalist 
view about mental states is correct, then individuating mental states in terms 
of their factivity should be no more problematic than individuating them in 
terms of their attitude or content. That is, the attitude externalist is free to 
regard knowing as a type of mental state, just as believing or hoping or 
guessing are different types of mental states. And of course, on the attitude 
externalist view, believing that p and believing that p* are different types of 
mental states as well. The same goes for knowing that p and knowing that p*. 
Talk of token mental states has been acceptable practice for quite some time 
in both philosophy of mind and in epistemology. So, let us briefly look at 
what might motivate this acceptance. For Burge, if a propositional attitude 
like ‘seeing-that’ or ‘remembering-that’ is factive, then it cannot be purely 
mental (recall Fricker’s 3rd and 4th marks of the mental). Burge’s denial of 
attitude externalism is primarily motivated by his adherence to a causal 
psychological form of explanation. However, his reasons for the denial of 
states like veridical seeing as constituting a distinct psychological kind can 
be seen best in his argument against perceptual disjunctivism. The 
perceptual disjunctivist holds that there is no mental kind (perceptual state) 
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that characterizes both veridical cases of seeing and non-veridical cases of 
seeing. Visual experiences are of a disjunctive kind. That is, either one is in 
the good case, in which the perceptual state of one is veridical, or one is in 
the bad case, in which the perceptual state of one is non-veridical. For the 
disjunctivist, there is no common mental (perceptual) state to both the good 
case (where one is actually perceiving some object or feature of one’s 
environment) and the bad case (where one is under an illusion perhaps, and 
only seems to see some object or feature of one’s environment).24  Burge 
holds that perceptual kinds depend exclusively on antecedent psychological 
states, certain internal conditions and proximal stimuli to the visual system. 
No reference to distal environmental conditions is required to explain any 
perceptual state. Perceptual states are psychological only insofar as they are 
applicable to the science of perceptual psychology, and such a science makes 
no attempt to incorporate how distal conditions (e.g. p’s being the case) 
might individuate kinds of psychological states. In fact, science in general 
Burge thinks, is not in the business of discovering the conditions necessary to 
determine a kind. That, it seems is the business of philosophy. But, there are 
very mature sciences of perception that seem to completely ignore some of 
the basic claims made by the perceptual disjunctivist. Burge is keen to point 
this out. He writes, 
On any given occasion, given the total antecedent psychological 
state of the individual and system, the total proximal input 
together with the total internal input into the system suffices to 
produce a given type of perceptual state, assuming no malfunction 








He refers to this principle as the proximality principle and argues that this 
principle is implicit in causal explanations offered by perceptual psychology 
and the vision sciences. He goes on to argue that, 
The import of the principle is that given antecedent psychological 
states, the formation of perceptual states causally depends on 
nothing more than proximal input and other contemporaneous 
internal input into the perceptual system (Burge, 2005, p. 22). 
Thus, he concludes, 
Causal explanation of the occurrence of types of perceptual states 
in the science assumes that the effect of distal causes are entirely 
exhausted by their effects on proximal causes (Burge, 2005, p. 22). 
Burge’s goal with these arguments is to refute the disjunctivist claim that 
there is no common core psychological state for cases of both veridical and 
non-veridical perception. Burge’s rejection of the perceptual disjunctivist 
view is based on the premise that the empirical sciences, whose goal it is to 
understand the causes of perceptual states within a visual/perceptual system 
makes no use of a disjunctive concept of perception. As such, we should 
align our view with what our best empirical science of vision tells us, which 
is that variations in the distal environment are negligible for doing the 
science of perception since various distal stimuli can still produce similar 
proximal effects. It follows that a given perceptual state can be either 
veridical—accord with distal conditions in the environment—or non-
veridical—not accord with distal conditions. So, for Burge, we individuate 
our psychological (in this case perceptual) states independently of their 
veridicality conditions out of necessity for scientific practice. We restrict our 
attribution of mentality to states that necessarily can be both veridical and 
non-veridical. The same thinking applies to propositional attitudes. ‘Seeing 
that p’, on Burge’s view, is a hybrid of some internal mental state (something 
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like perception as of p) and some external conditions of the environment (p’s 
being the case). On this view we would not refer to factive states as types of 
mental states for the exact same reason that we would not refer to veridical 
seeing as a type of mental state. 
It seems like Burge is right that if we allow ourselves recourse to conclusions 
drawn from scientific practice, especially in the science of perceptual 
psychology, we can effectively disregard the disjunctivist appeals to require 
type individuation be dependent upon what is going on in the distal 
environment, to a large extent—at least, as far as veridicality conditions are 
concerned. The same logic, as Fricker, Brueckner, Burge and many others 
have argued can successfully be applied to factive attitudes like seeing-that 
or remembering-that. However, as the attitude externalist position regards 
mental states strictly as universals, the motivation Burge finds for denying a 
disjunctive view of perception, which carries over to his view on the mental 
in general, is absent for the attitude externalist. For the attitude externalist, 
mental states are things which are essentially structured in such a way that 
allows for individuation based on things like truths about the environment. 
The condition that p is true can be said to play a constitutive role in 
determining the attitude one has to p, simply because one’s having that 
mental attitude is not thought of in terms of particular token states. S’s belief 
that p is not a thing which would ever be subject to proximal stimuli from 
the environment. Neither would any mental state for that matter perceptual 
or otherwise. Mental states, ontologically speaking, are generic types of 
things, and generic types of things are never things which could be subject to 
proximal stimuli at all. To think of mental states in the way in which the 
moderate internalist thinks of them is essentially to commit a kind of 
category mistake. It is worth noting that even Fricker acknowledges the 
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relevance of discussing the broader issues here with respect to how we 
understand mental states. In her criticism of Williamson’s account, she 
footnotes,  
One implication of the present discussion is that the final 
judgment on KMS [knowledge as a mental state] will turn, inter 
alia, on the stance taken on large general issues in metaphysics 
about the nature of properties and states (Fricker, 2009, p. 55). 
The quote from Fricker in section 2.2. points up the problem between the 
moderate internalist and the attitude externalist rather well. Ultimately, it 
boils down to what we count as being fully mental. The internalist thinks, for 
various reasons, that only that which is narrow and internal should count as 
purely mental. The externalist simply denies this. Given the arguments of the 
previous section we are led to one of two conclusions. Since, ‘seeing that p’ 
and other factive attitudes are prime conditions, either they are mental 
conditions or they are not mental conditions. On the one hand one feels a 
sort of reluctance to grant the mentality of such broad conditions given the 
obvious non-mental character of the relevant environmental facts. On the 
other hand, denying conditions like ‘seeing that p’ or ‘remembering that p’ 
any kind of mentality seems too strong. It needs to be recognized that the 
attitude externalist is not simply conflating as one existence what Fricker 
regards as two distinct existences. It is just that on the attitude externalist 
account there is no reason to deny ‘knowing that p’ full mental status as 
there is on the internalist account. Factive mental states are just as 
legitimately a type of mental state as any other. The claim that factive 
attitudes are purely mental thus goes through just fine given this restriction 
to the level of types. 
To summarize, both the moderate internalist and the attitude externalist 
agree that we can regard factive attitudes as at least types of mental states. 
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The internalist, of course, would argue that the type of mental state they are 
are hybrid and impurely mental states. But, at least it can be conceded by the 
internalist that there is nothing objectionable to regarding ‘seeing that p’ or 
‘remembering that p’ as at least a type of mental state. The moderate 
internalist goes one step further than the attitude externalist and claims that 
internality or narrowness is essential to pure mentality. Only those narrow 
internal conditions can be regarded as purely mental. The externalist simply 
denies this. He can deny this for two reasons. Firstly, certain types of mental 
states do not factor into internal and external components. They are prime 
conditions. So, in many cases, specifically those concerning factive attitudes, 
there are no internal or narrow conditions to speak of. Secondly, there can be 
no narrowness or internality requirement for types of mental states. The 
internality or narrowness requirement is a requirement for token particulars, 
not for generic types. Universals do not supervene upon the individualistic 
properties of the subject, particulars do. On the attitude externalist view, 
there is nothing for the internality or narrowness requirement to be true of. 
The debate is not necessarily resolved by either party’s arguments, and it 
seems that what is required is recourse to a particular set of metaphysical 
suppositions to settle things. The attitude externalist makes those 
suppositions clear. There are no token mental states. For the attitude 
externalist there is no issue of how a factive attitude can be a purely mental 
state, since mental states, by their very nature are already fact-like entities. 
Attributing a mental state to a subject is just to say of that subject that certain 
facts are true of her—certain mental facts. As we’ll see in the next chapter, 
adopting the attitude externalist view is advantageous in a very important 
way, and accepting the underlying metaphysical view allows the attitude 








The literature on mental causation and psychological explanation, the two 
topics with which this chapter is concerned is vast. These topics are topics for 
an entire thesis and cannot be sufficiently explored within the bounds of a 
single chapter. Thus, my foray into these topics is not for purposes of 
exploring some new understanding of either of these topics, but only to 
answer a very particular challenge presented to the content externalist, 
which I think is uniquely handled by the metaphysical distinctions offered in 
the first chapter, and which I think help motivate the overall view of attitude 
externalism. 
In chapter one I suggested that there is a significant difference between 
mental states and mental events with respect to their temporal properties. I 
argued, along with Steward, that mental events are ontologically distinct 
types of entities from mental states due to a difference in temporal shape. I 
further argued that mental states should be thought of strictly as universals 
and that the type-token distinction, while applicable to events does not come 
into play in discussions of mental states. The ontological differences between 
these types of entities should give us some pause when discussing the 
mental where we feel the temptation to simply lump them together as if 
what is said about one, might just as easily hold for the other. In this chapter 
I will continue this line of thinking and suggest that there is a further, and 
crucially important difference between mental states and mental events with 
respect to mental content. For Burge, and other externalists a psychological 
Chapter	3	
	 76	
state like the belief that p has its content essentially. Since the 
representational content of a belief that p is thought to individuate the type 
of belief, the fact that the belief is a ‘belief that p’ cannot be a contingent 
matter of fact. As Burge puts it, “…representational psychological states are 
explanatory kinds that cannot be reduced to any others” (Burge, 2010, p. 63). 
Content for Burge and many others plays a constitutive role in determining 
the type of state. The particular content that p in a subject’s belief that p 
determines what that belief is essentially. 
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. First, the intent is show that the 
metaphysical distinction between occurrent mental properties and non-
occurrent mental properties provides a solution to a serious problem for the 
content externalist. In section two I will discuss this problem, which has 
most recently been articulated by Joseph Owens in the form of a dilemma, 
for the content externalist. Second, it will be shown that by addressing this 
dilemma through employing the metaphysical distinctions of chapter one we 
thereby motivate the attitude externalist view, which Owens concedes is 
motivated by the dilemma. The argument presented in section one will show 
that mental states have their content essentially, whereas mental events can 
have their content contingently. That is, a change in content for a mental 
event (e.g. S’s considering whether p contrasted with S’s considering 
whether p*) does not necessarily make for a different event. This difference 
between necessary and contingent content is at the heart of the problem for 
the content externalist. I believe that this distinction is most often overlooked 
by theorists and is the source of serious confusion in discussions about the 




The argument of section three is that mental states do not play the causal 
explanatory role that the content externalist typically claims for them. This 
does not mean that there are no mental particulars that do play a causal 
explanatory role. Mental events are well suited for just this purpose. The 
ontological differences between occurrent mental entities and non-occcurrent 
mental entities comes into play here. The advice to parties engaged in the 
debate over the role that mental states play in psychological explanation is 
that we must be careful with our mentalistic vocabulary. The distinction 
between events/processes and states is so often overlooked that it is just 
assumed that what is said of one is true of the other and that nothing 
substantive turns on making this distinction. Nothing could be further from 
the truth in this case.  
Essentially, it will be argued that mental states are causally relevant to 
psychological explanations but contra popular opinion should not be 
thought of as involving reference to causally efficacious particulars. The 
right way to think of their role in explanation, in causal terms, is as causally 
relevant, but their explanatory weight in providing reasons for acting must 
be considered as something more like an explanation of relevant facts of the 
case. In this sense, the role that mental states play in psychological 
explanation is much more akin to the traditional Wittgensteinian/Rylean 
model of psychological explanation. However, this does not jeopardize the 
causal role of certain mental entities, namely, mental events. Such mental 
entities can be regarded as causally efficacious particulars and serve in 
causal-psychological explanation in the manner in which most theorists 
today believe that all content-bearing mental attitudes do (mental states 
included). So, in effect the arguments of this chapter are irenic in theme, but 
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should help clarify the underlying support that the given metaphysical 
picture of this thesis gives to the overall account of attitude externalism. 
 
3.1 Necessary and Contingent Content 
Content is always generic.25 Any discussion of mental content should restrict 
itself to the level of types. That is to say, that when we individuate a mental 
state by its content we are doing so at the level of types. This is not to say 
that this is the only way to individuate mental properties, but only that 
mental content must be sufficiently generic to be multiply realizable. If we 
want to allow for the possibility of more than one subject having the belief 
that water is translucent, then the content of that state must be something 
sufficiently generic such that more than one individual can be in that type of 
state. Thus, mental content, and I specifically mean propositional content, 
must be regarded as typical in any case in which one grasps such content. 
This is also not to say that propositional content cannot be specific or cannot 
be quite granular, but regardless of the fine-grainedness or specificity of the 
propositional content, such content is always going to be typical to allow for 
the fact that it is multiply realizable.26 For our purposes we can think of 
content in the Fregean sense, as being something abstract and in the public 
domain. That is to say, mental content as discussed here is not a subjective 













state. Multiple individual minds can share or be in the same mental state 
with the same mental content. This is part of what it means to say that 
mental states are universals. This much has been discussed so far, but what 
hasn’t been discussed in much detail is the fact that both mental states and 
mental events can be said to have some kind of propositional content. The 
sentence ‘S is considering whether p’ attributes an occurrent mental property 
to S, which on the view outlined above can be thought of as a kind of mental 
event. That particular mental occurrence has the content p. The same content 
can be captured by a mental state attribution, such as ‘S believes that p’. Let p 
be the proposition ‘Jane’s argument is sound’. So, S’s considering whether 
Jane’s argument is sound and S’s belief that Jane’s argument is sound do not 
differ in content but differ in attitude: they differ in the way in which that 
content, that ‘Jane’s argument is sound’ relates to them.27 Now, it is fairly 
standard practice to acknowledge that a difference in attitude can be thought 
of as a difference in the way, in our example, S stands to p. However, some 
attitudes can be described as events and some can be described as states 
depending on whether or not we are attributing an occurrent property to S 
or a non-occurrent property to S. The suggestion here is that the way in 
which a mental event and a mental state have their propositional content is 
not necessarily the same. We can, of course talk about particular mental 















stretches of time. These occurrences can be thought of as particulars, because 
we can, in a sense, isolate them spatio-temporally from other particulars. 
Thus, in principle we can individuate a particular mental event 
independently of its propositional content. Consider again the sentence ‘S is 
considering whether p’. This is a particular mental occurrence, which might 
be described from a purely physiological perspective. We might describe this 
as a particular group of neuronal firings, occurring in a specific region of a 
specific brain at a specific time. We can, in principle, depending on the state 
of neuroscience, point to the neurological event and say, “That is S 
considering whether p.” We might even form an identity statement of the 
form ‘A = B’, where ‘A’ is a description of the event from a physiological 
perspective and ‘B’ is a description of the event from an intentional 
perspective. So, we can individuate some mental properties such as the 
property of ‘considering whether p’ on a physical basis, as a particular event. 
In doing so, we neglect the specific content, p. Obviously, what S is 
considering is important in understanding what S is doing, at least from the 
intentional perspective. There is a relevant content here, and that is p. But 
from the physiological perspective, the content is irrelevant in identifying the 
event in question. The question I want to ask here is: could the content of 
such an event just as easily have been something other than what it is? From 
a physical perspective could the same event have been the mental property 
of ‘considering whether p*’? In other words, is p essential to the event as 
being the event that it is? We’ll come back to this question. First, let us ask 
the same question of mental states. Can a mental state be given a completely 
non-intentional description and still be describing the same state as it is 
described in intentional language? Or, to put it another way, can a state like 
the belief that p be the self-same state but be the belief that p*? 
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The answer to this question should be fairly obvious given the arguments of 
chapter one. Mental states do not admit of any particularity and thus cannot 
be the subject of identity statements like the one above relating a physical 
description of an event to an intentional description of the same event. 
Mental states are inherently generic, which means there is no non-intentional 
way of individuating them. The way in which we individuate mental states 
is only through their intentional characteristics, such as their content and 
attitude. The denial of the possibility of token instances of mental states 
precludes the possibility of there being any non-intentional way of 
individuating one mental state from another. So, the content and attitude of 
any given mental state is essential to that state. Thus, the belief that water is 
translucent, which I hold, could not have had the content that ‘twater is 
translucent’, which my twin holds, and still be the same mental state. Mental 
states must have their propositional content essentially if we are to even 
make sense of such twin scenarios. But the question remains whether the 
same is true for particular mental events. Why should we maintain that a 
particular mental event has its content essentially if we can, in theory, give 
both an intentional and completely non-intentional description of one and 
the same event? If we have some completely non-intentional description for 
a particular mental event e, which describes that event from, say a 
neurological perspective, and we have the identity statement ‘A = B’, where 
‘A’ is that neurological description of e and ‘B’ is an intentional description of 
e, then ‘A’ picks out the same event as ‘B’, namely, e. But if e is that 
neurological event, then both me and my twin have e. But if, holding the 
world fixed, we vary the content for my twin such that the content of e is not 
p, but p*, then that content can only be regarded as a contingent property of 
e. For, if it were essential for e that it have the content p, then it would be 
common to e for both me and my twin. In other words, if we want to claim, 
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as externalists do, that content can vary while all other things are held fixed, 
and allow for such token identities to hold, then content cannot be essential. 
If on the other hand we deny that such token identities hold, as we do for 
mental states, according to the view being developed here, then we can claim 
that such content is essential. For, a variation in content will be a variation in 
mental state. And this accords with our intuitions that a belief that p is a 
different belief from a belief that p*. 
 
3.2 Owens’ Dilemma 
Current formulations of content externalism embody a deep inconsistency. 
There are many names for the type of theory I’m referring to. I’ve been using 
‘content externalism’, but ‘psychological externalism’ is another popular 
term used and Burge uses ‘anti-individualism’. There are subtle variations 
between the views as formulated by different theorists, but there are some 
very basic tenets that carry over, and this inconsistency can be found in most 
variations of the theory. The first major principle of any of these theories is 
that psychological theorizing appeals to content-individuated states. In 
particular, the folk-psychological concepts of the propositional attitudes 
figure in our psychological explanations of human behavior. Of course, there 
are many theories that have attempted over the years to reduce intentional 
talk to that of more scientific talk of brain states and functional roles, but the 
elimination of intentional terminology has not succeeded in any wholesale 
manner. The second important claim is fairly universal in externalist views 
and is that psychological explanations are just a species of causal 
explanations. This is the result of a reversal of what was once philosophically 
fashionable in the early part of the twentieth century with the ordinary 
language school. Prior to Davidson, Lewis, Putnam and others ushering in a 
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new era of philosophy of mind where identity theories and functional 
accounts of mind were all the rage, there was a very different understanding 
of just what psychological explanations were, and what they were meant to 
explain.28 The Rylean/Wittgensteinian school of thought was dominant then 
and on this school of thought psychological explanations were thought be 
essentially rationalizations of human behavior and actions, and not causal 
mechanistic explanations invoking mysterious mental entities.29 To say that 
Sally brought her umbrella with her because she believed it would rain was 
to give a rationalization of her actions by citing reasons for such actions, and 
reasons were not thought of as causes, nor was explaining one’s behavior by 
citing their reason for so acting thought of as explaining things in causal 
terms. I will not go into the details of the ordinary language approach to 
rationalizations and psychological explanations here. Suffice it to say, there 
was a very different picture of just what psychological explanation 
amounted to prior to a particular turn in the philosophy of mind. Davidson, 
as much as anyone had quite a lot to do with this turn with his “The Logical 
Form of Action Sentences” where he argued quite admirably against the 
Rylean/Wittgensteinian school of thought. Davidson essentially argued that 
reasons should be thought of as causes, and provided several arguments for 
this view. This is not the place to do any exegesis of Davidson’s view, but it 
will help to touch on one essential point that played quite an important role 
in overthrowing the previous school of thought. Rationalizations, Davidson 
argued, suffer one serious inadequacy, and that is that one could have good 
reason for X-ing while X-ing but not for those reasons. Thus, if what we’re 
doing in giving a psychological explanation is rationalizing one’s behavior 






one could have acted in the way they acted for any number of reasons, all of 
which could be good reasons. How, exactly are we explaining anything if we 
cannot differentiate between what Davidson referred to as ‘reasons for’ and 
‘reasons for which’? The difference, Davidson reasons, is that in the case in 
which the reason explains the action, that reason must be regarded as the 
cause of the action.30 
Both of these claims, that psychological theorizing makes reference to 
content-individuated states and that psychological explanation is a species of 
causal explanation find a home in most externalist accounts of mental 
content. However, these two theses have been, ever since the Twin-Earth 
thought experiments of Burge and Putnam, at the core of an ongoing debate. 
The debate has mostly focused on whether or not psychological theories 
should take into account externally dependent content or can survive in all 
its explanatory power without any recourse to such notions. Fodor and Stich 
among others have argued that psychological science, in particular cognitive 
psychology, can and must only consider those individualistic properties that 
we consider to be causally efficacious. Even if it is conceded that some 
content is externally individuated, psychology as a science must only 
concern itself with those kinds that can be type individuated in terms of their 
causal powers, and such causal powers must supervene upon the 
individualistic properties of the subject.31 Others, like Burge, have argued 
that such “narrow content” theories completely neglect the context-sensitive 
nature of certain psychological kinds, and that drawing the boundaries of 
what we consider to be causally relevant psychological features in such a 






internal states of an individual discounts a great many theories in cognitive 
psychology.32 
This debate is large and even though the history of it is quite interesting, 
what concerns us in this section is a particular problem with the two theses 
above, one that ironically has not been addressed to any adequate degree by 
either parties. The tension is basically this. Reference to content-individuated 
mental states requires that one recognize mental states whose content is 
essential to that state. However, the explanatory practice of appealing to 
such mental states interpreted as a causal form of explanation is in tension 
with the very notion of those states as being intentional states. For the 
internalist about content, the story is quite clear. Causal explanation must 
make reference in some way to those psychological properties that can be 
said to supervene on the internal physical properties of the individual. But in 
this case, we lose the ability to reference intentional states in our 
explanations. As Owens puts it, “Psychological theory cannot both appeal to 
content-individuated states and satisfy the supervenience requirement” 
(Owens, 1987, p. 545). For the content externalist, like Burge, the story is 
equally clear, only the difference is that causal explanations do not need to 
only make reference to those properties which supervene upon the internal 
physical properties of the individual. The problem with this approach is that 
in this case, the causal explanation ceases to be a genuine causal explanation 
by virtue of making reference to intentional states whose content is essential 
to the nature of that state. I’ll attempt to explain these conclusions by first 







Owens. I will then proceed to explain the reasoning behind each horn. 
Owens presents the dilemma as such. 
For the [intentional] realist, the expressions ‘Alf’s belief that cans 
are made of aluminum’ and ‘Alf*s belief that cans are made of 
twalum’ designate states that have contents. The states designated 
have these contents essentially or non-essentially. If they have 
them non-essentially then the states designated are simply not 
psychological states, not beliefs, not desires. If they have such 
contents essentially then we have reason to think that explanations 
which cite such states are not causal explanations; we have reason 
to think that such states cannot play the causal role traditional 
theory assigns them (Owens, 2007, p. 270). 
The argument, roughly put, is that if we accept that a subject S and her twin 
S* can be said to be in distinct psychological states and the content of those 
psychological states is essential to those states, then these states cannot play 
the causal role in action, which many externalists like Burge assume they do. 
The idea is that if you’re an externalist about content like Burge, who thinks 
that representational content serves to determine a psychological kind (i.e. 
content is essential), then you cannot accept that such psychological states 
are causally efficacious. Let’s look at the first horn of the dilemma.  
The first horn states that if some psychological state has its content non-
essentially, that is, the content of that state is contingent, then they are not 
psychological states. The idea here is that if the content is not regarded as 
essential to the state, but is only a contingent property of the state, then we 
cannot be type individuating the states with respect to content. We must be, 
as suggested earlier, individuating the state/event non-intentionally. That is 
to say, the contingent content theorist is committed to claiming that there 
must be a way of describing one’s mental state non-intentionally. For, if we 
cannot, then the content must be essential to that state. However, if this is the 
Chapter	3	
	 87	
case we have a problem. Consider the following phrase, adapted from 
Owens (2007). 
a) ‘Alf’s belief that cans are made of aluminum’. 
If we’re contingent content theorists, then we can accept that the state 
designated by (a) could have had a different content. It could have had the 
content that ‘cans are made of twalum’. This is perfectly acceptable, since we 
are considering the state in question from a non-intentional perspective, 
perhaps physiologically. However, it is certainly not acceptable to claim as 
Owens notes, that “[A]lf’s state of believing that cans are made of aluminum 
could have had the content that cans are made of twalum” (Owens, 2007, p. 
261). This is essentially to claim that one’s state of believing that p could have 
been a state of believing that q, which is borderline incoherent. The reason 
for this, is simply because we recognize that a difference in the content of a 
belief makes for a different belief. If the state is a psychological state of belief, 
then we simply cannot accept this kind of claim. The only way in which it 
makes any sense to say that the state could have had a different content, is to 
do so from a non-intentional perspective, but this amounts to dismissing the 
psychological state as psychological. We might as well just talk about such 
states from a purely physiological or neurological perspective and dismiss 
talk of the intentional content altogether. As Owens puts it, 
Such a theorist may understand psychological expressions such as 
(a) as designating psychological states…but then that theorist is 
committed to…the absurd result of thinking that the very state of 
believing that P could be the state of believing that Q. On the other 
hand, the contingent content theorist may understand expressions 
such as (a) as not designating psychological states at all, but rather 
as designating physiological or some such states. On this second 
option, the absurd position…is not forced on one, but one is opting 
for an ontology devoid of mental states (Owens, 2007, p. 264). 
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 Clearly the option that most externalists opt for is the essentialist option, 
where we can avoid the incoherent talk of claiming that a state of believing 
that p could have been a state of believing that q and be the same 
psychological state. However, this option has its own problem, which is 
captured by the second horn of the dilemma. So, let’s take a look at that. 
Now, the second horn basically says that the causal explanatory route is 
closed to the essentialist, the externalist that thinks that such psychological 
states have their content of necessity, and externalists like Burge think that 
this is the case. Burge has claimed in several places that content plays a role 
in individuating psychological kinds. However, the line usually taken to talk 
of psychological explanations as causal, is the one that usually does so using 
a non-intentional vocabulary. In order to avoid the challenges that the 
Rylean/Wittgensteinian approach posed to talk of the mental in causal 
language, we must use a non-intentional vocabulary. But we cannot do this if 
we’re committed to claiming that a subject and her twin’s mental states have 
their content necessarily. For, as Owens points out, once we recognize that 
we’ve characterized the state as being a state that has its content essentially, 
then that state cannot be a state characterized non-intentionally, since it 
would be common to both a subject S and her twin. But by the externalist 
thought experiment the content is not common to S and her twin. The only 
thing that is common to both is how things are with them as non-
intentionally described. If we were able to describe S’s state of believing that 
p non-intentionally, then that state so described would be applicable to her 
twin and would also be the state of believing that p. But ex hypothesi this is 
not the case. Thus, the content externalist who regards the content as 
necessary to the state has no way of avoiding using the intentional language 
of reasons and rationalizations in psychological explanations, since the 
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causal language, which for most, relies on the possibility of referring to such 
states as non-intentionally described is not available. On something like a 
Davidsonian picture the reason why psychological explanations work as 
causal explanations is because of the fact that we can identify token 
psychological states with token physical states. But if we have nothing like 
this available to us, which we do not if we’re essentialists about content, then 
it doesn’t look like we have any way of characterizing a psychological 
explanation as causal at all. Of course, Burge has offered a counter argument 
to the effect that he accepts the causal explanation view but rejects the token 
identities of Davidson’s view. His reasoning here is that under Davidson’s 
characterization of things, a causal relation between A and B obtains only if 
that singular causal relation instantiates a law-like generalization.33 
However, Burge argues that as in many sciences, the psychological sciences 
employ the use of singular causal explanation in many cases where the 
generalization of a law-like regularity seems to not directly apply.34 Thus, for 
Burge, we can be essentialists about mental content and adopt the causal-
psychological view of explanation of action and behavior and not accept the 
token identity theses of Davidson. I do not want to spend time here arguing 
for whether or not Burge has successfully defended such a combination of 
views. There are reasons to suspect he has not successfully defended such a 
view. 35 The intention here is to point out that this form of externalism is not 
obviously consistent with the causal-psychological view of explanation. In 
the next section we’ll look at a way of handling this dilemma, one which 
allows for both notions of necessary and contingent content and one that 







Owens’ dilemma is a serious challenge to the externalist. Ultimately Owens 
argues that we cannot be essentialists and externalists about mental content 
while holding that belief states are causally efficacious psychological states. 
He suggests that externalism not only motivates views like Williamson’s, 
where knowledge can be counted as a full-blown mental state, but that 
externalism about belief states counts against the view that belief is a 
causally efficacious mental state. I believe that Owens’ analysis is correct and 
that beliefs are not causally efficacious states. Fortunately for us, this accords 
with attitude externalism. 
 
3.3 The Role of Mental States in Psychological Explanation 
In this section I want to show that the Rylean/Wittgensteinian view of 
psychological explanation really turns on the considerations mentioned 
earlier about the distinction between mental events and mental states. 
Singular causal statements of the form ‘A caused B’ refer to particulars as 
their causal relata. Thus, if a mental state, such as belief, only admits of a 
type of universality as was argued in chapter one, then how do we make 
sense of such statements when used to describe a causal relation between a 
given mental state and a particular action? Davidson offers us a way to do 
this, but unfortunately it requires us to recognize the existence of token 
mental states, which we’ve already seen is a specious concept. The use of the 
type-token distinction goes hand-in-hand with trying to account for how 
psychological states can have any kind of causal-explanatory power. To shift 
our model of what psychological explanation is back to a 
Rylean/Wittgensteinian interpretation is to question whether in describing 
one’s actions as resulting from the presence of a particular belief we are 
giving a strictly causal explanation. Do all psychological explanations pick 
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out a causal relation? Perhaps, we might be inclined to think those 
explanations that take the form of a singular causal statement necessarily 
pick out a causal relation, but not all explanations take this form. In fact, the 
most common form of explanation used in giving a psychological 
explanation is what Steward refers to as a ‘sentential explanation’. They take 
the form of sentences like ‘Mary bolted the door because she was afraid’ or 
‘Sam went to the fridge because he was hungry’. The form of explanation 
here is not a singular causal form, but a sentential form and it is not obvious 
that such a form is necessarily picking out a relation between causally 
efficacious particulars. We may say things like, ‘Sally X-ed because she 
believed that p’, but it is not totally clear that we are citing a causal relation 
between Sally’s belief and her action. In fact, on the Rylean/Wittgensteinian 
model to do this is to commit a kind of category mistake. On something like 
Davidson’s view we certainly are citing a causal relation, but it is critical at 
this point to note that on the attitude externalist view, the view argued for in 
this thesis, things are a bit different. The attitude externalist restricts the 
discussion of mental states to the level of types. This makes reference to the 
causal efficacy of mental states inherently problematic for the attitude 
externalist, since causal interaction is not typically thought to occur at the 
level of types. Types do not causally interact with one another – particulars 
do. We wouldn’t say that the type of A caused the type of B. Types don’t 
seem suited to play the same kind of causal role that particular objects or 
events might play. Davidson’s view led to talk of token identities between 
mental and physical states. The type-token distinction requires something 
like Davidson’s identity theory to make sense of the causal-psychological 
form of explanation. This is not to say that there is no way to make sense of 
sentential form psychological explanations as being causal, it just isn’t clear 
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that they are picking out causally efficacious particulars as singular causal 
statements of the form ‘A caused B’ do. 
Particulars bear causal relations to one another, that much seems plausible. 
And types might bear causal relations to particulars or even to other types, 
but the kind of relation they bear doesn’t seem to be one of efficacy, but more 
one of the relevance of certain sorts of facts. If what we’re saying when we 
say that Sally believes that p is that there are certain kinds of facts that are 
true of Sally, which is what the attitude externalist is saying, then the causal-
explanatory role of mental states doesn’t quite seem to make sense. For, her 
belief that p, on the view just argued for is just there being certain facts or 
states-of-affairs applicable to Sally’s situation. There is no particular entity—
Sally’s belief that p—which can act as a causal relatum in the way in which a 
particular event or object might. The fact that she believes that p might be 
relevant in giving a full causal explanation of her actions, but that is not to 
say that her belief that p caused her actions. 
If our picture of the mental is the one outlined in chapter one, where we 
recognize the ontological differences between those mental properties which 
are occcurrent and those which are non-occurrent, we are in a position to 
allow for both the possibility of contingent content and the possibility of 
necessary content. It makes sense on the view outlined here that we 
individuate mental states like belief by its content, which means that such 
content is necessary to those states. But it also makes sense to individuate 
certain mental events non-intentionally, which means that the content of 
those events can be merely a contingent matter. The attitude externalist is 
thus uniquely positioned here, in that she can accept both horns of Owens’ 
dilemma. Accepting the fact that mental states do not come into play in 
causal-psychological explanations of actions because of the fact that their 
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content is essential is perfectly in line with the attitude externalist view. For 
the attitude externalist, mental states are universals, something more akin to 
facts than they are to particulars. Thus, their role in psychological 
explanation should not be expected to be anything similar to the role that 
particular events might play. On the other hand, particular mental events are 
well suited to play a causal-explanatory role due to their particularity. The 
claim that we must have a way of non-intentionally describing certain 
mental phenomena in order to describe the causal relations they may have, is 
a plausible claim for mental events. Thus, on the attitude externalist view, 
both causal and non-causal types of explanations have their place in 
psychology. To give an explanation in terms of one’s mental states 
exclusively, we must keep in mind that the appropriate form of explanation 
is not strictly a causal explanation, but more one of the relevance of certain 
facts or truths. On the other hand, to give an explanation in terms of 
particular mental events, which can be non-intentionally described, a causal 
form of explanation seems perfectly reasonable. What is important here is 
that we are describing subtly different phenomena in each case, and as such 
it should not be surprising that what is said for one may not be the case for 
the other. 
Owens’ arguments serve to put the Rylean/Wittgensteinian position on 
psychological explanations back into play as a plausible way of talking about 
the mental and its relation to human behavior. It needs to be emphasized 
that to say that ‘Sally X-ed because she believed that p’ is not strictly a causal 
explanation, is not to claim that Sally’s belief is causally irrelevant to her 
action, as we might include the fact that she believed that p in a complete 
description of the cause of her actions. But this is not to say that her belief is 
acting like a causally efficacious particular. If we invoke the notion of causal 
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relevance versus causal efficacy, then we can get a bit more purchase on the 
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Chapter 4 Remembering, Forgetting and Knowing 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will consider what are thought by many to be paradigmatic 
factive mental attitudes, remembering and forgetting. Philosophical accounts 
of remembering are quite numerous, whereas the literature on forgetting is 
surprisingly anaemic. I will try to give as thorough a treatment of these 
topics, as pertains to the general discussion of the thesis, though much more 
can be said on both than is present here. The chapter is divided into three 
sections. The first section will be a brief discussion on two opposing views 
on the nature of remembering which have a fairly firm foothold on the topic. 
The first is regarded as the causal view of remembering, the second, the 
epistemic view of remembering. I will then offer up a distinction that I think 
plays a critical role in any proper discussion of remembering, and one which 
as I’ve argued in a previous chapter plays a critical role in how we 
understand the mental—the occurrence/non-occurrence distinction. As in 
previous chapters, it will be argued that this distinction is overlooked by 
most theorists and as a result the view advanced from both sides is lacking. I 
will argue that what most theorists take to be the central feature of 
remembering, the connection condition, is not just a blanket condition that 
equally applies to all cases of remembering. Insofar as one can be said to 
remember in the non-occurrent sense, the causal view is found deficient and 
the epistemic view is much more plausible. However, insofar as one is 
occurrently remembering something, a causal explanation of the connection 
between one’s current representation and one’s past experiences seems 
perfectly acceptable. However, the acceptance of a causal connection does 
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not rule out an epistemic connection for the simple fact that occurrent 
remembering entails non-occurrent remembering; and non-occurrent 
remembering entails an epistemic relation between one’s remembering and 
previous mental states.  
I will offer three counterexamples to what is known as the entailment thesis. 
I suggest that we are forced to acknowledge a kind of compromise between 
the competing views on remembering and accept a jointly causal-epistemic 
view. The ultimate outcome of this approach is that remembering entails 
knowing, but not in the case in which one remembers, since it only entails 
having previously come to know. Thus, remembering has an interesting 
existential implication that other factive attitudes do not. The point can be 
made as follows. For any case α, where S remembers that p, there is another 
case β in which S knows that p. Yet, from the fact that S remembers that p in 
α it does not follow that S knows that p in α. 
 
4.1 Contrary Psychological Attitudes and Contradictory Epistemic 
Conditions 
To remember that something is the case is to know that it is the case, and to 
forget that something is the case is to not know that it is the case. At least, if 
we adopt a very common sense sort of understanding of these mental 
attitudes, these statements seem true enough, even platitudinous. What also 
seems a platitude is that one remembers just in case one has not forgotten, 
and when one has not forgotten one can be said to remember. We use these 
terms in ordinary language to refer to what seem to be contradictory states of 
mind. Ryle expressed this point in noting that, “by far the most important 
and the least discussed use of the verb is that use in which remembering 
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something means having learned something and not forgotten it”(Ryle, 1949, 
p. 272). In other words, at least in ordinary usage, there seems to be an 
important bi-conditional relation between remembering and forgetting—one 
remembers that p if and only if one has not forgotten that p. 
Our everyday use of these verbs is further meant to indicate a kind of 
privileged (or lack thereof) epistemic condition. As Ryle further points out 
‘remember’ when used to indicate the fact that one has not forgotten, “…is 
often, though not always, an allowable paraphrase of the verb ‘to know’” 
(Ryle, 1949, p. 273). That is to say, to remember how to swim is to know how 
to swim, to remember the way to the church is to know the way to the 
church, etc. We also regard remembering as a factive propositional 
attitude—if one remembers that p, then p must be the case.36 Like 
remembering, forgetting is also thought to be a factive attitude. Thus, if one 
has forgotten that p, then it immediately follows that p is the case. 
Remembering and forgetting are also often treated as if they are 
contradictory states of mind, or at least that they entail contradictory 
epistemic conditions. The obvious reason for this is that in conjunction with 
the fact that they are regarded as factive attitudes, they are both regarded as 
indicating opposing epistemic conditions. If one remembers that p, then one 
knows that p. Forgetting, on the other hand, is taken to entail ignorance. If 
one has forgotten that p, then one does not know that p. I take these remarks 








What I want to do here is cast a bit of doubt on what I think is an overly 
simplistic view on the relation between remembering and forgetting. I will 
try to argue that there is an important logical relation between the condition 
that one remembers that p and the condition that one has forgotten that p, 
and that despite the fact that the mental attitudes of remembering and 
forgetting are mutually exclusive, viz. one cannot have both attitudes to the 
same content at the same time, that is not the whole story when it comes to 
the epistemic relation both these attitudes bear to knowledge. One question 
that will be quite important is whether we should think of remembering and 
forgetting primarily in terms of one another, or in terms of their relation to 
knowledge. There may be sacrifices to make either way to our ordinary 
conception of both attitudes. 
I will adopt the conventional stance here and assume that remembering and 
forgetting are both factive propositional attitudes and it will be, at least, 
provisionally assumed that remembering entails knowing and that 
forgetting entails ignorance. With that, I think common usage of the verbs 
warrant, at least to begin with, the following. Where p is a true proposition,  
1. S remembers that p, if and only if, S has not forgotten that p. 
This bi-conditional is certainly consistent with the idea that remembering 
entails knowing and forgetting entails ignorance, since we hold that 
knowledge and ignorance are exclusive of one another. Thus, we can say, 
2. If S remembers that p, then S knows that p. 
3. If S has forgotten that p, then S does not know that p. 
Starting with our everyday conception captured in (1), let us ask whether 
this is strictly true. As the reader might have suspected, this bi-conditional is, 
of course, false. Let us break the bi-conditional in (1) into its components: 
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4. If S remembers that p, then S has not forgotten that p. 
5. If S has not forgotten that p, then S remembers that p. 
Looking at the components of (4) we have, 
6. S remembers that p, and 
7. S has not forgotten that p. 
Now, remembering is factive, which means that p must be true for S to 
remember that p. Thus, (6) is false if p is false. Forgetting is also factive, 
which means that (8) is false if p is false. 
8. S has forgotten that p. 
But, what about (7), the consequent of (4)? Is (7) false if p is false? If (8) is 
false just in case p is false, then (7) must be true, since it says that it is not the 
case that S has forgotten that p, which is a denial of (8), which is true just in 
case p is false. 
Now, (4) is true given that remembering entails knowing and forgetting 
entails ignorance. That is, if (2) and (3) are true, then (4) must be true. But 
what about the converse, (5)? Is (5) true on the condition that (2) and (3) are 
true? A moments thought reveals that there is a sense in which (5) doesn’t 
quite get things right. Both remembering and forgetting are factive, which 
means the truth of the target proposition is a necessary condition for both. It 
is perfectly consistent with the fact that one has not forgotten that p, that p is 
false, since to claim that one has not forgotten that p is equivalent to saying 
that it is not the case that one has forgotten that p. And even though 
remembering that p implies not having forgotten that p, not having forgotten 
that p does not imply remembering that p, since it could be the case that one 
has not forgotten that p simply because p is false. It sounds quite odd to say 
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that I have not forgotten that Glasgow is the capital of Scotland, but in fact it 
is a true statement. It is not possible for me to have forgotten such a fact, 
since it is false. This is just a consequence of the factivity of forgetting. 
Obviously, just as I cannot have forgotten that Glasgow is the capital of 
Scotland, neither can I remember that it is. So, trivially, not having forgotten 
that p does not imply that I remember that p. 
Breaking (5) into its component propositions we have, 
9. S has not forgotten that p. 
10. S remembers that p. 
If p is false, then (10) is false, but (9) is true just in case p is false. For (9) says 
that it is not the case that S has forgotten that p, which is true if p is false, 
since forgetting is factive. But if (10) is false when (9) is true, then the 
conditional (5) is false. 
By the same token, not remembering that p, does not imply having forgotten 
that p. For one can fail to remember that p simply because p is false, which 
means that a failure to remember that p does not necessarily imply that S has 
forgotten that p. Thus, the contraposition of (5) is also false. Since, (5) is false 
and its contraposition is false it looks like the following compound condition 
is possible. 
~ (S remembers that p) and ~ (S has forgotten that p) 
Again, trivially, this just says that there is a compound condition in which 
neither attitude obtains for a subject. Obviously, such a condition is possible 
if the target proposition is false, as has been shown above. However, more 
importantly, this condition also may obtain even if p is true even though in 
both cases the epistemic status of such a condition seems to be one of 
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ignorance. On one interpretation, S fails to know in the case where p is true 
simply because S never knew that p to begin with. This interpretation 
intimates the fact that remembering that p, as a way of knowing that p, 
implies a way of coming to know. This is an important fact about 
remembering, which I will come back to shortly. For now, I’d like to point 
out that there is a sense of ‘remember’ and ‘forget’ that is quite common in 
ordinary language, the use of which seems to suggest that this compound 
condition might also be consistent with knowing.37 Take the following 
scenario for example. 
Jim is walking down the street and bumps into his neighbor, Julia. The two 
greet each other. Julia says, “Oh, hi Jim”. “How are you?” Jim knows her 
name, he’s called her by it several times, but cannot recall it at the moment. 
In such a case it is quite common and a seemingly appropriate use of the 
term ‘remember’ to say that Jim knows her name but just cannot remember 
it. He has not forgotten her name, in the sense that forgetting entails 
ignorance, he just can’t recall it for whatever reason. In this case, Jim knows 
that her name is Julia; he hasn’t forgotten it, he just can’t remember it. He 
neither remembers, nor has he forgotten, yet I submit that we still would be 
inclined to say that he knows her name. He may even say to himself, “I know 
that I know her name...why can’t I think of it?” Let’s say that after the 
awkward encounter is over several minutes later Jim exclaims, “Julia, that’s 
her name.” “I knew I knew it!” Again, in such a case I feel we are typically 
inclined to attribute knowledge to Jim, but to simply say that there was a 








more, if we think of remembering not as a way of coming to know something 
but merely as a way one retains knowledge one already possesses - which 
seems a plausible view – it would seem quite strange to claim that Jim didn’t 
know her name at the time he failed to recall it, but later upon successfully 
recalling it, did. How is it that he now knows that her name is Julia? How 
did he come to know this? Surely, we wouldn’t want to say that he came to 
know that her name is Julia by remembering that it is. It seems much more 
reasonable to claim that he came to know that her name is Julia on a 
previous occasion in some other way, and his remembering that her name is 
Julia is just a way in which he retains this knowledge. 
This type of situation demonstrates two important facts about remembering. 
First, that there is a distinction that can be made between different senses of 
the verb ‘to remember’ which corresponds, I think, to two ways in which one 
can be said to remember. These senses can be thought of as an occurrent way 
of remembering, where remembering is a kind of mental event, and a non-
occurrent way of remembering where remembering is a kind of mental state. 
Second, remembering (in either sense) that p in any given case seems to carry 
with it an existential commitment to a second case, one in which the subject 
necessarily has knowledge that p. We can formulate this in the following 
way. Let C be the condition ‘S remembers that p’ and D be the condition ‘S 
knows that p’. We can say that if in a case α where C obtains, there is another 
case β where D obtains.38 Now, the question that will be addressed in the 











That is, does remembering that p entail knowing that p, in the case in which 
one remembers that p? The answer to this depends on us getting clear about 
the first distinction. 
 
4.2 The Entailment Thesis 
The arguments in the previous section show that though remembering and 
forgetting seem to display a kind of symmetry insofar as they are factive 
attitudes, that is, they are contrary attitudes, their relation to knowledge, 
another essential fact about them, doesn’t seem to display the same kind of 
symmetry. There seem to be cases in which one fails to remember but has not 
forgotten yet still retains the knowledge that remembering is supposed to be 
responsible for. It remains to be shown whether the opposite case is true, 
whether there are cases in which one does in fact remember that p but fails to 
know. For our purposes, we’ll refer to the claim that remembering entails 
knowing as the entailment thesis. Schematically, the thesis looks like, 
Where S denotes a subject and p is any true proposition, then 
(ET) If S remembers that p, then S knows that p. 
Broadly speaking we can classify philosophical views on remembering as 
either epistemic or causal, where the crucial difference is supposed to turn 
on whether (ET) is true. Those who opt for the epistemic account argue that 
(ET) is true and those who opt for the causal view argue that it is false. The 
epistemic theorist is apt to claim that one remembers that p if and only if one 
knows that p because one previously knew that p. Whereas, the casual 
theorist will claim that remembering generally only requires a certain causal 
relation between past representations and current ones, and such a causal 
relation does not entail current knowledge or previous knowledge.  
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In what follows, I am going to argue that the competing views on 
remembering, the causal and epistemic views, are not mutually exclusive. 
There is a sense in which both are correct and both are incorrect. The debate 
here turns on what is known as the connection condition and just what we 
hold the nature of this connection to be, causal or epistemic. I will argue 
along with the casual theorist, that remembering, in one sense is causally 
related to past experiences, but in another important sense is also 
epistemically related to one’s prior mental state. It is one thing to claim that 
one only remembers that p on the basis of previously coming to know that p, 
it is another thing to claim that remembering entails knowing, something the 
epistemic theorist endorses but the causal theorist denies. The view I’m 
proposing is that one only remembers that which one has previously come to 
know, but that remembering does not entail knowing, at least not in the case 
in which one remembers. That is, one can remember that p, but fail to know 
that p, even if one’s remembering that p implies that one has come to know 
that p. We might ask whether there is any reason to question the entailment 
thesis over the factivity thesis. I’m inclined to think that there is less reason, 
and it is less common in practice, to question whether or not remembering 
and forgetting are factive than it is to question whether or not they entail 
contradictory epistemic conditions. In fact, the factivity of these attitudes is 
almost universally assumed by theorists on this subject, yet there is quite a 
fair amount of dissent as to whether, for example, remembering entails 
knowing or not.39 I think there is also some linguistic evidence that lends 
support to this bias. Consider the sentences ‘Madison forgot that sharks are 
mammals’ and ‘Louise remembers that a dog once spoke to her in French.” 





something like ‘Nichole remembers that she put her keys in her bag though 
she isn’t sure that they are there’. I think we’re more inclined to accept this 
last statement as capturing a real state of mind, but that the first two are the 
result of a kind of conceptual failure. We would respond to the person who 
asserted either of the first two with a correction of their understanding of the 
terms ‘forget’ and ‘remember’ not with any kind of acceptance of the 
plausibility of the claims, as we probably would with an assertion of the last 
sentence. 
Looking at ET, the first thing to note is that we can reject ET on several 
different grounds. For example, we might reject it based on certain modal 
conditions claimed for knowledge, such as safety. In the following case it 
looks like one can fail to have knowledge yet remember due to a failure in 
such a modal condition. 
(JANET) Janet is sitting at a coffee shop reading and has just 
placed her mobile phone in her handbag, which is hanging on her 
chair.40 While she is drinking her coffee a thief comes along and 
lifts her phone from her handbag without her noticing. She is 
completely unaware that her phone has been stolen. As Janet 
placed the phone in the bag herself we can say that she knows that 
the phone is in the handbag prior to the theft. However, after the 
phone has been stolen, since knowing is factive, she fails to know 
that the phone is in the bag. For brevity, we’ll let ‘p’ stand for the 
proposition ‘the phone is in the handbag’. So, Janet knows that p 
prior to the theft, and after the theft she fails to know that p. Now, 
let’s say the thief is making off with the phone, but is suddenly 
struck with terrible guilt. Realizing that he shouldn’t have stolen 
the phone he immediately seeks to return it. However, he does not 
want to get caught, so he slips it back into her handbag without 





We note that Janet’s belief that p, as a result of the phone’s return to the 
handbag is true again. And there is every reason to hold that Janet’s belief is 
justified just as it was prior to the theft. So, it looks like Janet has a justified 
true belief after the thief returns the phone. Obviously, her belief is true 
simply by luck in this case and we have a garden variety Gettier case of 
justified true belief that does not amount to knowledge. On a safety account 
of knowledge, Janet certainly fails to know that p. Once p is made false, her 
belief that p is unsafe, since there are close possible worlds in which Janet 
would have believed that p even if p were false.41 However, it seems 
reasonable to claim that Janet still remembers that p. For, she at least seems to 
remember that p, and we can stipulate that nothing is wrong with Janet’s 
memory. If someone were to ask her if she remembers where her phone is, 
she would answer correctly that it is in the handbag. It seems at least initially 
plausible to claim that Janet does in fact remember that p, despite the fact 
that her belief is unsafe. Alternatively, we can say that despite that fact that 
Janet seems to be remembering things correctly, her belief in p is unsafe, and 
thus, does not know that p. 
Similarly, let’s say that you’re told on Monday that the party is scheduled for 
Saturday. Assume that it’s true and that you hear this from a reliable source, 
and that you thereby come to know via reliable testimony that the party is 
scheduled for Saturday. Let ‘p’ be the proposition ‘the party is scheduled for 
Saturday’.42 So on Monday you know that p. The next day, however, 










on Tuesday you fail to know that p, since knowing is factive and the party is 
not scheduled for Saturday now, but Friday. Wednesday rolls along and due 
to scheduling conflicts, the party organizer needs to switch the day of the 
party back to Saturday. Again, you are not aware of this fact. No one has 
informed you of either of the switchings. Suppose someone were to ask you 
now, whether or not you remember which day the party is scheduled for. 
You correctly answer that the party is on Saturday, since the party is now 
again scheduled for Saturday. You seem to remember that the party is 
scheduled for Saturday, and you’re right, it is scheduled for Saturday. Again, 
it seems at least initially plausible to claim that you do in fact remember that 
p, yet your belief that p is unsafe. You could have easily got this wrong. In 
fact, just yesterday, you were wrong. So, despite the fact that you seem to be 
remembering things correctly, your belief in p is unsafe and thus, you don’t 
know that p. 
The intuition here is simply that you actually do remember that p, but fail to 
know that p because your belief that p is unsafe. Remember that we’re not 
questioning the factivity condition, only (ET). Thus, we would not be 
inclined to agree that you remember that the party is scheduled for Saturday 
if it were not. It is only because the party is scheduled for Saturday that we 
can claim that you remember that it is. At the time that the party was 
scheduled for Friday, we could simply say that you do not remember that p. 
The same would apply in the Janet case. Janet fails to remember that p just 
when p is false, but does remember that p just when p is true. 
While modal considerations are theoretically important on some views, 
others consider whether or not a subject knows in a given case to be 
dependent upon certain relevant pragmatic factors. Such pragmatic 
encroachment theories argue that if the stakes of the situation are quite high 
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as to whether or not a subject knows, then the standards for knowledge in 
such a situation are higher than it would be had the stakes been much lower. 
For those who hold such a view, in the following case one might reject ET on 
pragmatic grounds. 
(BANK) Tom needs to pull money from the bank to make a 
payment. The bank is closed today, but Tom has an ATM card and 
can pull money from the bank machine. Let’s say he just recently 
got this card and only just yesterday created a new PIN for it. Now, 
it is absolutely crucial that Tom make this payment today. Let’s 
say that if he doesn’t he’ll get evicted. The stakes are high. Let’s 
also say that if Tom enters an incorrect number for his PIN his 
account will be locked and he will not be able to withdraw funds 
until the bank reopens in two days. Now, since Tom has only 
recently got this new card and just set the PIN for it yesterday, he 
has not yet had an opportunity, let’s say, to use it nor has he 
written down the PIN anywhere. And let’s further stipulate that 
there is no way for him to confirm with the bank what his PIN is. 
Since, in this case, Tom has only one try to get the PIN right, does 
not have it written down anywhere, and if he gets it wrong he will 
not get his money in time to prevent being evicted, the stakes are 
so high the question as to whether or not Tom knows his PIN is 
quite important. Tom goes to the machine, and despite his almost 
completely overwhelming anxiety enters the correct PIN and gets 
his money. 
Clearly, the stakes are quite high in this case, and as such one who holds that 
pragmatic factors encroach upon knowledge attributions might be reluctant 
to attribute knowledge to Tom. The pragmatic encroachment theorist might 
be inclined to say in this case that Tom doesn’t actually know his PIN. The 
standards for knowledge in this case are just too high and he doesn’t meet 
them. But does this fact at the same time mean that Tom doesn’t remember 
his PIN? It seems somewhat incorrect to flatly deny that Tom remembers his 
PIN. It certainly isn’t a matter of luck that Tom typed in the right sequence of 
numbers. Surely, the probability of entering the right sequence of 4 or 5 
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numbers out of an extremely large number of possible sequences precludes 
the possibility that Tom just got lucky. As in our previous example cases, it is 
at least plausible to claim that Tom remembers his PIN, but if one is inclined 
to accept a pragmatic encroachment view on knowledge, it seems quite 
implausible that Tom knows his PIN. 
Lastly, an orthodox view is that remembering entails believing. Another way 
of rejecting ET is by simply denying this. The idea that belief is a necessary 
condition for remembering, is said to go back, at least to Russell, and 
perhaps back to Locke, though it is questionable that Russell actually held 
such a position, and the textual evidence for the claim for Locke is curiously 
thin.43 Several contemporary theorists, however have argued that the belief 
condition is not necessary. Steup (1992) seems to hold that this is a real 
possibility, and more recently Bernecker has offered several arguments to the 
effect that one can remember that p but fail altogether to believe that p. For 
Bernecker remembering implies neither belief nor justification.44 The 
intuition I’m trying to elicit with these examples is that it is quite reasonable 
to allow that the subject actually does remember that p despite the fact that 
we may hesitate in attributing to the subject knowledge that p for whatever 
reason. If this intuition is correct and remembering and knowing can come 
apart, then the entailment thesis looks false. The above counterexamples are 
meant to illustrate how questionable ET is in its current form. There may be 









captures such an entailment. We’ll see in the next section that the entailment 
between remembering and knowledge is not so straightforward. 
 
4.3 The Connection Condition 
I will use Ryle’s notion that there are two distinct senses of remembering to 
draw attention to what I think is problematic about most treatments of the 
connection condition. So, we’ll start by recognizing that there is more than 
one sense in which we commonly use the verb ‘to remember’. As mentioned 
earlier we say that someone remembers something, in one sense of the word, 
just when they have learned it and not forgotten it. Some refer to this as the 
ability sense of remembering.45 To say that one remembers something in this 
sense is to say that one can or is able to do something, but not necessarily that 
one is currently doing anything. There need not be any occurrent thought 
about the matter for one to remember in this sense. Call this the non-
occurrent sense of remembering. 
There is another sense in which one is said to remember and that is the sense 
in which one is currently doing something, like recalling some fact or 
reminiscing about some past experience. In these cases, there is some mental 
event that is the remembering. Continuing with Ryle’s discussion we can say 
that, in this sense, remembering, “…is an occurrence; it is something which a 
person may try successfully, or in vain to do...” (Ryle, 1949, p. 273). Call this 
the occurrent sense of remembering. Note that occurrent remembering 
implies non-occurrent remembering. However, the converse is not true. Ryle 





There is an important connection between the notion of not-
forgetting and the notion of recollecting. To say that a person 
either actually is recalling something, or can recall, or be reminded 
of it, implies that he has not forgotten it; whereas to say that he has 
not forgotten something does not entail that he ever does or could 
recall it (Ryle, 1949, p. 273). 
So, there is an asymmetrical relation between the two, such that non-
occurrent remembering is a necessary condition for occurrent remembering, 
but not the other way round. This seems fairly straightforward and obvious, 
since all this really means is that if one actually recalls something, then it 
follows immediately that one has not forgotten it. 
The occurrent sense of remembering can be understood as something like 
having a thought that p, where this thinking-that-p is either a recalling, 
recollecting, reminiscing, dwelling, reviewing, reliving or any other mental 
“happening” or event that we would normally regard as a case of 
remembering. We should understand the non-occurrent sense of 
remembering as something like having-learned-and-not-forgotten-that-p, 
where we’re referring to a kind of state or dispositional attribute of the 
subject such that there need be no occurrent thought that p for a subject to be 
in such a state or have such an attribute. We might inquire, given our 
previous discussion on the occurrent/non-occurrent distinction, whether the 
conditions for one are the same as those for the other. 
Most theorists, if not all agree that there is some kind of connection 
requirement for remembering, connecting a subject’s current remembering 
that p (whether it is a state/disposition or an event) to some past experience 
or representation. Steup suggests exactly this. He notes that,  
For S’s belief that P to be a case of remembering that P, the belief 
must be connected in the right way with the original input. Call 
this the connection condition (Steup, 1992, p. 277).  
Chapter	4	
	 113	
Virtually every theorist agrees that something along these lines must be true 
of memory. What is debated is whether or not this connection needs to be 
causal. Some, like Ginet, Malcom and Audi seem to think the connection is 
epistemic in nature.46 Malcolm, for instance, holds that S remembers that p if 
and only if S knows that p because S knew that p (Malcolm, 1963). Others 
hold that there must be some kind of uninterrupted causal chain connecting 
the original input or state of affairs to the current state or event of 
remembering (Martin and Deutscher, 1966, Bernecker, 2010). Whatever the 
nature of the connection, it is thought that there must be some kind of 
suitable connection between the original input or state of affairs that caused 
the belief and the present state of remembering. Complicating this 
connection criterion is the fact that if one isn’t related to their environment in 
an appropriate manner, then one cannot be said to remember certain facts 
about that environment. Whether this relation is supposed to be epistemic or 
causal is far from perspicuous, for it seems we can remember facts that we 
could not have possibly experienced. Someone might ask you, for instance, 
who won the battle of Gettysburg. To which you might reply, “I don’t 
remember, I’ve forgotten who won that battle.” This is a perfectly normal 
way of speaking and the answer does not imply that you were actually at the 
battle of Gettysburg, or even alive during the time, but simply that you’ve 
learned that fact, namely, who the victor was, but have since forgotten. 
Clearly, there are many of these types of facts that we claim to remember and 
sometimes forget. So, any connection condition must not only account for 
remembering things directly experienced but also remembering facts like 






The debate over whether the connection condition is causal or epistemic 
often overlooks the distinction between occurrent and non-occurrent 
remembering. I believe this to be an oversight and a source of some 
confusion. Most causal theorists focus exclusively on occurrent 
remembering. Martin and Deutscher’s set of criteria, which they hold as 
constituting necessary and sufficient conditions for remembering, are an 
example of this. To paraphrase Martin and Deutscher, S remembers just in 
case, 
Within certain limits of accuracy S represents that past thing; 
If the thing was “public,” then S observed what she now 
represents and if the thing was “private,” then it was hers; 
S’s past experience of the thing was operative in producing a state 
or successive states in her finally operative in producing her 
representation (Martin and Deutscher, 1966). 
Bernecker, another causal theorist, has advanced arguments against the 
epistemic view, specifically the entailment thesis, on several fronts. For 
Bernecker, remembering neither implies belief or justification and hence not 
knowledge.47 On Bernecker’s view, S remembers that p only if, “S’s 
representation at t2 that p is suitably causally connected to S’s representation 
at t1 of p*”, where the “suitable” causal connection is of the appropriate type, 
and p is identical or sufficiently similar to p* (Bernecker, 2010). Bernecker 
goes to some length to spell out just what kind of causal connection qualifies 











non-deviant in a way that rules out both the possibility of S not actually 
having retained the memory, and the possibility of S re-learning that 
particular content. While I agree with Martin and Deutscher’s and 
Bernecker’s views, the essential problem with the causal approach is that it 
leaves open the question as to what the connection is between one’s non-
occurrent state of remembering, that is, the state of having-learned-and-not-
forgotten-that-p, and one’s past experience (or past states). The causal 
explanation is meant to explain how one’s occurrent thought that p can be 
said to be a remembering that p, but says nothing about one’s non-occurrent 
remembering that p. How do we explain, on either Bernecker’s or Martin and 
Deutscher’s view, or any causal view for that matter, how I can be said to 
remember anything that I’m not currently thinking about? If the only 
explanation of the connection condition we offer is in terms of how one’s 
current representation is suitably causally connected to one’s past 
experiences, then it seems we’re fated to leave unexplained quite a large 
portion of one’s total propositional memory; and we’re committing ourselves 
to a kind of presentism about remembering, and this just seems false. There 
are a great many things, for which it is true to say of me that I remember 
such things, though I am not currently representing any of them, nor is it 
necessary that I ever call any of them to mind. Regardless of whether or not I 
actually represent any one of a vast number of possible propositional 
contents it is true that I do remember such things, if as was suggested earlier 
I have learned such things and have not forgotten them. 
As we saw in a previous chapter the connection between one’s mental states 
are not causal, though there may be be a causal connection between one’s 
occurrent thoughts and one’s past experiences, the chain of which may 
meander and loop things in from the environment, as long as it is non-
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deviant, in a sense similar to Bernecker’s sense of non-deviance. So, one’s 
non-occurrent remembering that p, one’s having-learned-and-not-forgotten, 
is not causally determined by one’s past experiences or mental states. It is 
better to think of the connection condition in such cases as epistemic and 
constitutive rather than causal. In other words, the relation between the type 
of mental state attributable to a subject that has learned and not forgotten 
that p and a previous state of that subject is just that—an epistemic relation. 
We can think of one’s having-learned-and-not-forgotten as previously-
having-come-to-know. 
Insofar as the connection to a previous state is non-causal but rather 
epistemic, it looks like the epistemic view must be true, but the epistemic 
view traditionally holds the following bi-conditional claim. S remembers that 
p if an only if S knows that p because S knew that p. However, all that follows 
from what has been said is that one remembers that p only if one has 
previously come to know that p. Call this the simplified epistemic view. At 
this point the causal view is compatible with the simplified epistemic view, 
since rejecting ET does not mean that remembering does not imply 
previously knowing. It is perfectly consistent to deny the entailment thesis as 
it is formulated in the previous section and claim that ‘S remembers that p’ 
implies ‘S knew that p’—it just doesn’t entail that ‘S knows that p’. Let me 
elaborate this point a bit further. 
I’ve argued that it is at least initially plausible that the subjects in our 
previous examples remember but fail to know. For a causal theorist, our 
subjects would remember if there were some representation that p that is 
suitably causally connected to their past experiences that p. Thus, if the 
causal theorist’s criteria are met in each case, then the subjects remember. 
The causal view can handle the Janet case quite easily by claiming that if 
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Janet is prompted in some way and comes to represent that p, then she must 
be remembering that p. The reason for this is that there is nothing other than 
her past experience that could possibly be operative in producing such a 
representation. According to the casual account, Janet only needs to meet 
criteria similar to Martin and Deutscher’s or Bernecker’s in order to 
occurrently remember that p, which it seems she would if prompted. The 
same goes for each of the other cases. If you are prompted by a question as to 
which day the party is scheduled for, it is quite plausible that you will call to 
mind the fact that p and provide an answer based on this fact. Absent any 
other source for such a representation, there is nothing we can point to to 
explain why your thought has that particular content and not some other 
content. The point here is that it is quite reasonable that in each case the 
subject could call to mind the particular content that p, and this particular 
occurrent event (that calling-to-mind that p) meets the criteria for 
remembering that p in the occurrent sense. 
The standard epistemic view (one that maintains ET) would argue that in the 
examples of section two the event that changes the target proposition from 
false back to true again is what undermines the fact that the subject 
remembers in such cases. Presumably, at that point the subject’s mental state 
couldn’t be one of remembering, since the subject lacks the appropriate 
connection to the initial state. It was clearly stated in the first case that Janet 
is not aware of the fact that the phone has been returned. Thus, unlike when 
she saw that the phone was in the handbag, she lacks that connection to the 
initial state of affairs after the phone has been returned and as a result no 
state of remembering can arise for her. Once the phone has been returned, 
she continues to believe, but cannot be said to remember, since we would 
only attribute remembering if that connection to the initial state of affairs 
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were in place as it was when Janet saw that the phone was in the handbag. 
Once it has been stolen, that connection is no longer viable. For, how could 
Janet remember that p once the phone has been returned if only moments 
before she did not remember that p (since p was false) and any such mental 
state must come about for Janet as a result of coming to know that p, as it did 
for her when she saw that the phone was in the bag? Similarly, with the 
other two examples, there is no connection in place between the subject’s 
putative state of remembering that p and the fact that p such that there is a 
coming to know that p after p is made true again. 
Our response to this problem draws on the points made earlier about the 
relation between remembering and forgetting. We noted there that even 
though remembering that p implies not having forgotten that p, not 
remembering that p does not imply having forgotten that p, and not having 
forgotten that p does not imply remembering that p. One can fail to 
remember that p simply because p is false, but this does not imply that one 
has forgotten that p. For, in that case p is not something that could be 
remembered, let alone forgotten. In our example cases, even though there is 
a time at which S does not remember that p, namely, the time at which p is 
false, the reason that S doesn’t remember that p is not because S has forgotten 
that p, but merely because p at that time is false. In other words, at that time 
it is both true of our subjects that they have not forgotten that p and do not 
remember that p (remember the compound condition from section one). In 
other words, at that point we would be inclined to attribute remembering in 
the non-occurrent sense to S, since they have learned that p and have not 
forgotten it, but since p is false at that point, it is not true that they remember, 
since remembering is factive. However, even though they fail to remember 
when p is false, this does not imply that they have not learned that p nor does 
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it imply that they have forgotten that p. There is an epistemic connection 
between the two conditions, namely, S’s having-come-to-know-that-p and S’s 
not-having-forgotten-that-p, such that despite the fact that p is false at a 
particular time, at such a time, despite the fact that S fails to remember we 
cannot say that S has forgotten. 
The story that the causal theorist tells explains how our subjects can be said 
to remember that p provided there is a certain prompting. However, since 
any occurrent remembering entails non-occurrent remembering, and our 
notion of non-occurrent remembering is best understood in terms of an 
epistemic connection between mental states, the full story is both an 
epistemic and a causal story.48 The connection condition is therefore causal 
insofar as we are trying to explain how any occurrent thought that p counts 
as a remembering that p. The connection condition is epistemic insofar as it is 
true that any time one occurrently remembers that p they thereby must be in 
a type of mental state such that that state is just a previously-having-come-
to-know-that-p. The connection condition is thus not a general condition in 
either its causal or epistemic interpretation but must be thought of either as a 
relation that explains in causal terms what it is to be occurrently 
remembering a fact or a relation that explains, in epistemic terms, what it is 
for one to be in a specific type of mental state. In each example above the 















prompted. However, they also fulfil the criteria for remembering in the non-
occurrent sense since they have learned that p and have not forgotten it. 
It might be thought that in recalling a fact, we do not recall that which is the 
case, but only that which was the case; when we recall we necessarily are 
recalling something that occurred in the past. That is, strictly speaking one 
does not recall that something is currently the case, since ‘recalling’ is 
reserved for an act of bringing the past before the present mind. So, it is 
incorrect to say that Janet recalls the fact that the phone is in the handbag. 
She may recall that the phone was in the handbag, or that she placed the 
phone in the handbag, but not that it is presently in the handbag, since that is 
a fact about the present and thus, is not something that one can recall, or so 
goes the objection. The same goes for the other two examples. You may recall 
having been informed that the party is scheduled for Saturday, or you may 
recall that the party was scheduled for Saturday, but you do not recall that 
the party is scheduled for Saturday. 
This concern seems to pick up on how we typically use the term ‘recall’ to 
refer to some kind of mental event of bringing before the mind some past 
fact or event. So, can we recall anything that is currently true? Would it be 
recalling strictly speaking, or is it incorrect to claim that one can recall that p 
is the case? The response to this objection is that we can easily substitute 
‘recall’ with ‘remember’ and the objection seems to disappear. If we need to 
use a more tense-neutral term, like ‘remember’ to address the apparent 
awkwardness of the use of ‘recall’ the same point is still conveyed. If the 
substitution didn’t work, then the same charge could be levied against all 
cases of remembering that some fact is presently true. And we do remember 
facts that are presently true. Take for example the claim that ‘I remember 
what the capital of Quebec is’. In the non-occurrent sense of remembering, 
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this simply means that I have learned which city is the capital and have not 
forgotten this fact. In the occurrent sense of remembering, however, this 
must mean that there is some occurrent representing of that fact, but it need 
not be a remembering of the fact that Quebec City was the capital of Quebec. 
For, that carries with it the implication that it no longer is, or that I no longer 
believe that it is, both of which are false. It is true that I can remember having 
been told that Quebec City is the capital of Quebec, but I need not recall ever 
actually learning this fact to remember that it is a fact. Likewise, I remember 
that Nietzsche once wrote that, “Poets treat their experiences shamelessly: 
they exploit them”, though I do not remember where I read it. There’s a 
substantial difference between remembering the learning of a fact and 
remembering the fact. Many theorists distinguish between what is known as 
episodic or experiential memory and dispositional memory for just this 
reason. The difference is roughly one of remembering doing or undergoing 
something and remembering the fact that you did it or underwent it, and the 
latter does not entail the former.49 Similarly, I could remember what the 
Pythagorean Theorem is by remembering that the equation ‘a2 + b2 = c2’ is the 
standard way of formulating it. But I’m certainly not remembering that this 
was the Pythagorean Theorem, nor am I remembering, necessarily, that I 
learned it from so-and-so at such-and-such a time. I remember that ‘a2 + b2 = 
c2’ is the Pythagorean Theorem by remembering that that is the standard 
way of formulating it. 
Now, it could be said that what I remember in these cases is simply ‘what the 
Pythagorean theorem is’ and ‘what the capital of Quebec is’, which is not 
strictly propositional remembering, since the content is not in propositional 





her phone is’ and you remember ‘what day the party is scheduled for’. So, 
we do have a kind of remembering, a remembering-wh, viz., remembering –
who, -what, -which, -where, etc., but not a remembering-that. There are two 
ways to use this kind of response. One is to defend ET by claiming that Janet 
remembers where she put her phone or that she remembers that she put her 
phone in the bag, or something like this, but doesn’t necessarily remember 
that her phone is in her bag. On this line of reasoning we can retain ET, since 
we have not shown the target proposition ‘The phone is in the handbag’ to 
be what is actually remembered and not known. The other is to claim that 
Janet does remember and still retains knowledge in such cases, but only a 
kind of non-propositional knowledge. The subject knows-wh in these cases, 
but does not know-that. Both of these seem like plausible redescriptions of 
the cases and as such not incompatible with ET. The first problem is that for 
many, knowledge-wh reduces to knowledge-that.50 Correspondingly, we 
could argue that remembering-wh is just another form of propositional 
remembering.51 So, if Janet remembers where her phone is, then she 
remembers some true proposition about its current location. If you 
remember which day the party is scheduled for, then you remember that it is 
scheduled for that day. In other words, we cannot deny that our subjects 
know that p but only retain a kind of knowledge-wh in these cases, since we 
would be admitting ultimately that they do have some propositional 
knowledge either by admitting that remembering-wh reduces to 










Lastly, it might be suggested that the epistemic condition that one 
remembers that p only if one previously knew that p is too strong. A causal 
theorist like Bernecker would make this objection, since the casual view only 
requires that one be able to call up a previous representation under certain 
conditions. That is, it is sufficient for remembering that p that one have some 
representation that one previously had and being in this representational 
state, at either time need not amount to knowing. The idea is that if we can 
have accidentally justified true beliefs that count as rememberings, then it is 
feasible that what we remember is not something that we once knew, but 
another accidentally justified true belief, or simply just a true belief without 
justification. The casual view only requires that there be a suitable 
connection between the two representational states, and that there be some 
degree of accuracy in the representation. Thus, if we accept the casual 
connection, the epistemic connection seems quite unnecessary. 
I think this is problematic for two reasons. First, as I’ve argued above, the 
causal thesis falls short of explaining a large part of one’s total propositional 
memory. So, we need to explain non-occurrent remembering in non-causal 
terms. Second, and more importantly, if one can remember that which they 
merely came to believe, but not know, even in cases where the belief is a 
justified true belief, but only accidentally so, then it is possible that one 
remembers all sorts of truths accidentally. I may remember p, q, r, etc., all of 
which are only accidentally justified true beliefs. In these cases, I only come 
to believe such propositions, but never come to know them. It is just sheer 
accident that I got them all right. If our conception of remembering is that it 
can simply be a matter of luck that I get what I’m remembering right each 
time I remember it, then why impose the factivity condition in the first 
place? What difference does it really make that what I remember actually be 
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true, if the truth can always be a matter of sheer luck? In other words, on 
what basis are we denying that one can remember a falsehood? Even the 
causal theorist denies that false memories are genuine cases of remembering 
on the grounds that remembering is factive. But why impose such a 
condition on the theory, if remembering is not essentially a case of getting it 
right, but can be a case of merely happening to get it right? The factivity 
condition seems completely arbitrary if we allow that we can remember 
Gettierized beliefs. On the contrary, if we hold that one must have come to 
know that which they remember, then we can at least appeal to that fact in 
explaining why remembering is factive. Remembering that p entails p 





Chapter 5 Seeing and Knowing 
 
Introduction 
Linguists have identified more than fifteen different senses for the English 
verb ‘see’.  We us it to describe our direct visual perception of objects as in, “I 
see a deer” or to describe cases of more indirect perception as in, “I see a way 
through”. We also say things like, “Do you see what I mean?” or “I see your 
point”, where the sense is one of understanding and not perceptual at all. As 
a verb indicating some kind of activity, we might say things like, “Are you 
still seeing that girl from accounting?” or “My assistant will see you to the 
door”, where the former is a sense in which ‘seeing’ means ‘to date’ and the 
latter is a sense in which ‘seeing’ means to escort.53 As Gisborne puts it, 
“…the verb is massively polysemous.” (Gisborne 2010) While its 
prototypical sense is as a perceptual verb another common use of the verb is 
in a factive sense, where the function is to convey a kind of understanding. 
To complicate things even further, both in the perceptual sense and in the 
factive sense the verb can be said to be polysemous. That is, there are 
multiple perceptual senses, and multiple factive senses of the verb. Despite 
its variegated uses, epistemologists are generally concerned with only one or 
two of its uses, and for our purposes here the sense in which ‘see’ is used in 
propositional contexts will be of chief importance. We’re interested in cases 
where ‘see’ occurs within perceptual and propositional contexts, but more 







In other words, we’re interested in factive verb phrases constructed with 
‘see’ such as ‘Sally sees that a barn is nearby’. 
Many hold that seeing is a way of knowing, or at least, that seeing that p 
entails knowing that p. Now, even though we may cite the fact that we can 
see that p as a way of explaining how we know that p, the claim that seeing 
that p entails knowing that p is much stronger than this. Even if we conceded 
that some kind of knowledge or understanding is built into the semantics of 
‘sees that’ ascriptions, and that pointing out the fact that one’s seeing that p 
adequately explains how one knows that p, all that follows from these 
considerations is that there is a strong relation between seeing and knowing, 
not necessarily that seeing entails knowing. In the last chapter we discussed 
an entailment thesis between remembering and knowing, and many hold a 
similar thesis for seeing and knowing. For seeing to entail knowing there 
cannot be any possible cases in which a subject sees that p but fails to know 
that p. Such cases have been proposed by a few authors, and the entailment 
thesis for seeing is usually supported by an argument about the semantics of 
‘sees that’ ascriptions, though a few other arguments have been advanced. I 
argued that the entailment thesis for remembering as it is currently 
formulated by many authors does not necessarily hold in all cases. In this 
chapter I will argue not against the entailment thesis—as I believe it does 
hold for seeing—but will offer an argument to the effect that seeing that p is 
not strictly a stative attitude. As the goal for this part of the thesis is to 
explore the epistemology of factive psychological attitudes in light of what 
has been said about attitude externalism, the arguments offered in this 
chapter and the last both serve to differentiate the view offered in the thesis 
about propositional knowledge from two other prominent views in the 
literature with which this thesis, in most other respects, is aligned very 
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closely. These other two views are Williamson’s factive attitude view of 
knowing and Cassam’s explanatory theory of knowing. 
Section one discusses what is known in the literature as propositional (or 
epistemic) seeing, and a particular contemporary view on the semantics of 
‘sees that’ ascriptions offered by Craig French. French’s view closely follows 
that of a previous theory developed by Dretske, so we’ll begin by briefly 
discussing a few of Dretske’s important conclusions about seeing. 
Ultimately, both views draw the same conclusion that seeing that p is 
knowing that p on the basis of visual perception. While I agree with both 
Dretske and French about the relation between seeing and knowing it will be 
argued here that there seems to be a general conflation of an epistemic 
condition (the epistemic condition associated with seeing-that) with the 
underlying psychological/perceptual states. Some accounts of perceptual 
knowledge like McDowell’s and views that regard knowing as a mental 
state, like Williamson’s, are particularly subject to such conflation. 
Williamson’s view is especially subject to this problem due to the obvious 
fact that factive attitudes like ‘seeing that’ just are psychological (mental) 
states. In section two we’ll take a look at the entailment thesis as it is 
advanced in the literature today and consider some objections to it. The 
purpose of the discussion here will be to get clear on what the recent 
challenges to the thesis are and to assess whether or not they are plausible 
objections to the thesis. In section three I turn to a general discussion on the 
nature of perceptual success terms like ‘see’, ‘recognize’ and ‘notice’ and 
argue that such terms do not denote mental states of an individual, but 
rather to particular events or perhaps merely changes in epistemic 
conditions. The arguments in section three along with arguments from 
section one are meant to put serious pressure on the idea that epistemic 
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(propositional) seeing is a kind of mental state. The ultimate goal of the 
chapter is to show that the factive propositional attitude seeing-that, while 
entailing knowing, is not necessarily a mental state, and thus cannot serve as 
an example of a factive mental state, but is best thought of as a kind of 
factive mental event. This calls in to question a central claim of Williamson’s 
view, namely, that knowing is the most general factive stative attitude. 
 
5.1 Propositional Seeing 
Seeing that p as a paradigm case of knowing that p is complicated by the fact 
that there are multiple senses of the term ‘see’, even when we narrow the 
context down to only propositional contexts. Gisborne has argued that even 
within propositional contexts the verb is subject to conflation and seems to 
take on a jointly perceptual propositional sense (Gisborne, 2010). Thus, if 
seeing that p is knowing that p, as many authors have argued, then we need 
to be clear to begin with, on just what kind of propositional seeing we’re 
talking about. It may be obvious from the semantics of ‘sees that’ ascriptions 
that in one sense, seeing is knowing, but there is more than one sense that is 
relevant here. Dretske argued for two distinct kinds of seeing, which he 
referred to as epistemic and non-epistemic seeing. Non-epistemic seeing, 
which is sometimes referred to as objectual seeing, is the seeing of objects or 
particulars in one’s environment. It is essentially a sensory function and 
occurs in any animal with a visual sensory system. This kind of seeing is 
regarded as being non-epistemic since it is belief independent. Any animal 
equipped with a visual sensory system can objectually see and doing so does 
not entail the formation of any belief about what is seen. Dretske likens non-
epistemic seeing to that of stepping on a bug. Such an act does not entail that 
a person has any particular belief at all. When a person sees non-
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epistemically, there is nothing about that fact that entails that the person who 
sees some object or feature of their environment has any particular belief. 
More formally, “…there is a way of seeing such that of any proposition, P, 
the statement “S sees D” does not logically entail the statement ‘S believes P” 
(Dretske, 1969, p. 6). Non-epistemic seeing is thus belief independent, or as 
Dretske puts it, has zero belief content. Epistemic seeing on the other hand, is 
a more complex kind of seeing, one that involves, necessarily, non-epistemic 
(objectual) seeing but the occurrence of which entails some kind of belief. On 
Dretske’s view, one cannot see anything in an epistemic sense and fail to 
form some belief about that which is seen. In this sense, epistemic seeing is 
not devoid of positive belief content.54 One sees epistemically only if one 
believes that p. Moreover, one sees that p only if p. The difference between 
the two kinds of seeing is borne out by the sentences used to express each. 
Sentences used to convey epistemic seeing can take a propositional clause as 
its object, whereas sentences expressing non-epistemic seeing never take a 
propositional clause as an object. This propositional object is usually 
indicated by a that-clause in sentences expressing epistemic seeing. Thus, 
seeing epistemically is essentially seeing-that. It is seeing that such-and-such 
is the case, which implies some kind of propositional attitude. Hence, the fact 
that this kind of seeing is not belief independent. Dretske’s account is much 
more complicated than this of course, and I will not go into further detail 
here, since all we need to note is that there are two fundamentally different 
ways of seeing on Dretkse’s view, one that involves a propositional attitude, 
since the object of the seeing is a proposition, and one, which does not 








some feature or particular of the environment. Lastly, we also need to note 
that on Dretske’s view, to epistemically see that p is to be in an advantaged 
epistemic condition with respect to p. One doesn’t simply believe that p 
when one sees that p. For Dretske, if one sees that p, then one knows that p. 
Thus, Dretske’s account gives us a thesis about the relation between seeing 
and knowing. This thesis is often referred to as the seeing entails knowing 
thesis (SET). 
When ‘see’ functions in propositional contexts the relevant sense is 
something like Dretske’s epistemic seeing and the verb becomes a factive 
verb. Consider the sentence, ‘I see the point you’re making’. The object of 
this sentence is not an actual object, but is ‘the point you are making’, and 
whatever the point is, it can be expressed by some proposition p. So, 
essentially what is being seen in cases like this is that p is the case. Now, in 
this particular example the sense of ‘see’ is not perceptual. It is however, 
necessarily a propositional use of the verb. Despite the fact that the sentence, 
‘I see the point you’re making’ lacks a that-clause it is not difficult to see that 
it is operating in a propositional context here. When ‘see’ operates in a 
strictly propositional context there is no sense in which one would 
perceptually see the object of the sentence. We wouldn’t claim that one is 
visually seeing ‘the point you are making’. This fact is revealed rather simply 
by the fact that a blind person could just as easily see the point you’re 
making as a person who is not visually impaired. When ‘see’ operates in a 
strictly propositional context, I’ll refer to this sense of the verb as its 
propositional awareness sense. Sentences like, ‘I see what you are saying’, ‘I 
now see your side of the issue’, etc., are all employing the propositional 
awareness sense of ‘see’. Its use does not rely on the perceptual sense of ‘see’ 
to convey the awareness of the fact that such-and-such is the case. 
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There is a further, more nuanced sense of ‘see’ that conflates both the 
perceptual and the propositional senses when operating in some 
propositional contexts. Dretske’s notion of epistemic seeing is an example of 
this. In such cases the possibility of a blind person seeing that p would be 
necessarily ruled out. Consider the following examples from Gisborne 
(2010). 
1. Peter saw through the window that Mary had crossed the road. 
2. Peter saw through the window that Mary was right. 
We can check for a conflated sense of ‘see’ by using certain selection 
restrictions such as the prepositional phrase ‘through the window’. Gisborne 
argues that the reason why (2) is infelicitous is due to the fact that the two 
sentences employ different senses of ‘see’. The phrase ‘though the window’ 
works only when ‘see’ indicates what Gisborne refers to as a kind of 
perceptual gaze, something that the strictly propositional awareness sense of 
‘see’ does not indicate at all. Gisborne’s point is that perceptual verbs 
indicate a kind of directedness, for which it makes sense to use such 
embellishing phrases, as ‘through the window’. Thus, the sense of (1) even 
though it works perfectly well in a propositional context, nevertheless has a 
perceptual element to it, since it works with ’through the window’ which 
works only in perceptual contexts. Thus, the sense of ‘see’ in (1) is both 











So, there is a sense of ‘see’, which in propositional contexts indicates an 
awareness of some fact, but also carries with it a perceptual component. 
Recently, Craig French has adopted a view very similar to this and argues 
that seeing in the epistemic sense, to be more specific, the perceptual 
propositional sense, is a way of knowing on the basis of visual perception.56 
This is essentially what Dretske argued for as well. Dretske writes, 
For I am attempting (both in the present schema and in later 
schemata) to specify a type of situation which is both epistemic in 
character and essentially visual in nature, a type of situation which 
represents the acquisition of knowledge by visual means, a type of 
situation which is frequently, but certainly not always, described 
by the ‘seeing that’ construction (Dretske, 1969, p. 80). 
For both Dretske and French, seeing that p is knowing that p on the basis of 
visual perception. French’s idea is that some visual sensation q serves to 
indicate the source of the knowledge when one epistemically sees that p, and 
thus plays an evidential role in S’s knowledge that p. For French and 
Dretske, q can be any kind of objectual (non-epistemic) seeing, the idea being 
that, “[I]t is not part of the semantics of [perceptual propositional seeing 
ascriptions] that it ascribes a specific type of state or episode of visual 
perception…” (French, 2012, p. 122).57 One could see that it is raining by 
seeing the rain fall, seeing puddles on the deck fill, seeing someone soaked 
after stepping in from just being outside, etc. What is essential for this type of 














seeing. French refers to this view as the visuo-epistemic model, and 
according to this model to see that p is to know that p on the basis of vision. 
At this point it is worth noting that often theorists engaged in debates about 
the epistemic import of the use of such locutions seem to make the 
assumption that we are referring to, with the use of such expressions, is 
some kind of mental state of the individual. Even though our epistemic 
vocabulary includes locutions like ‘sees that’, which indicate a kind of 
epistemic-visual condition, this is not a reason to think that there is any kind 
of sui generis psychological (mental) state which corresponds to a subject’s 
‘seeing that’. I think, following Dretske and French, we can accept the notion 
of epistemic seeing and that there is a sense of ‘see’ when taken in 
propositional contexts that is both perceptual and epistemic. We can also 
concede that this sense of the verb indicates a privileged epistemic condition 
of the individual insofar as one’s ‘seeing that’ often serves as an answer to 
the question of how one knows. However, despite the fact that there is a 
sense of the verb ‘see’ that is both epistemic and perceptual, and that seeing 
in this perceptual propositional sense can be thought of as a single privileged 
epistemic condition, it does not follow, nor is it likely I would argue, that 
there is any kind of single psychological state that is both perceptual and 
propositional. That is, there is no mental state being in which is sufficient for 
seeing that p, when seeing is taken to be both perceptual and propositional. 
The expression ‘sees that’ does serve to indicate a single epistemic condition, 
but one which is consistent with there being more than one state of the 
individual, perhaps one that is perceptual and one that is 
cognitive/propositional. Perhaps even a series of perceptual states (or events) 
and a standing propositional attitude. It is a mistake to think that since we 
recognize this perceptual propositional sense of ‘see’ and the privileged 
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epistemic position of ‘seeing that’ that there must be a hybrid mental state of 
the individual, which is both perceptual and propositional. 
The assumption on French’s view seems to be that when we make 
ascriptions of the form ‘S sees that p’ – where the sense of ‘see’ is the 
perceptual propositional sense – we are referring to a specific state of that 
subject (Williamson makes the same assumption). For example, in arguing 
for what he refers to as an explanatory challenge that some non-
propositional theorists of perceptual experience face, French states that, 
“States of seeing that p seem to be (A) perceptual, and (B) propositional… the 
challenge is to explain how states of seeing that p can be perceptual and 
propositional” (French, 2013, p. 2). However, at this point I think we should 
allow ourselves the distinction between psychological states of the 
individual and epistemic conditions predicable to that individual. That is, 
even though the condition of ‘seeing that p’ can be regarded as involving 
both perception and some propositional attitude, it doesn’t necessarily 
follow that every time a subject S sees that p, in the perceptual propositional 
sense, there must be some particular state such that being in that state is 
sufficient for S’s seeing that p, which is implied by reference to any state of 
seeing that p. We can make the distinction between epistemic conditions and 
psychological (mental) states, which may or may not be identical with or 
equivalent to such conditions. I’ll maintain that there is a single epistemic 
condition that corresponds to a subject’s seeing-that but it is not obvious that 
such a condition is equivalent to a sui generis mental state. It is certainly 
plausible that the epistemic condition is a supervenient property the base of 
which may be a mix of several states and events. Some, like Williamson, 
maintain that epistemic conditions such as ‘seeing that’ just are mental states. 
The point here is that there may be any number of relevant cognitive and/or 
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perceptual events involved in determining such a privileged epistemic 
condition, none of which are equivalent to one another. 
The claim here is that it is not obvious that when S sees that p, there must be 
some kind of perceptual propositional mental state for S, even though we are 
referring to a kind of epistemic condition of the subject such that S’s 
knowing that p is explained by the fact that S sees that p. In fact, this is 
precisely what Dretske’s notion of epistemic seeing is meant to convey. 
Dretske’s intention was to show that seeing that p is an epistemically 
advantaged positon. He makes the point thus, 
Seeing something in a primary epistemic way represents a 
particularly favored position in which we sometimes find 
ourselves for answering the question ‘How do you know that b is 
P?’ The position is favored, epistemologically speaking because 
we have available the reply ‘I can see that it is P’, not by the 
newspapers, not by the gauge, not by seeing that something else is 
Q, but by seeing b itself (Dretske, 1969, p. 157). 
It seems perfectly consistent to accept the semantics of ‘sees that’ ascriptions 
and agree with Dretske that epistemic (propositional) seeing is a unique 
epistemic condition, different in kind from objectual (non-propositional) 
seeing, but still deny that there is some mental state, which is both 
perceptual and propositional. I suggest that it is perfectly reasonable to claim 
that in cases of perceptual propositional seeing there is a ‘seeing X’, where 
‘X’ denotes some object or event such that seeing X is merely perceptual and 
non-epistemic, and that there is also a ‘Φ-ing that p’, where ‘Φ’ denotes a 
propositional attitude to p, which is propositional and not perceptual. It is 
also reasonable to hold that the two can be thought to constitute a single 
advantaged epistemic condition such that this condition entails knowing, but 
there need be no single state of seeing-that for such an epistemic condition to 
obtain. Not much turns on this point for Dretske. It isn’t relevant to Dretske’s 
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view whether or not there is a single mental state or a group of states or 
events associated with seeing-that. However, for French and Williamson 
there is an important consequence here. French holds that there is an 
explanatory challenge for those who hold a non-propositional view of 
perceptual experience.58 However, this is only a problem if we think there is 
a state of seeing-that. The problem this raises for Williamson’s view is much 
more obvious, since for Williamson seeing-that is just a mental state. We can 
of course regard seeing-that as a factive propositional attitude and according 
to the attitude externalist view such an attitude would be regarded as being 
purely mental. Where we might draw attention is to the claim of stativity. 
Williamson regards this factive attitude as being stative. I think this is a 
highly debatable point, and one that has not really been challenged in the 
literature. Just as we challenged the widely held assumption that talk of 
token mental states is metaphysically acceptable in chapter one, here we 
need to challenge another widely held assumption, that seeing-that is a 
stative factive attitude. 
The underlying assumption in this debate seems to be that since there is a 
locution that seems to bridge the two together (perception and propositional 
awareness), there must be some hybrid state that corresponds to the 
locution. But this is a completely unwarranted assumption. The conflated 
sense of ‘see’ may just fail altogether to pick out any unique type of state. It is 
perfectly reasonable to hold that the expression is used in this conflated 
sense to simultaneously report a visual experience and ascribe a 









single epistemic condition, but that there is no single psychological state that 
corresponds to such a condition. Everything we accept about the semantics 
of ‘sees that’ ascriptions and the epistemological considerations about the 
relation between seeing and knowing are perfectly consistent with there 
being no such state at all. In fact, in section three I will argue that the factive 
psychological attitude seeing-that is best thought of, not as a kind of mental 
state at all but as a special kind of mental event. For now, let us turn to the 
entailment thesis. 
 
5.2 The Entailment Thesis 
Recent literature has seen a few objections raised against SET. One such 
objection comes from John Turri. Turri’s goal with this objection is to 
undermine Williamson’s factive attitude account of knowing, and he offers 
three putative counterexamples to the thesis, one of which will suffice to 
convey the gist of his argument. 
(BARN) Henry and his son are driving through the country. 
Henry pulls over to stretch his legs and while doing so regales his 
son with a list of currently visible roadside items. “That’s a tractor. 
That’s a combine. That’s a horse. That’s a silo. And that’s fine 
barn,” Henry added, pointing to the nearby roadside barn. And 
indeed Henry saw that a barn stood nearby. But unbeknownst to 
them the locals recently secretly replaced nearly every barn in the 
county with papier-mâché fake barns. Henry happened to see the 
one real barn in the whole county. But had he instead set eyes on 
any of the numerous nearby fakes, he would have falsely believed 
it was a barn. (Adapted from Goldman 1976, pps. 172-3, who 
credits Carl Ginet) 
Turri claims that in this case, Henry sees that there is a barn nearby but fails 
to know as much. Thus, SET must be false. In a response to Turri, French 
argues that Turri has misunderstood the sense of ‘see’ employed in the 
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example. For French, seeing, in the perceptual propositional sense, and 
knowing do not come apart, and for French and many others, that means 
that SET must be true. French agrees with Turri’s conclusion that Henry does 
not know that a barn is nearby, but of course denies that Henry sees that 
there is a barn nearby. According to French, Henry sees a barn, but doesn’t 
see that there is a barn, since the sense in which we are using ‘see’ here is a 
perceptual propositional sense, and the visuo-epistemic model holds that the 
perceptual propositional sense of ‘see’ should be understood as knowing on 
the basis of visual perception. French’s criticism of this argument is essentially 
that Turri fails to recognize that the kind of seeing relevant to this case is 
perceptual propositional seeing, which is just knowing on the basis of visual 
perception. French offers the following as an example of how this sense of 
‘see’ is supposed to function. 
(JACK) Jack is driving through the country. He knows there is just 
one barn in the area, and he has to deliver a package to it. He comes 
up to a point where he sees some rutted tracks which are of the 
kind (he knows) that inevitably terminate in a barn. At this point, 
Jack can’t see the barn itself (as it is hidden behind the bushes), but 
he sees the rutted tracks, and thereby sees that there is a barn there 
(French, 2012, p. 124). 
The claim is that in this example we have an utterance of, 
1. Jack can see that there is a barn there. 
French contrasts this with Turri’s example where we have a similar utterance 
of, 
2. Henry could see that a barn stood nearby. 
The argument is that in JACK (1) is true, but in HENRY (2) is false. French 
claims that, “It is clear in the context that the means by which Jack knows 
that there is a barn there is his visual perception of the rutted tracks” 
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(French, 2012). And if (2) employs the same sense of ‘see’ as (1), then Henry 
would know by the sense of sight that a barn stood nearby. However, ex 
hypothesi Henry does not know this. The conclusion is that (2) must not be a 
case of seeing-that in the visuo-epistemic or perceptual propositional sense. 
French’s claim here is that (2) is false not because Henry fails to see, but 
rather that, “…what Henry sees does not enable him to know that there is a 
barn nearby – because he is, unknowingly, in a county populated with fake 
barns” (French, 2012). On the visuo-epistemic model, perceptual 
propositional seeing is just knowing on the basis of visual perception. 
Now, to be fair, French is not offering us an account on what makes SET 
true, but merely pointing out the flaw in Turri’s arguments. We could say 
that our evidence is always subject to defeat and is defeated in cases where 
the modal environment is hostile to knowledge, as it is in HENRY. 
Essentially, this is what French is pointing out between the two examples, 
and that this does not undermine SET, since on a correct reading of the 
examples, ‘see’ is being used in the perceptual propositional sense, which is 
the sense in which a subject knows based on visual perception. The response 
from French is really just trying to offer us a way of understanding the fact 
that we do just mean by the phrase ‘sees that’ that a subject has a kind of 
knowledge or understanding in such cases. This is obvious in the 
propositional awareness sense of ‘see’. Where explicating this notion 
becomes complicated is in the attempt to describe the relation between the 
perceptual element and the propositional element of this conflated sense. 
The difficulty is showing that when the verb ‘see’ is taken in this conflated 
sense the verb phrase ‘sees that’ not only conveys a kind of knowledge or 
understanding, but it also serves to simultaneously pick out the evidential or 
justificatory grounds of that knowledge as being some visual sensation, and 
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this is epistemologically problematic. How exactly is this supposed to work? 
I think French is correct about the fact that we mean to convey that there is a 
visual sensation that plays a kind of justificatory or evidential role in our 
knowing in such cases. I don’t think that Turri’s arguments succeed as they 
stand, and I think French’s assessment of them is essentially correct. 
However, I suggest that if we interpret the challenge as a question of what 
makes SET true, then it still needs to be met, despite the fact that we may 
have a semantic account of ‘sees that’ ascriptions on which such ascriptions 
are used to express an epistemically advantaged condition. 59 That being said, 
Turri’s arguments fail to recognize the proper sense of ‘see’ used in the 
example cases and thus do not succeed. 
Pritchard has also raised a challenge to SET. His angle is a bit different from 
Turri’s, but he essentially draws the same conclusion as Turri, that not all 
cases of seeing-that necessarily are cases of knowing. On Pritchard’s view the 
entailment thesis is false because there are cases in which one can see that p 
but fail to believe that p, and since belief is a necessary condition for 
knowledge one thereby fails to know. His motivation for denying the 
entailment thesis stems from what he calls the basis problem. Pritchard’s 
epistemological disjunctivist view wants to acknowledge the intimate 
epistemic connection between epistemic seeing and knowing, but at the 
same time needs to allow for the possibility that one’s knowledge that p be 
based on one’s seeing that p. For Pritchard, this cannot be the case if seeing 










The problem…is that if this is indeed the right way to think about 
the relationship between seeing that p and knowing that p, then it 
is hard to understand how seeing that p could constitute one’s 
epistemic basis for knowing that p. After all, on this view seeing 
that p already presupposes knowledge that p on account of how it 
is just a way of knowing that p. But how then could seeing that p 
constitute one’s epistemic basis for knowing that p? Call this the 
basis problem for epistemological disjunctivism (Pritchard, 2012). 
Pritchard uses the barn façade case altered slightly to demonstrate this point 
as well. So, we’ll continue to refer to Henry as our subject to illustrate his 
point. In Pritchard’s case, Henry forms the belief that a barn is nearby based 
on seeing a barn while driving through the country. In this case, Henry does 
see a barn and there are no fake barns nearby. However, let’s say that Henry 
is given false testimony from an otherwise reliable source that the 
countryside is populated with barn facades. Henry, Pritchard argues, is thus 
obliged to withhold his belief that there is a barn nearby based on this 
testimony. In this case, as in Turri’s example, there is an undefeated defeater 
to Henry’s knowledge, which in this case is the fact that he is being deceived 
by the testifier – there are in fact no barn facades, only real barns. Pritchard 
argues, I think plausibly that later on when Henry is told the truth that he 
was being deceived, he would be inclined to say that he did in fact see that a 
barn was nearby despite the fact that he did not believe that a barn was 
nearby. He says,  
Wouldn’t one now retrospectively treat oneself as having earlier 
seen that there was a barn? Think, for example, about how one 
would describe one’s situation in this regard were one to be asked 
about it. Wouldn’t it be most natural to say that one did see that 
there was a barn in the field, rather than to ‘hedge’ one’s assertion 
by saying, for example, that one merely thought that one saw a 
barn? (Pritchard, 2012) 
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For Pritchard, propositional seeing merely guarantees that one is in a good 
position to gain knowledge, not that one has knowledge, as it does for 
French and Dretske. Thus, seeing-that need not entail knowing, but merely 
be robustly epistemic enough to serve as a basis for knowledge. I think it is 
somewhat tricky to both defend this argument and to object to it. Pritchard 
does raise a worry for the entailment thesis and the support for this concern 
comes from a major epistemological view of Pritchard’s, epistemological 
disjunctivism, a view which has been gaining popularity for some time now. 
In other words, we don’t just have an ad hoc attempt at denying the 
entailment thesis, we have a full blown epistemological theory which, 
according to Pritchard, requires that the concepts of propositional seeing and 
knowing come apart, even though they remain intimately connected. As 
Pritchard puts it, “…seeing that p is factive and robustly epistemic…[and] 
can properly be thought of as providing an epistemic basis for [knowing]” 
(Pritchard, 2012) However, it isn’t clear how one should gauge just how 
popular Pritchard’s intuition is in this case. One might be inclined to initially 
say that they did see a barn, but if pressed to answer the more direct 
question, “Did you see that there was a barn?” they might be reluctant to 
grant the seeing-that but deny the knowing. I can imagine a popular 
response being, “Well if you mean by ‘seeing that there was a barn’ did I 
know that there was a barn, the yes, I did.” Maybe, what is lacking in this 
case is just the second order knowledge that one knew that they knew that 
there was a barn. It is a reasonable response to say that once I was told that 
there were no barns, I no longer believed that what I saw was a barn, but 
prior to that I believed that what I saw was indeed a barn. Pritchard’s 
argument is quite provocative but requires us to stretch our intuitions in 
such cases fairly thin and as such do not seem compelling enough to counter 
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the much stronger intuition that seeing that p is just knowing on the basis of 
visual perception. 
The arguments presented in this section are examples of ways in which some 
authors have challenged SET in the recent literature. As provocative as 
theses arguments are, as challenges to SET, they can be met. Most of the 
attacks on the entailment thesis come from challenges to views like 
Williamson’s not specifically because there seems to be a problem with 
propositional seeing, but that there seems to be a problem with Williamson’s 
attitude externalism, or they come from views like Pritchard’s where SET 
poses a specific problem for the epistemological theory being developed. 
Ultimately, I think both Turri’s and Pritchard’s objections fail. French’s reply 
to Turri is I think fairly decisive, the error in Turri’s argument is failure to 
recognize the semantics of ‘sees that’ ascriptions and that in the sense in 
which his use of such ascriptions is applicable they are knowledge 
ascriptions. Prichard’s argument, I think requires a bit of finessing to make it 
really convincing. There is a certain degree of plausibility to such a case as 
outlined by Pritchard, but there is also a sense in which the timeline of the 
events in that case forces us to construe our epistemic attributions in an 
unclear way. That is, if one were inclined to retroactively attribute seeing-
that to the subject, then one might also be inclined to attribute knowledge on 
that very basis. 
 
5.3 Perceptual Success Terms and Factive Verb Phrases 
There is a rather uncontroversial thesis about seeing, which we may credit to 
Ryle, who in turn credits Aristotle, and that is that as soon as one sees that p 
Chapter	5	
	 144	
it immediately follows that one has seen that p.60 If I see that the cup is on the 
table, then I have seen that the cup is on the table. My having seen that the 
cup is on the table is true at the same time that I actually see that it is. In a 
sense, my seeing-that is just my having-seen-that.61 Terms like ‘see’, 
‘recognize’ and ‘notice’ have a success component to them. Ryle argued that 
there is an important difference between verbs of perceptual exploration like 
‘look’ and ‘search’ and verbs of perceptual detection like ‘see’ and ‘notice’. 
They serve different purposes in describing different aspects of perception, 
and only the latter imply a kind of terminus. He says,  
In some respects, though certainly not in very many, the verbs ‘see’ 
and ‘hear’ function like the verb ‘win’. They do not stand for 
bodily or psychological states, processes or conditions. They do 
not stand for anything that goes on, i.e. has a beginning, a middle 
and an end (Ryle, 1954, p. 106). 
Such successes might very well be the result of previous processes or events 
that did unfold over time, but it seems fairly accurate to say that any seeing, 
recognizing or noticing occurs only at the point of success. Linguists 
sometimes regard this quality of certain verbs as having a positive telicity. 
These verbs have some kind of implied endpoint built in to their semantics. 
Vendler, following Ryle referred to this “spotting” sense of the verb ‘see’ as a 
type of achievement. Vendler’s analysis of verb types was meant to have 
philosophical import. He regarded the differences in the sense of ‘see’, for 
example, as indicating distinct ontological categories. For Vendler, as well as 
other linguists, ‘see’ in many cases denotes a kind of punctual occurrence, 









On the other hand, recent authors such as Gisborne have argued that ‘see’ in 
its physical perception sense is underspecified in multiple ways. In its 
prototypical sense ‘see’ is underspecified with respect to its telicity, 
durativity and dynamicity (Gisborne, 2013). If we look at certain tests we use 
for determining these qualities of verbs, we can see very easily, Gisborne 
thinks, that ‘see’ is underspecified with respect to each of these 
characteristics. As regards its duration, Gisborne offers the following 
examples: 
1. She saw him hit the dog. 
2. She saw him make supper. 
As Gisborne points out, in both cases the percept is a type of event. The 
event in (1) the ‘hitting of the dog’ is a punctual occurrence (i.e. is 
instantaneous or of very brief duration), which implies that the seeing itself 
was of equally short duration. However, the event in (2) takes time to unfold, 
and correspondingly the seeing of that event must have also occurred over 
an extended period of time. The conclusion here is that ‘seeing’ is neither 
inherently durative or punctual but has its duration determined by the 
percept. Similar arguments are made for the telicity and dynamicity of ‘see’. 
Again, Gisborne argues that the telicity and dynamicity of ‘see’, at least in its 
prototypical sense is conditioned by the percept and has no inherently 
dynamic, telic or durative structure. Over the last fifty years or so the 
linguistic analysis of perception verbs has been an important topic for both 
philosophers and linguists, and yet there doesn’t seem to be any strong 
consensus on the inherent characteristics of perceptual success terms. In fact, 
some like Gisborne, question whether ‘see’ is even always a success term. 
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As our interest here is primarily in the perceptual propositional sense of ‘see’ 
our focus will mainly be on the factive verb phrase constructions that can be 
made with such verbs, since these phrases seem to have special epistemic 
import. And whether or not perceptual success verbs in their prototypical 
senses are not inherently telic, durative or dynamic, I will argue, their use in 
factive verb phrase constructions always seem to employ a very specific 
profile of these characteristics. Now, one point that seems to be widely 
accepted is that the verb phrase ‘sees that’ is in its typical use a stative 
predication. It is this presupposition that works in the background of views 
like Williamson’s. Gisborne, along with many others holds that when ‘see’ is 
used in a propositional context, such predications as ‘sees that p’ are always 
stative. However, I want to suggest here that such predications, even though 
they share some commonalities with other stative predications, are not 
themselves typically stative. For, it seems the perceptual component of ‘see’ 
in the perceptual propositional sense is always telic, non-dynamic and non-
durative in factive verb phrases like ‘sees that’. To see this, let us note first 
that states are typically atelic and durative, but in its perceptual 
propositional sense ‘see’ seems to be telic and non-durative. Consider again 
the example from Gisborne, ‘She saw him make supper’, which on a typical 
reading is taken to be a stative predication. What about this use of ‘see’ 
makes us think that the predication is stative? Certainly the sense of ‘see’ 
here is telic, that is, if he failed to make supper, then the statement would be 
false. And stative predications are almost never telic. So, that certainly isn’t 
the reason. If anything it is a reason to think it is non-stative. Perhaps the 
idea that since the percept is an event with some duration the seeing itself 
must have similar duration is driving the intuition here that the predication 
is stative. But this is a false equivalence. Just because an event that is seen has 
duration doesn’t imply that the seeing of that event has a similar duration. 
Chapter	5	
	 147	
Consider the statement ‘S sees that the plane is landing’. This seems to 
indicate that what S is doing is seeing that the plane is landing, or that S is in 
a state of seeing the plane landing. Certainly in this context there is 
something going on over a period of time, namely, a plane is landing. 
Obviously, it takes time for a plane to land, and if S sees that it is landing, 
then it stands to reason that S’s seeing that the plane is landing must occupy 
an equal amount of time. Unfortunately, this argument is fallacious. It does 
not follow from the fact that the event which I see has temporal extension 
that the event of ‘my seeing it’ is also temporally extended. It is entirely 
possible that my seeing that the plane is landing is still just a punctual 
success, in that once I saw that the plane was landing, I had seen that it was 
indeed landing. This is not to say that we cannot give expression to a 
perceptual event which does correspond in temporal duration to the event 
which it is of. Watching the plane land seems to be an apt way of describing 
such a perceptual event. Here we are specifically mentioning the fact that the 
perceptual event (or process) continued along with the event of which it was 
a perceptual event. The same is not so for ‘seeing that the plane is landing’.63 
We might note that in Gisborne’s example ‘She saw him make supper’ the 
direct object is an event, whereas in my example the object is a proposition. 
But even here there is an objection to be made against the claim of durativity. 















the verb denotes a kind of achievement, an analysis similar to Gisborne’s. 
Vendler essentially argued that in the sentence ‘I saw him cross the street’ 
the sense of ‘see’ cannot be dynamic, and thus must refer to a state. 
However, as Mourelatos carefully pointed out, the paraphrase data for this 
sentence does not bear this out. Mourelatos contends, 
This diagnosis hardly accords with our intuitions. There is no 
difficulty in paraphrasing “He was running” as “He was engaged 
in the activity of running.” But would we really be tempted to 
paraphrase “I saw him run” as “I was in a state of visual awareness 
of him running? ...the force of “I saw” in these two sentences [‘I 
saw him running’ and ‘I saw him cross the street’] is not to convey 
the state of the subject but to record a sighting or a seeing, however 
protracted, as an occurrence, as an individuated something that 
took place. The correct category for the “saw” of Vendler’s 
sentence is event (Mourelatos, 1978, p. 422). 
The same point can very easily be made for Gisborne’s example ‘She saw 
him make supper’. We wouldn’t normally paraphrase this as ‘She was in a 
state of visual awareness of him making supper’. The fact that she saw him 
make supper, since the direct object in this case is an event of some duration, 
may imply that there must have also been some visual episode of some 
duration that corresponds to the event perceived. We might think that ‘She 
saw him make supper’ implies ‘She watched him make supper’, whereas 
‘She saw him making supper’ does not. The latter being consistent with her 
just briefly seeing him while he was making supper, but not watching or 
observing him for any real stretch of time. This is all perfectly acceptable, but 
should not force us to read “saw” as indicating some kind of state. On a 
typical reading, perception verbs like ‘see’ are success terms, and typically 
lack duration, which is inconsistent with stativity, and they also tend to 
exhibit a positive telicity—hence the success component—which is not 
commonly associated with stative verbs. We might also look at the 
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dynamicity of perceptual success verbs to further the point. As Vendler and 
Steward have pointed out some verbs do not take the continuous tense—
something which would indicate a dynamic verb—simply because we 
typically use them to indicate something that happens almost 
instantaneously.64 Now, both dynamic and stative verbs can be durative, so 
the fact that perceptual success terms often lack duration, might be thought 
to be a result of their positive telicity. Achievements or successes are not 
drawn out processes or activities if Ryle and Mourelatos are right, and 
typically, only dynamic verbs display a kind of positive telicity, whereas 
stative verbs tend to be atelic. 
What we’re specifically interested in are when verbs like ‘see’ are used in 
factive verb phrase constructions. Despite its underspecified nature in its 
prototypical sense, the verb ‘see’ takes on a different profile of characteristics 
when taken in perceptual propositional contexts, that is, when used in 
factive verb phrase constructions. ‘Sees that’ employs the telic, non-dynamic 
and non-durative qualities of the verb, all of which should raise an eyebrow 
as to why we should be inclined to think of such predications as stative. The 
fairly common view that such predications are stative, I think is dubious at 
best. Verbs that indicate a kind of perceptual success like ‘see’ or ‘notice’, 
when used in propositional contexts certainly denote a factive propositional 
attitude. That being said, the question remains as to just what type of 
condition holds in a case where one sees or notices or recognizes that p. I 
think it is safe to regard these as epistemic conditions, but are they stative or 
dynamic conditions? For, the notion of condition is sufficiently general to 






axes (durativity, telicity, dynamicity) we get a pretty good picture of things 
and whether or not we should regard such predications as ‘sees that p’ as 
typically stative is definitely called in to question. Given the telic, non-
durative qualities of these verbs when used to express a propositional 
attitude, it is not obvious that we should regard ‘sees that p’ as a stative 
predication. 
Just looking at the linguistic evidence it seems there is equally good reason 
to think that we’re talking about events or punctualities with perceptual 
success verbs as there is to think that we are talking about states. I think the 
case can be made either way, though I believe the evidence is skewed 
slightly more in favor of the event/punctuality interpretation, despite the 
nearly ubiquitous presumption that we are referring to a type of state with 
such predications. There is also a kind of compromise position here. 
Gisborne ultimately suggests that we regard such verbs as not necessarily 
indicating an event or a state, but something more like changes in state. On 
this view, perceptual success verbs are neither strictly dynamic nor strictly 
stative. Compare these verbs to the strictly stative propositional attitude 
verbs, like ‘believe’ and ‘know’. For some propositional attitude verbs, it 
seems quite plausible to say that such verbs and verb phrases cannot be 
picking out anything like an event or a process. One certainly wouldn’t 
answer the question, “What have you been doing for the past twenty 
minutes?” with, “I was believing.” Believing just doesn’t seem like 
something one can be occupied doing for any amount of time. One believes 
for a time, but it doesn’t follow that one was believing at any point during that 
time. We wouldn’t say that any kind of believing was going on or taking 
place. Yet, from the fact that a verb does not seem to clearly indicate an event 
or a process, it does not follow, as we’ve already seen, that it must then 
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indicate some kind of state. So, even if one is not convinced that the proper 
ontological category for what expressions like ‘sees that’ denote is event, 
claming statehood for it is not an obvious conclusion either. In fact, it is even 
more problematic given the conception of mental states argued for earlier. 
Since, any mental state must obtain over some interval of time, S’s seeing 
that p, if it is a state, must obtain over some positive interval of time.65 The 
case is peculiar with success terms in a way that it is not with verbs like 
‘believe’ in that the notion of success gives the verb a telic quality. On the 
one hand, we might be inclined to say that they refer to a unique type of 
event since what they refer to happens, or occurs in the sense that events 
happen or occur, only these types of events do not take any time to happen. 
That is to say, seeing, thought of as an event, though it does occur, does not 
take any time to occur. There is no interval of time over which or during 
which a ‘seeing’ might have occurred. It might take time for one to see that p, 
but once one has seen that p, then even though we may think of that seeing 
as having occurred, the seeing itself did not unfold over any interval. It may 
have punctuated a specific interval of time, at the end of which one could be 
said to have seen that p, but we typically would not use the verb in the 
continuous tense to refer to an event or process that unfolds over time. It 
would just sound strange to say that S is seeing that p. The same goes for 
other perceptual success terms like ‘recognize’ or ‘notice’. Things start to 
sound odd when we use the term ‘recognize’ to refer to something that 
occurs over a stretch of time. Consider the sentence ‘She is recognizing her 
family members.’ Here we are referring to something that is going on over 
an interval of time, but whether or not she is actually recognizing will 






her family members, then she did not recognize them, and whatever we 
were referring to with this statement could not have been a recognizing. In 
such a case it would be better to say that she is trying to recognize. The lack 
of any duration may make it difficult to see these terms as referring to a kind 
of mental event, but it is even more so for them to be referring to a mental 
state. 
If we want to adopt the view that factive verb phrases employing perceptual 
success terms refer to mental states, then we must accept the notion of telic 
states that do not obtain over any interval of time. This is obviously 
problematic. If on the other hand we adopt the view that such terms denote 
events, then we must acknowledge that some events have no duration. With 
this option, I believe we gain ground in accounting for their positive telicity. 
The compromise view here is that perceptual success verbs and their 
corresponding factive verb phrases, rather than denoting a concrete event of 
no duration, or a state that obtains over no interval of time, indicate a kind of 
temporal demarcation between different epistemic conditions. That is, their 
function is primarily epistemic. Perceptual success terms delineate 
conditions that have different epistemic properties. One way to think about 
this is to think of seeing, as an example, as just the earliest point in time at 
which a certain epistemic condition obtains for a subject. Prior to that time, 
the condition did not obtain. The term serves as a kind of temporal epistemic 
marker. The verb phrase ‘sees that’ while used to express a factive 
propositional attitude toward some proposition p, thus does not necessarily 
indicate a mental state, but rather a change in a subject’s epistemic position 
with respect to p; and it does this while simultaneously indicating the way in 
which that epistemic position (knowing) is achieved. If this analysis is right, 
then there are two important points to consider.  First, ‘seeing that p’ is a 
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non-stative factive psychological attitude that entails knowing. Second, that 
at least some factive psychological attitudes can serve as a way of knowing, 
even though they are not mental states. In the last chapter we will pick up on 
this notion of a ‘way of knowing’ and compare the view being developed 
here with two prominent views in the literature, both of which employ the 








The arguments of the last two chapters discussed two factive attitudes 
thought by many to be paradigmatic ways of knowing—remembering and 
seeing. It was argued that the entailment thesis for remembering, as 
construed by most in the literature is not strictly true, and that seeing-that, 
though it does entail knowing, should be thought of as a kind of mental 
event rather than a mental state. Both of these conclusions serve to 
undermine Williamson’s view, where knowing is thought to be the most 
general factive stative attitude. The first two sections of this chapter are 
focused on situating the overall view outlined in the thesis between two 
prominent contemporary views, Williamson’s factive attitude account of 
knowing and Cassam’s explanatory theory of knowing. To a certain extent 
the shortcomings of the one compensate for the shortcomings of the other, 
and in this sense the two are not only compatible but complimentary views.66 
However, if the arguments of this thesis are right and the attitude 
externalism account offered here gets the metaphysical picture right there is 
more to be said. 
 In the first section I will take up this notion of ‘ways of knowing’, which is 
found in both Williamson’s and Cassam’s theories. I will discuss both of 
their conceptions of ‘ways of knowing’ and how they differ from one another 







discussion of the first section precipitates the discussion of the next in that 
we are left with the question of what the relation is between knowing and 
the ways in which one knows—whatever kinds of things they may turn out 
to be. I will briefly survey three types of relations that are potential 
candidates: determination, realization and explanation. My argument at the 
end of this discussion will be that the way in which we should think of how 
knowing relates to specific factive attitudes is not along the lines of 
determinable property types and their more specific determinates, as 
Williamson conceives of it, but along the lines of explanation—something 
closer to Cassam’s approach, though I will go further than Cassam and argue 
that the explanatory relation just is the metaphysical relation that specific 
factive psychological attitudes have to knowing. That is to say, since mental 
states, ontologically speaking, are more akin to facts, the kind of 
metaphysical relation that plays between certain particular mental 
occurrences or events and general mental state types is one of an explanation 
of certain facts. 
The last section of the chapter sketches out what I take to be a fundamental 
epistemological principle I call the multiformity principle. At the surface level 
it says that propositional knowledge is always had in some particular way, 
that is, if a subject has propositional knowledge at all, then there is a specific 
way in which that subject has that knowledge. At a deeper level, it will be 
suggested that the multiformity principle reveals what I see as an inherently 
disjunctive nature to propositional knowledge. The principle is endorsed by 
both Cassam and Williamson to one degree or another, though it is not 
articulated as a fundamental principle, and the deeper consequence is not, at 
least explicitly, endorsed by either. I will suggest at the end of this section 
that the multiformity principle has some very interesting implications and as 
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such has application to several important problems in epistemology. The 
Gettier problem is one such problem, and I will briefly sketch out a way of 
interpreting the Gettier problem in terms of the multiformity principle. 
 
6.1 Ways of Knowing 
In his discussion about the logic of dispositional statements, Ryle makes a 
crucial insight for our purposes here. While Ryle’s motivations for his 
discussion on this topic were quite different from ours—he was mainly 
concerned with the mind-body problem, or rather the dissolution of it—his 
discussion is both incredibly insightful and germane to our purposes. Ryle 
recognized that our mental talk falls into two broad categories—
dispositional statements and episodic statements. We often describe our 
mental lives in terms of dispositions to act and behave in certain ways, but 
also quite often report on specific episodes of our mental lives which seem to 
denote something very different from a disposition. They seem to be more 
like mental occurrences. Much of his criticism of philosophy of mind stems 
from what he considers to be a confusion about the logic of these types of 
statements. He noticed that when it comes to dispositions, not all are created 
equal. That is, some dispositions can be described in very nuanced ways that 
help to characterize them more specifically. Thus, Ryle makes an even finer 
grained distinction among dispositions, recognizing that some of the 
dispositional attitudes one might have reflect tendencies of the individual, 
whereas others reflect certain capacities. For Ryle, knowing and believing 
characterize this distinction quite aptly. Both are dispositional terms, but 
function differently according to Ryle. He suggested that one difference 
between these two types of dispositions lies in the fact that believing relies 
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upon reasons and knowing typically utilizes methods. 67 That is, our 
tendency to believe things is the result of having certain reasons for believing 
them, but our capacity to know things is the result of having certain methods 
of gaining that knowledge. Superficially, this looks a bit like an 
internalist/externalist conception of each, but this is too simplistic. This 
difference is subtly revealed if one considers the relevant interrogatives for 
inquiring into one’s states of belief and knowledge respectively. We typically 
ask of a person, how they know that such-and-such is the case, and why they 
believe that such-and-such is the case.68 The difference in the interrogatives 
alludes to the fact that what we’re inquiring after is subtly different in each 
case. In the case of belief, we want to know what reasons one has for 
believing something, but in the case of knowledge we want to know the 
method by which one came to know. 
Recent work in epistemology has seen a kind of revival of some of these 
distinctions that philosophers like Ryle and Austin were working with in 
discussions about the ways in which subjects have knowledge. The idea that 
we often look for methods or ways in which a subject has knowledge is of 
particular interest to us. That we can give expression to different ways of 
knowing has played a key role in both Williamson’s and Cassam’s views and 
is fast becoming an important area of research, and the idea that we might 
look at the specific ways in which a subject has knowledge is more than just 












epistemological inquiry. Understanding what it is to have propositional 
knowledge, will ultimately depend on understanding how propositional 
knowledge is had. Let me illustrate this point. Consider the following 
scenario. Sally passes by Ted in the hallway and sees that he is wearing a red 
jumper. They briefly exchange pleasantries and go their own way. Sally 
knows that Ted is wearing a red jumper today, as she just saw that he was. If 
Alice were to ask her, “What color jumper is Ted wearing today?” she would 
answer, “Red.” Later on that day, Alice does, in fact ask Sally what color 
jumper Ted is wearing. But Sally has forgotten what color his jumper is. It’s 
been a long stressful day, and the color of Ted’s jumper is just not that high 
on her list of concerns. So, Sally says to Alice, “I forget what color his jumper 
is.” Now, assuming that forgetting entails not knowing, we can say that Sally 
no longer knows what color Ted’s jumper is. But let’s say that later on she 
runs in to Ted again. She sees (again) that he’s wearing a red jumper. Here’s 
where our epistemological worries surface. Since seeing that p entails 
knowing that p, Sally now knows (again) that Ted is wearing a red jumper. 
And if we think of knowing in terms of cases, where a subject is indexed to a 
time we might put things in the following way, where p is the proposition 
‘Ted is wearing a red jumper’. At time t0 Sally sees that p and therefore 
knows that p. At time t1 (Alice queries Sally) Sally has forgotten that p and 
therefore does not know that p. At time t2 Sally sees that p and therefore 
knows that p. This is all fine except for the fact that at t2 it is still true that 
Sally has forgotten that p and therefore does not know that p. Seeing that p 
does not entail that one has not forgotten that p. It entails that one knows 
that p. However, having forgotten that p entails that one does not know that 
p. Thus, at t2 Sally both knows and does not know that p. What are we to say 
about this? Obviously, Sally’s epistemic condition is not going to be one of 
both knowing and not knowing that p. She either knows or she does not. But 
Chapter	6	
	 159	
how do we decide? I think the stronger intuition is to claim that she knows 
that p because she sees that p even though up to that point she had forgotten 
that p. And this is the right decision to make—Sally knows that p. What, I 
think, this scenario illustrates is the very intuitive point that in order to 
substantiate the claim that Sally knows we must be able to point to the 
specific way in which she knows. The important claim here is not that she 
knows, but that she knows by seeing. We cannot simply claim that she knows 
that p and leave it at that. For that doesn’t resolve the problem of her both 
knowing and not knowing.69 What is needed is an explanation of the way in 
which Sally has knowledge. 
Along with Williamson I think that attitude externalism is correct. That is, 
factive psychological attitudes, like seeing-that are broad but also prime 
conditions and are purely mental. However, there is significant enough 
variation amongst the factive psychological attitudes such that there are 
problems with some of Williamson’s claims, specifically the claim that 
knowing is the most general factive stative attitude. Firstly, not all factive 
attitudes that entail knowing are stative. As we saw in chapter five, seeing-
that is best thought of as a kind mental event or change in epistemic 
conditions. There is no mental state corresponding to one’s ‘seeing that p’. 
Secondly, not all factive stative attitudes entail knowledge. As we saw in 
chapter four non-occurrent remembering, though it is a factive mental state 
only entails that one previously came to know, not that one currently knows. 
The divergence between the view developed here and Williamson’s is 








Williamson will not necessarily work if the arguments of the previous 
chapters are correct. For even though seeing that p entails knowing that p, 
‘seeing that p’ is not a state of mind. And even though ‘remembering that p’ 
is a factive state of mind, it doesn’t follow that if one remembers that p that 
one knows that p. Thus, it is not sufficient for knowing that one be in a 
factive mental state, nor is it necessary. That being said I believe we can 
claim one necessary condition for knowledge that is in line with the attitude 
externalist view, which is that if one knows that p, then there is some factive 
psychological attitude which is purely mental and which serves as the way 
in which one knows that p. On this view, both ‘seeing that p’ and 
‘remembering that p’ count as ways of knowing that p, though their relation 
to knowing differs in quite important ways. 
Despite this difference, there is an important claim made by Williamson that 
we can accept. For, it is a very plausible claim about propositional 
knowledge in general. The claim is that, if S knows that p, then there must be 
a specific way in which S knows. Williamson formulates the idea thus, 
“…knowing is the most general factive stative attitude, that which one has to 
a proposition if one has any factive stative attitude to it at all” (Williamson, 
2000). Knowing, on Williamson’s account, is a general factive state of which 
there are multiple possible more specific factive states such as, perceiving 
and remembering. Now, even though this way of formulating things won’t 
work for our purposes this does not mean that Williamson’s claim about 
ways of knowing is false. ‘Seeing that p’ and ‘remembering that p’ can still be 
regarded as ways of knowing. Williamson’s view requires the sufficiency 
condition, ‘If S sees that p, then S knows that p’, but it also states that having 
a factive stative attitude is a necessary condition for knowing. Thus, if one 
knows that p, then one either sees that p or remembers that p, etc. For 
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Williamson, having any factive stative attitude is a way of knowing. We can 
agree with Williamson that having a factive attitude (and on the view 
endorsed here, this includes non-stative attitudes) is necessary for knowing. 
But we must deny the sufficiency claim, that having any factive attitude 
(stative or non-stative) entails knowing. We of course cannot accept just any 
factive attitude. Forgetting, for example, surely will not work, as it entails 
not knowing. However, if we simply hold that in any case in which a subject 
knows that p the fact that the subject knows entails a disjunction of possible 
factive psychological attitudes, some of which are stative, some non-stative, 
we can construe such factive psychological attitudes as the possible ways in 
which the subject knows that p. Thus, we can account for the multiformity 
claim by saying that knowing entails an open-ended but finite disjunction of 
possible factive psychological attitudes any one of which can serve as a way 
of knowing.70  
Cassam has also argued for the multiformity principle. His approach is 
slightly different, in that on Cassam’s view seeing that p is a way of knowing 
that p, since it offers a satisfactory explanation for how one knows that p. 
That is, it answers the “how do you know?” question. Cassam’s explanatory 


















case we can explain how one knows that p, by citing the fact that they Φ that 
p. For Cassam, ‘seeing that p’ is a way of knowing, since it explains how 
what is known, is known. The same goes for remembering. On Cassam’s 
view a way of knowing is identified by the fact that it explains how one 
knows, not by being a factive stative attitude. 
Though the two agree on the fact that seeing and remembering are both 
ways of knowing along with others, the reason why they count as ways of 
knowing is fundamentally different on each view. Cassam’s view differs 
from Williamson’s view in three important ways. On Cassam’s account, even 
if some factive stative attitude entails knowledge, it doesn’t follow from this 
fact alone that having such an attitude is a way of knowing. He uses the case 
of regret as an example. ‘S regrets that p’ is a factive stative attitude, since the 
inference from ‘S regrets that p’ to ‘p’ is deductively valid, and ‘regret’ can be 
read in a stative way. However, as Cassam points out, we normally wouldn’t 
regard regretting that p as a way of knowing that p, and it’s questionable 
whether it would fit Cassam’s criterion of providing a satisfactory answer to 
how one knows that p to claim that one regrets it. So, the entailment doesn’t 
necessarily give us any reason to regard such an attitude as a way of 
knowing. That being said, this argument isn’t completely convincing, since it 
is possible to conceive of a case in which one might use a sense of regret in 
this way. If someone asks you, “How do you know that Albert had help with 
the test?” and you reply with “Because I regret helping him”, feeling bad for 
being an accomplice of Albert’s in helping him cheat on the test, you are in 
sense asserting your knowledge that Albert had help with the test. 
Williamson could also respond by noting that there is also the fact that 
regretting that p entails remembering that p, and on Cassam’s view 
remembering that p, for appropriate substitutions of p, would count as a way 
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of knowing that p.71 Thus, even though regretting may not be a way itself of 
knowing that p, it is parasitic on a way of knowing, namely, remembering 
that p.  
The second difference to note on Cassam’s view is that if Φ is a way of 
knowing, then the sentence ‘S Φ’s that p’ need not entail ‘S knows that p’. 
Explanations for how one knows need not be entailing explanations. 
Cassam’s reasoning on this is that the explanatory view of knowing is much 
less restrictive than Williamson’s account and allows for common examples 
of knowledge explanations since they can satisfactorily explain how one 
knows. He offers the example of having read in the newspaper that Quine 
was born in Akron, Ohio. Having read that Quine was born in Akron, 
according to Cassam is a way of knowing that Quine was born in Akron, 
since saying, “I read it in the newspaper” is a perfectly acceptable answer to 
the question, “How do you know that Quine was born in Akron?” 
Admittedly, this is a much looser view than Williamson’s, since ‘I read in the 
paper that Quine was born in Akron’ certainly does not entail ‘I know that 
Quine was born in Akron’. That factive attitudes like ‘seeing that p’ are ways 
of knowing even if it is not generally true that ‘S Φ’s that p’ entails ‘S knows 
that p’ where Φ is a way of knowing, I’m in agreement with Cassam. 
However, our reasons differ slightly as will be made much clearer in the last 
section. For now, it will suffice to say that it is not necessary that any 
particular factive attitude entail knowing in order for a subject’s having that 
factive attitude to explain the way in which that subject knows. On Cassam’s 
account, a way of knowing need only provide a satisfactory explanation of 






Lastly, Cassam argues that if Φ is a way of knowing, then Φ need not be a 
propositional attitude. On Cassam’s account non-propositional seeing can 
suffice for knowing. As he says, 
Ways of knowing needn’t be propositional attitudes. I can know 
that there is a bittern at the bottom of the garden by seeing it but 
this kind of seeing isn’t propositional (Cassam, 2009, p. 114). 
It is important to note here that the type of knowledge that Cassam is 
concerned with is propositional knowledge. He is not making reference to 
knowledge by acquaintance or any kind of knowledge-wh, the expression of 
which in ordinary language might not strictly take a propositional form, 
though these other kinds of knowledge are not excluded in principle by 
Cassam’s account. His examples of knowledge are all examples of 
propositional knowledge, which makes this last claim somewhat more 
difficult to accept. In fact, on this point I’m inclined to disagree with Cassam 
for the following reasons. First, it isn’t clear to me just how one can acquire 
propositional knowledge without there being such a propositional attitude. 
The presence of propositional content seems to require a propositional 
attitude appropriate for grasping such content, and it isn’t clear just how that 
is done in the absence of any propositional attitude. There are views out 
there that attempt to articulate a way in which one’s non-epistemic seeing 
can “build-up” as it were, to one’s propositional knowledge but it isn’t 
argued in such views, as far as I know, that when one does have 
propositional knowledge that p, there need be no corresponding 
propositional attitude to p. Cassam could reply that he is not claiming that 
there is no relevant propositional attitude, only that the non-propositional 
(objectual) seeing of a particular can count as a way of knowing. However, if 
I say, “I know there is a bittern at the bottom of the garden,” I may know this 
because I can see it, but surely it follows that I can see that there is a bittern 
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at the bottom of the garden. For this particular claim of the explanatory view 
to carry the weight it is meant to carry, we might require that one’s knowing 
by seeing to suffice as an explanation of how one knows where there is no 
propositional attitude that can also do the explaining. And it seems that in 
any case where simple objectual seeing suffices for an explanation of 
knowing, there is always a propositional attitude there to do the same work. 
Another reason to reject this last claim of Cassam’s is that if one holds that 
knowledge entails belief – and this is practically universally held to be true – 
then we have a problem of how one’s belief is formed in such cases. As 
Dretske pointed out, non-epistemic seeing – the kind of seeing Cassam is 
using in his example – has zero belief content. My seeing object o does not 
entail my belief that p, for any proposition p. Thus, one could see object o and 
not believe that there is an o. If seeing o is a way of knowing, say, that there is 
an o, then the belief that there is an o (if there is one), in such a case could be 
completely anomalous. The problem here is explaining where the belief that 
there is an o comes from. At least, if we hold that in order for one to claim 
that one knows by perception, they must be epistemically seeing that 
something is the case, which implies some kind of non-epistemic seeing of 
course, then we are safe in terms of how one acquired the belief. This might 
only be a special problem for perceptual knowledge, and there may be 
recourse to other ways of knowing that do not require one to have a factive 
attitude to some proposition that Cassam can exploit, but I’m inclined to 
think there will be problems with those as well. 
In summary, Cassam’s view differs in important ways from Williamson’s 
view in terms of what counts as a way of knowing. For Williamson, what 
exactly constitutes a way of knowing is not totally clear, but there are 
exemplars such as seeing and remembering, and having a factive stative 
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attitude is a necessary condition for knowing. The agreement between the 
view outlined here and Williamson’s is that having a factive attitude (stative 
or non-stative) is necessary for knowing. For Cassam, a way of knowing is 
identified by giving a satisfactory answer to the question of how one knows. 
We saw that on Williamson’s view, if Φ is a way of knowing that p, then it 
must entail knowledge. This view was found too stringent, since there are 
factive attitudes that seem to be perfectly acceptable ways of knowing that p, 
but do not entail knowing, like remembering. However, this does not rule 
against the view that having a factive attitude is a way of knowing or that 
having a factive attitude is a necessary condition for knowing. We saw that 
Cassam’s view though much more flexible than Williamson’s in what it will 
count as a way of knowing, has two claims that seem to be problematic, the 
one only slightly, the other much more so. The first was that even if some 
factive attitude does entail knowledge, it does not follow that it necessarily 
figures as a way of knowing. I think this is problematic for particular cases, 
but doesn’t pose any real general problem for the view. It will ultimately 
depend on how we are to understand what a way of knowing is. The other 
problem is the idea that knowing that p does not require having a factive 
propositional attitude. That is, one can know that p, and the way in which 
one knows that p does not entail that one has a factive propositional attitude 
to p. This seems much more problematic. In fact, as I will argue in the last 
section, having a factive attitude to p, is a necessary condition for knowledge, 
and this goes hand-in-hand with the specific way in which one knows in any 
given case. I agree with Cassam that our explanations for how we know do 
not need to entail our knowing, but need only be one of a number of possible 
ways in which we can know. These ways of knowing are entailed by the fact 
that one knows in any case in which one has knowledge. We’ll see in the 
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final section that this fact reveals something about the nature of 
propositional knowledge in general. 
 
6.2 Explanation as Metaphysical Relation 
 On the Rylean view ‘know’ is a generic term for the capacity a subject has to 
get things right. The fact that the verb is a “highly determinable” 
dispositional term alludes to the fact that there are various ways in which 
that capacity can be exercised. The question Ryle was attempting to answer 
and which is pertinent to our discussion is about the logical relation between 
the two types of statements: episodic reports and dispositional statements. 
Now, one who holds the entailment theses discussed in the preceding 
chapters on remembering and seeing, like Williamson, will claim that the 
logical relation between these types of statements is one of entailment. 
Sentences of the form ‘S sees that p’ or ‘S remembers that p’ entail ‘S knows 
that p’ and even ‘S believes that p’. If it were the case that sentences like ‘S 
sees that p’ are about mental states and not particular cognitive events, then 
we might think that this indicates a specific type of metaphysical relation 
between the two. On the other hand, if sentences like ‘S sees that p’ are not 
about states but particular occurrences, that is, they act much more like 
episodic reports of the individual rather than dispositional statements, then 
the metaphysical relation between what these types of statements refer to 
might be thought to be something different. So, there are two issues here. 
One is the question of the logical relation between these types of sentences 
and the other is the question of the metaphysical relation between the types 
of mental entities these sentences are about. It is tempting to think that if 
both types of sentences ‘S sees that p’ and ‘S knows that p’ are about types of 
mental states, then the relation here is one of determination. That is, the 
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generic factive attitude of knowing is just a highly determinable mental state 
of which there are more determinate types—specific types of states like 
‘seeing that’ and ‘remembering that’. If the logical relation between the two 
types of sentences is one of entailment, then one might expect the parallel 
metaphysical relation between the two types of states to be one of 
determination. This would be a natural fit. There is a necessary connection 
between a determinable property type and any determinate of that type. 
However, in light of the discussions of the previous chapters, and as other 
authors have pointed out (Cassam being one of them) it should be pretty 
obvious at this point, that this way of thinking about the relation between 
knowing and specific factive attitudes cannot be right. Williamson seems to 
take just this line though. Given the analogies he uses to illuminate the 
relation between specific factive attitudes and knowledge, like the relation of 
‘being colored’ to ‘being red’, it is clear that this view is meant to be thought 
of in terms of something like the determination relation. Even Ryle’s use of 
the phrase “highly determinable” seems to push in this direction. However, I 
want to suggest caution here. The question is whether the determination 
relation is appropriate given the fact that the logical relation between the two 
types of sentences is not necessarily one of entailment. 
Consider the example Williamson gives of the properties ‘being colored’ and 
‘being red’. The argument here is that knowing and specific factive attitudes 
like ‘seeing that’ stand to one another in the same way the properties ‘being 
colored’ and ‘being red’ stand to one another. The relation between the 
property types ‘being colored’ and ‘being red’ is one of determination. Being 
red is a specific way of being colored. That is, an object’s being red 
determines it property of being colored. Williamson’s suggestion through 
the use of this analogy is that factive attitudes like ‘seeing that’ are 
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determinates of knowing. So, the condition that ‘S sees that p’ determines the 
condition that ‘S knows that p’. Thus, we can say that ‘seeing that’ is a more 
specific way of knowing. The problem is that there is a necessary connection 
between determinable property types and their determinates.72 An object 
cannot be red without being colored. That is to say, sentences of the form ‘O 
is red’ entail sentences of the form ‘O is colored’. But we’ve seen that this is 
not the case with remembering and knowing. If the arguments in the 
preceding chapters are correct, then sentences of the form ‘S Φ’s that p’ 
where Φ is a factive mental state operator do not necessarily entail sentences 
of the form ‘S knows that p’. Thus, remembering and knowing cannot stand 
in such a relation. On the other hand, seeing that p does entail knowing that 
p, but in this case we have two different types of statements, one of which 
refers to a mental occurrence, while the other expresses a type of fact. The 
logical relation between the two sentences ‘S sees that p’ and ‘S knows that p’ 
may be entailment but it certainly isn’t clear that the metaphysical relation 
between seeing and knowing is one of determination. Determination cannot 
be the right type of relation that in general obtains between knowing and the 
specific factive psychological attitudes that count as ways of knowing. 
Given that determination fails, one might opt for another type of relation 
such as the realization relation. It might be argued that specific factive 
attitudes like ‘seeing that p’ realize the general factive mental state of 
knowing.73 However, it is hard to see given the attitude externalist’s 
metaphysical commitments how this can work. The realization relation is 








between mental and physical properties, though it is not exclusively used in 
such contexts. However, there is a general understanding of the relation that 
seems to be the following. Realizers, whatever their nature, tend to realize 
general property types, of which they are particular instances. For example, 
we might think of the general property type ‘being a liquid’ or ‘being 
brown’. These are generic properties that can be instantiated in several ways, 
but one way in which they might be instantiated is by being realized by 
some physical substance or object. We could think of the coffee in my cup as 
realizing both property types ‘being a liquid’ and ‘being brown’. But in this 
case, the realizer is a particular substance, in this case the coffee in my cup. 
And in most cases, where the realization relation is recognized, what does 
the realizing is considered to be a kind of particular, a token or an instance of 
something.74 However, the attitude externalist view cannot make this 
concession when it comes to mental states. Mental states are generic in 
nature, and do not admit of token instances. Thus, if knowing is a mental 
state, then it is difficult to see how that state is realized, if the realizer is 
supposed to be a token instance of that state. Realization seems to carry with 
it some metaphysical implications that do not necessarily seem consistent 
with what has been said about the attitude externalist view.  
So, where does this leave us? What is the right relation between the state of 
knowing and specific factive attitudes? One point here is fairly obvious, and 
is that the logic of statements like ‘S sees that p’ and ‘S knows that p’ or ‘S 
believes that p’ at least stand in an explanatory relation to one another. This 









the types of sentences have to one another is the metaphysical relation that 
the specific occurrences/states have to one another. Fact-like entities can 
stand in an explanatory relation to one another. And this is all there is as 
regards any relation between these types of mental state types. The fact that 
one explains the other can be thought of as a metaphysical relation that 
obtains between them. The same type of relation exists between specific 
mental events and mental states. ‘Know’ is a highly determinable 
dispositional verb, but the state itself does not stand in a determinable-
determinate relation with other states, nor is it realized by other states. 
Determination and realization are not quite the right types of relations to 
obtain between the state of knowing and specific factive attitudes. The 
suggestion that we consider explanation as a metaphysical relation might 
seem like a poor substitution for determination and realization, or perhaps a 
weaker relation, but in many ways makes much more sense given the overall 
dialectic of the thesis. The relation that obtains between the general mental 
state of knowing and any specific factive attitude just is an explanatory 
relation. Mental states, like knowing, are in essence just certain sorts of facts 
that are true of an individual in any given case, and there is nothing 
shocking about saying that specific events, that is, specific concrete events, 
play an explanatory role in describing certain facts of any specific case. That 
is a natural function of concrete events – they explain the facts. What 
explains the fact that there is water all over the kitchen floor? Someone 
dropped a glass of water. The same goes with mental states like knowing 
and cognitive events like seeing. How is it that S knows that p? S saw that p. 
The logical relation between these types of statements is not all that 
puzzling. It is one of explanation. The trick here is to realize that the 
explanatory relation between sentences like ‘S sees that p’ and ‘S knows that 
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p’ is the metaphysical relation that obtains between the mental occurrence 
described by sees-that and the mental state described by knows-that. 
 
6.3 Knowing as a Disjunctive Kind: The Multiformity Principle 
We saw earlier that knowing that p entails an open-ended disjunction of 
possible factive attitudes. That is, the claim ‘S knows that p by seeing that p’ 
only commits us to the general claim ‘If S knows that p, then S either sees 
that p, or remembers that p, or…’, where the disjunction is open-ended but 
not infinite. This is entirely consistent with what has been said up to this 
point, and I think this is right. We now need to focus on this point, since I 
take this fact to indicate something fundamental about propositional 
knowledge in general. This fact, I think, reveals a fundamental 
epistemological principle, I call the multiformity principle, and it states that 
knowing always comes in specific ways, that there is no bare knowledge.75 
We could equally as well state the principle in the negative and refer to it as 
the principle of no bare knowledge, but the positive description, I think, conveys 
the point in precisely the right light. In a colloquial manner, we might just 
say that if one knows that such-and-such is the case, then there must be a 
specific way in which they know. We can formally state the principle by 
taking a look at one of Williamson’s central claims, call it (WC). 
(WC) There is a mental state being in which is both necessary and sufficient 
for knowing. 
We can understand this claim as involving two constituent claims. 






Let, p stand for a true proposition. 
Let, K be the standard modal operator, understood as ‘it is known that’, and 
Let, the Greek letters (Φ,Χ, Ψ…) stand for ways of knowing that p, where we 
might understand ways of knowing as having specific factive attitudes like 
seeing-that or remembering-that. (WC) is then equivalent to the conjunction 
of (1) and (2). 
1) Kp entails (Φp or Χp or…), where the disjunction is open-ended but 
not infinite. 
2) [(Φp entails Kp) and (Χp entails Kp)  and…)] 
The arguments of this thesis have attempted to show that (2) is false. 
However, no such attempt has been made for (1). In fact, (1) is the formal 
expression of this principle. The principle, in effect says that if S knows that 
p, then there is some specific way in which S knows. There is no knowledge 
simpliciter. Knowledge is always had in some specific way by a subject. (1) 
simply states that in any case in which a subject knows, such knowledge 
entails the disjunction of all possible ways in which that subject can know. 
Many theorists treat the question of how (or, the way in which) a subject 
knows as theoretically independent of the question of whether the subject 
knows. I submit that this is in large part the very reason why defining 
knowledge has proven to be so difficult. It is deceptively simple to ask, 
“What is knowledge?” and our attempts to answer it have traditionally taken 
the form of a conceptual analysis of the individually necessary and jointly 
sufficient conditions for knowing. As any reader of epistemology knows, this 
program has met some quite serious challenges. But perhaps the simplicity 
and the ease with which we can ask this question, in a sense, belies the 
intricacy of the question itself. Perhaps we just cannot get at the nature of 
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knowing through a direct approach. Perhaps this question is only answered 
by first asking another question—how do we know what we know? The 
priority of questions might be important here. Cassam touches on just this 
point in arguing that the notion of ‘ways of knowing’ might help elucidate 
our knowledge of knowledge itself. If giving necessary and sufficient 
conditions for knowledge fails programmatically, that certainly doesn’t 
mean we will never be able to give any kind of analysis of knowledge, just 
that the analysis will be of a non-standard kind, and the relevance of the 
question, “How do you know that p?” just might be central to providing 
such an analysis. He says, “At the very least it helps by showing that there 
are questions of the form ‘What is X?’ that don’t call for an analysis of the 
concept of an X” (Cassam, 2009, p. 111). In fact, this is precisely what 
ordinary language philosophers like Ryle and Wittgenstein were driving at. 
Of course, inquiring into how a subject knows what they know seems to 
presuppose the very knowledge that is the subject of inquiry. 
Understandably, this approach might be met with some resistance by those 
more inclined to accept a skeptical perspective on knowledge in general. But 
even the skeptic could be satisfied with this approach, since we could just 
caveat that we have this presumption. The import of the multiformity 
principle is that it forces us to acknowledge that answering the question of 
how we know first it seems, is necessary for answering the question of what 
knowing is. And this is more than just a pragmatic attempt to dissolve the 
question of what knowledge is, since the point is both deeply metaphysical 
and about the logic of the statements we use to talk about knowledge. The 
principle of the multiformity of knowledge captures this intuition by 
suggesting that to understand the nature of knowledge, one needs to 
understand the ways in which knowledge is had. For, its nature is essentially 
multiform. On this approach, to understand the question ‘What is 
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knowledge?’ is to understand that knowledge is essentially a disjunctive 
kind. To ask what knowledge is just is to ask how or in what ways do 
knowers know. 
One way of understanding this important principle is by juxtaposing 
knowledge, which is multiform, against another epistemic condition like 
belief, which is quite uniform. The insight that we tend to ask how one 
knows and why one believes, I think reveals a very important point, which is 
quite fundamental to our understanding of what knowing is. Though Ryle 
did not explicate things in quite the way I will, I think we can make a rough 
pass at differentiating between the two in the following way. If for a moment 
we regard an individual subject as merely a cognitive system, we might say 
that capacities are those dispositional properties the system has in virtue of 
its intrinsic properties, whereas the system’s tendencies are those 
dispositional properties it has, which are not merely the result of its intrinsic 
properties, but depend crucially upon the system’s history of interaction 
with its environment. Presumably, it is fair to say that that which we have a 
capacity for is also something that we have a tendency for. So, in this sense 
one is subsumed under the other. However, there is a sense in which it is 
somewhat infelicitous, at least, to say that one has a capacity to believe and a 
tendency to know. The reason seems to have to do with the fact that the 
latter seems to include more than is necessary in describing what the 
disposition to know is, and the former seems to leave something out. A 
cognitive system given at least the possibility of a minimal set of appropriate 
inputs can be described as having certain capacities, whereas for that system 
to have certain tendencies such inputs would have to be more than just 
possible—they would have to be actual and would have to be numerous. So, 
the idea that a cognitive system has the capacity to know (or the liability of 
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getting things wrong) is a consequence of the intrinsic properties of the 
system (even if that system is defined to include elements of its 
environment)76. The idea that a cognitive system has the tendency/proneness 
to believe or disbelieve or even abstain from judging altogether, requires that 
that system has already engaged cognitively with its environment (or 
another system for which it is designed to engage). The thought here is that 
the notion of a tendency implies a history of interaction and we cannot really 
attribute such a tendency absent any history or behavior indicating the 
presence of such a disposition, whereas we can attribute a certain capacity to 
a system independent of any history of its behavior. Capacities are in a way 
merely design-dependent features of the system and determined as such, but 
tendencies while also design dependent are only historically determined. In 
this sense then, it seems appropriate to say that we are born knowers, and 
only become believers over time. 
Returning to the point made earlier that we do not typically ask the question, 
“How do you believe that such-and-such?” but most often phrase the 
relevant interrogative as “why do you believe that such-and-such?” I said 
that Ryle’s take on this was that the difference is one of an inquiry into the 
methods of knowing as opposed to reasons for believing. The reason for this is 
that Ryle associated verbs like ‘know’ and its cognates with skill words in 
general. And just as there is no overarching skill in general by which one 
may be skilled in any number of specific ways, there is no overarching way 
of knowing by which we know any particular fact. Like being skilled, 








skilled” and just leaves it at that. The statement cries out for some kind of 
completion. One wants to respond, “At what?” Knowing is the same. One 
doesn’t just know that p. If one knows that p, then there is a specific way in 
which one knows. However, the same is not true of all epistemic conditions. 
Belief, on the contrary, is uniform. There is no corresponding multiformity 
principle for belief. That is, there are no ways of believing. One just either 
believes that p or does not without there being any specifiable way in which 
one has that belief. Belief is not a disjunctive kind. The multiformity claim for 
knowledge is not a claim about grounds or a kind of basis for knowledge in a 
given case. One might be tempted to argue that belief is also multiform since 
one may come to believe that p on the basis of perception or form the belief 
that p on the grounds that one remembers that p. But the view I’m 
advocating here does not think of ‘ways of knowing’ in this way. The 
difference is borne out to some extent by the ways in which we can 
paraphrase certain uses of the verbs ‘believe’ and ‘know’. One way to get a 
grip on the claim that knowledge is multiform is to recognize that there are 
several factive verbs for which ‘know’ is often an acceptable paraphrase. For 
example, ‘S remembers that p’, in most cases, can be paraphrased as ‘S 
knows that p’. This is not the case with belief. There are no non-factive verbs 
(since belief is non-factive) for which ‘believe’ is typically an acceptable 
paraphrase. There may be different reasons for which one believes that p 
(e.g. S believes that p because S seems to remember that p), but these are not 
strictly ‘ways of believing’. 
Both Cassam and Williamson will agree with the multiformity principle to 
one extent or another, but there is the question of how exactly to state it. For 
Cassam, having a factive attitude is not necessary for knowing. So, if it is 
formulated in such a way that each way of knowing is only thought of as a 
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factive attitude, then Cassam would reject the principle. For Williamson, the 
principle is acceptable stated as such, but incomplete. As I argued earlier, I’m 
inclined to think that insofar as we’re talking about propositional 
knowledge, there must be some corresponding propositional attitude. 
However, there is one objection to the principle that might be raised by 
Cassam, and that has to do with its universal application to all cases of 
propositional knowledge. Cassam has argued that despite the general 
epistemological value in investigating ways of knowing and seeing their 
analysis as a fundamental part of a theory of knowledge, it is not necessarily 
true that if one knows, then there must be a way in which one knows. He 
cites Hampshire's famous case of knowing that one is in pain, but not being 
able to give an answer to how one knows that one is in pain. Though I 
understand the example and the apparently paradoxical situation it 
represents, I must admit I’ve never been persuaded that it actually presents a 
problem. By their own admission, the subject that is in pain, or has a certain 
sensation is already in the best possible position to know that they are in 
pain. This is precisely what makes the question, “How do you know that you 
are in pain?” conversationally inappropriate. But therein also lies the answer 
to the question itself. Being in the best possible position to know that p, 
surely is a way of knowing that p. We may not have a term or phrase for 
being in such a position, but that is beside the point. Clearly, in such cases of 
self-knowledge, the subject could not be in a better position to have such 
knowledge, and by Cassam’s own theory, this is surely a satisfactory answer 
to the how question. This does, of course, leave open the question of whether 
or not we would attribute some kind of propositional attitude to the subject, 
which on Williamson’s view, and the one endorsed here is required for 
propositional knowledge. But again, just because we do not have a term or 
phrase for such a propositional attitude, does not mean there is no such 
Chapter	6	
	 179	
attitude. Cases like this are aberrant cases and do, in their own right, require 
attention, but I see nothing in them, in principle that calls the multiformity 
principle into question. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
I mentioned in the introduction of this chapter that the multiformity 
principle might have some interesting applications to various problems in 
current epistemology. Therefore, I’d like to conclude by discussing one of 
those possible applications. The Gettier problem, ever since Gettier 
published his famous paper, has become a perennial problem in 
contemporary epistemology. Much has been written about this problem: 
solutions have been proposed, arguments trying to dissolve the problem 
have been proposed and arguments against its validity as a real problem for 
the JTB theory have been proposed.  One of the latest takes on just what 
drives the intuition that in a Gettier scenario something has gone afoul is that 
there is some kind of knowledge undermining luck involved in such cases. 
Pritchard has developed a very sophisticated approach to handling the 
Gettier problem and Gettier-like problems by advocating for a kind of anti-
luck epistemology.78 There certainly is in most Gettier scenarios some kind of 
undermining luck involved and no doubt an approach like Pritchard’s is an 
appropriate way to address the problem of lucky knowledge in such cases. 
However, I’d like to propose an alternative way of conceiving of Gettier 
cases and what exactly is going wrong in such cases. A classic example of a 
Gettier case is the Roddy case. The case roughly goes like this. You are 





appear to be sheep in them. You have no reason to suspect that anything is 
wrong with your perceptual faculties, and there is also no reason to suspect 
that there is any funny business going on in the environment. You do not 
suspect that anyone is putting fake sheep in the fields to fool passers-by into 
thinking that there are sheep. In fact, there is nothing deceptive going on in 
the environment and there are sheep in the field. However, what you take to 
be a sheep, is actually a big dog, that from your vantage point happens to 
look like a sheep. You form the belief that there is a sheep in the field based 
on your perception of what is actually a dog. But just by chance, there 
happens to be a sheep in that particular field, only your view of it is 
obstructed by the dog, since it is directly behind the dog. Thus, your belief 
that there is a sheep in the field is true. Now, according to the standard 
justified true belief account of knowledge, as long as you have a justified true 
belief that there is a sheep in the field, you know that there is a sheep in the 
field. In this case, it is quite reasonable to say that your belief that there is a 
sheep in the field is justified given the fact that you can normally rely on 
your ability to detect sheep. And your belief is true, since there is a sheep in 
the field. Thus, you have a justified true belief that there is a sheep in the 
field. However, it isn’t clear that in this case you know that there is a sheep 
in the field. This is roughly how the case goes.  
The intuition that in such a case a person would lack knowledge despite 
having a justified true belief is shared by many. Intuitions, of course, vary 
but it is reasonable to object to the claim that one knows in such a case. So 
much for the JTB theory of knowledge. Now, the anti-luck theorist is going 
to argue that the reason why one lacks knowledge in such cases is due to the 
presence of a kind of luck in the situation. Pritchard refers to this as veritic 
luck. It is just lucky that you have a true belief in this case, since had there 
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not been a sheep in the field behind the dog, you would have still believed 
(falsely) that there is a sheep in the field. This is a plausible explanation for 
why we might not regard such a case as a case of knowing. However, there 
is another way of looking at this case. If the multiformity principle is correct, 
then there is always a way in which one knows when one knows. So, if you 
do have knowledge in a Gettier case, then there must be a way in which you 
know. But how exactly does the subject know in the case just described? Is 
there a way of knowing that we can point to in such cases to explain the fact 
that the subject knows? In what way could you know that there is a sheep in 
the field? What might just be going on in Gettier cases, what drives the 
intuition that something is wrong in such cases is just the fact that we cannot 
see the way in which the subject is supposed to have knowledge. We 
implicitly endorse the multiformity principle in our everyday knowledge 
attributions, and in such cases, it strikes us as obviously problematic that the 
subject knows, for the very reason that such knowledge is not explained by 
anything. If the subject knows in the Roddy case, then the subject would 
appear to have bare knowledge, that is, she would know without there being 
a specific way in which she knows. This, I think, just strikes us as incorrect. 
Underlying this intuition is the fact that we take knowledge to be the kind of 
thing for which there is some kind of explanation possible. If such an 
explanation is not possible, it strikes us problematic to attribute knowledge. 
The multiformity principle explains the intuition that something is wrong in 
Gettier cases, because the exact thing that is absent from such cases is a way 
of knowing. It may be the case that we also find lucky knowledge 
unacceptable. So, Pritchard’s approach seems a viable way of understanding 
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